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Abstract
Digital information communication technologies (DICTs) play an ever-more prominent role in politics,
from the technologically sophisticated presidential campaign of Barack Obama to the Twitter-inspired
Occupy Wall Street movement. However, not all political groups embrace technology to the same degree.
Little scholarly attention has been paid to understanding why some groups adopt DICTs and use them to
achieve political goals, while others do not. This dissertation attempts to remedy this by examining what
drives DICT adoption among 48 organizations involved in advocacy activities in support of and in
opposition to gay rights and marriage equality. It further contributes to the literature on DICTs and politics
by considering the role of national context in DICT adoption, selecting organizations based in the United
States, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, and comparing patterns of DICT adoption cross-nationally.
Several important findings emerge from this research. First, there is significant variation in the extent to
which the 48 organizations under study adopted DICTs. There appears to be no relationship between
organizational ideology and an organization's tendency to adopt DICTs, nor do the characteristics of the
organizations' staff or target publics appear to influence their adoption of DICTs, although this does seem
to affect the extent to which they deploy offline tools. The paper finds that first-mover advantage plays a
key role in DICT adoption, with laggards finding it hard to build online momentum. Further, the amount of
resources an organization is able to deploy strongly affects their ability to adopt DICTs. A number of
national factors also appear to play a role in DICT adoption, particularly the competitiveness of the issue
that organizations are engaged with, and the political traditions of the nation in which organizations are
domiciled. Overall, this paper finds that the adoption of DICTs is a complex process, born of an interaction
between an organization and its characteristics, and the environment in which it operates. The
dissertation concludes by offering a model of this process, suggesting that it could help organizations
build better strategies for DICT adoption, particularly when circumstances are challenging.
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ABSTRACT

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND DIGITAL INFORMATION COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGIES: THE SEARCH FOR EXPLANATORY MODELS OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS’ PROPENSITY TO USE DICTS IN DEVELOPED
DEMOCRACIES

Felicity Duncan

Michael X Delli Carpini
Monroe Price

Digital information communication technologies (DICTs) play an ever-more prominent
role in politics, from the technologically sophisticated presidential campaign of Barack
Obama to the Twitter-inspired Occupy Wall Street movement. However, not all political
groups embrace technology to the same degree. Little scholarly attention has been paid
to understanding why some groups adopt DICTs and use them to achieve political goals,
while others do not. This dissertation attempts to remedy this by examining what drives
DICT adoption among 48 organizations involved in advocacy activities in support of and
in opposition to gay rights and marriage equality. It further contributes to the literature
on DICTs and politics by considering the role of national context in DICT adoption,
selecting organizations based in the United States, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, and
comparing patterns of DICT adoption cross-nationally. Several important findings
iii

emerge from this research. First, there is significant variation in the extent to which the
48 organizations under study adopted DICTs. There appears to be no relationship
between organizational ideology and an organization’s tendency to adopt DICTs, nor do
the characteristics of the organizations’ staff or target publics appear to influence their
adoption of DICTs, although this does seem to affect the extent to which they deploy
offline tools. The paper finds that first-mover advantage plays a key role in DICT
adoption, with laggards finding it hard to build online momentum. Further, the amount of
resources an organization is able to deploy strongly affects their ability to adopt DICTs.
A number of national factors also appear to play a role in DICT adoption, particularly
the competitiveness of the issue that organizations are engaged with, and the political
traditions of the nation in which organizations are domiciled. Overall, this paper finds
that the adoption of DICTs is a complex process, born of an interaction between an
organization and its characteristics, and the environment in which it operates. The
dissertation concludes by offering a model of this process, suggesting that it could help
organizations build better strategies for DICT adoption, particularly when circumstances
are challenging.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010 a wave of protests convulsed the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
facilitated by the use of new digital information communication technologies (DICTs)
such as mobile phones (Baron, 2012; Comunello & Anzera, 2012; Harb, 2011; Khondker,
2011; Sabadello, 2011; Skinner, 2011; Stepanova, 2011). A year later “Occupy Wall
Street” protestors coordinated a seemingly leaderless global campaign against
contemporary capitalist arrangements using digital tools such as Twitter and Facebook to
spread messages, share logistical information, and mobilize thousands of people in
dozens of cities worldwide (DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012; Gaby & Caren, 2012; Juris,
2012; Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, & Albacete, n.d.).
As these two examples illustrate, DICTS are playing an increasingly prominent, if
still not fully understood role in collective action and social movement politics.1
However, not all social movements engage in the same practices, use the same tools, or
even rely on the internet and DICTs to the same extent. My own research among Tea
Party groups in the United States, for example, found that they did not deploy Web 2.0
tools to organize, instead focusing their recruitment and mobilization efforts on personal
networks, using the “mundane internet tool” (Nielsen, 2011) of e-mail newsletters and email lists to communicate, but also relying on the telephone and regular face-to-face

DICTS are also changing the landscape of more “routine” periods of contention within
institutionalized politics such as elections. For example, in 2012 the Obama campaign again
raised the bar for online electoral campaigning through the use of such things as a dedicated
social networking site, an iPhone application that allowed individuals to act as one-person phone
banks, an endless stream of online video, and a data mining operation that tapped dozens of
databases and online information traces and used sophisticated modeling to identify and reach
prospective voters, supporters, and volunteers (Ghani, 2013; Davidsen, 2013; Kreiss, 2012).
However, while distinguishing institutionalized politics such as elections from social movements
can be increasingly analytically and conceptually difficult (Chadwick, 2007; Masket, Heaney,
Miller, & Strolovich, 2009), my focus in this dissertation will be on the latter.
1

1

meetings. Karpf (2009, 2012) has documented a substantial and sustained gap between
the use of the internet, data, and Web 2.0 tools by tech-savvy progressive organizers and
activists and that of their lagging conservative counterparts in the United States. And, as I
will detail in my literature review, many studies document variation in the use of the
internet among social movements of different stripes in other countries. However, as I
will demonstrate, to date there has been relatively little scholarly attention paid to
systematically identifying factors that may explain variations in the use of DICTS among
such movements, and there has been little attempt to identify variables that hold
explanatory power across different national contexts.
My dissertation contributes to the literature by comparatively examining
similarities and differences in the use of DICTS by social movement advocacy
organizations in three developed democracies; specifically groups organized in support of
or in opposition to gay rights and marriage equality in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Ireland. I am interested in understanding the extent to which variation in
the adoption of digital tools is associated with the characteristics of the actors, including
their ideology, the demographics of the groups they target, their connections to other
organizations, and the dynamics of the political process, including the actors’
relationships to political power. I am also interested in determining whether patterns of
usage and non-usage are similar across different national contexts, and in offering
explanations for these differences.
To achieve this, I draw on data collected through the analysis of secondary
sources, an organizational survey, an in-depth analysis of organizations’ online activities,
and elite interviews. My approach is a hybrid of inductive and deductive research. I start
2

from a set of expectations culled from the existing literature, which I summarize in a
simple heuristic model. However, my approach also allows for the possibility of gaining
new, unexpected insights from my deep reading of my data, my elite interviews, and my
analysis of survey answers (i.e., grounded research – see Glaser & Strauss, 1999). I
incorporate both quantitative and qualitative data in my analysis, and use the insights I
gain to build a new heuristic model that captures the dynamic processes I observe and the
impact that national context and environment has on processes of DICT adoption.
In my first chapter, I will introduce and discuss the various bodies of literature
that inform my proposed project. The second chapter will outline my arguments and the
particular variables I wish to examine. Chapter three provides a detailed discussion of my
proposed methodology and the data I collect. Chapters four, five, and six detail my
findings, offering my analysis of my initial heuristic model, an assessment of the ways in
which DICT adoption differ by country and some potential explanations therefore, and a
description of the modified model that I propose offers insight into the process of DICT
adoption by advocacy organizations.

3

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
This project locates itself in research on the use of DICTS in the organization and
mobilization of collective action (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly,
2001). As such, it draws on several literatures that have often developed independently of
one another. In order to cover this broad terrain, my review of relevant literature proceeds
as follows. I begin with a general introduction to research on politics, the Internet, and
related information and communication technologies. I then briefly discuss the
development and state of research on social movements, followed by a review of the
current state of knowledge about the use of DICTS by social movements. Finally, I focus
more specifically on what the literature tells us about my central research question: which
factors best account for variations in the use of the internet and other DICTs by political
actors.
DICTS and Politics
Digital information and communication technologies, or DICTs, refers to the
constellation of new technologies, tools, practices, and affordances that have emerged
over the past 25 years. As such, this term captures a host of tools that involve the transfer
of digital information from one user to another, from a website to the computer of a
visitor, for example, or from one person’s mobile device to another person’s.
Furthermore, following Salter (2003), I do not wish my use of the term DICTs to be
understood purely as a reference to particular technological tools. DICTs also incorporate
practices and paradigms – they privilege certain skills, for example, and encourage
certain types of behaviors and uses and discourage others. Thus, DICTs is a rich term,
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referring both to tools and to the practices attached to them – both to cookies and to the
uses to which the data gathered by cookies are generally put.
As many scholars have noted (Anstead & Chadwick, 2008; Breindl, 2010a; Earl
& Kimport, 2011; Fung, Gilman, & Shkabatur, 2013; Sibbernsen, 2012), the study of
DICTs (starting most often with the Internet) and their role in politics has generally been
dominated by two schools of thought: technological optimists, who argue that the unique
affordances of online technologies have the potential to revolutionize the practice of
politics, and pessimists, who insist that the constraints of pre-existing power relations and
political structures will be replicated or exacerbated online, and that online tools will be
used for surveillance and the maintenance of power and the status quo. Leading voices
among the optimists include Benkler (1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2003, 2006), Castells (1996,
2009, 2010), Negroponte (1996), Shirky (2009, 2011), and Noveck (2010), while
prominent pessimists include Hindman (2008), Morozov (2011), and Schlozman, Verba,
and Brady, (2012). Over the years, much research and debate has been driven by the
search for evidence that one or the other side is correct.
In the early days of DICTs scholarship, when empirical evidence was still sparse
and much of the writing on the topic came from activists, information scientists, legal
scholars and technologists (Farrell, 2012), those who imagined the new communication
technologies birthing a democratizing revolution in politics dominated the discussion. In
his magisterial trilogy of books on the information age, for example, Castells (1996,
2009, 2010) posited a number of ways in which the new technologies would
fundamentally reshape society, introducing a new age of networked capitalist
development (for a discussion of his themes, see Loader, 2008). These themes continued
5

to have resonance over time, and were echoed in influential works like Benkler’s (2006)
book on social production and networks, which explored the internet’s potential for
enabling new forms of collaborative production of media and material goods, as well as
in Shirky’s (2009) book examining the new forms of collective organization that the
internet enables and speculating as to their democratizing potential. Scholars anticipated
that DICTs would usher in a new era of political engagement worldwide and would
deepen democracy and broaden political participation in technologically advanced
democracies by lowering barriers and costs (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010; Farina,
Newhart, Cardie, & Cosley, 2010; Noveck, 2010; Osimo, 2008). As I will discuss, these
hopes and predictions inspired a great deal of the work on the relationship between
DICTs and politics, with many scholars exploring the ways in which DICTs enable new
forms of collaboration, organization, production, and low-cost communication for
political purposes.
As scholarship developed and empirical evidence began to accumulate, however,
more-pessimistic assessments of the role of DICTs in politics emerged. Scholars noted
the existence of a digital divide; those with access to fewer material and educational
resources were less able to acquire and utilize new technologies for political engagement
and economic purposes, and so faced the possibility of further marginalization (Hargittai
& Walejko, 2008; Hargittai & Litt, 2012, Norris, 2001). In addition, as these technologies
developed, tendencies toward centralization, corporatization, and increased control and
surveillance manifested, leading scholars to conclude that the internet would primarily
replicate or deepen offline patterns of power and authority (Hindman, 2008; Margolis &
Resnick, 2000; Morozov, 2011). Further, many worried that the ease with which DICTs
6

could be used to find ideologically congruent information would lead to political
polarization and ideological segregation and diminish the quality of democratic discourse
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011; Hargittai & Kane, 2008; Sunstein, 2002, 2009; Yardi, &
Boyd, 2010).
More recently, scholars have begun to raise concerns about the role of so-called
“Big Data” in politics (Kreiss, 2012). Campaigns increasingly use a range of public and
commercial databases and data gathered from online tools like cookies to segment and
target voters with greater accuracy and a higher degree of personal tailoring (Ghani,
2013; Hersh, 2013; Issenberg, 2012); researchers worry that such tactics invade voters’
privacy and reduce their political autonomy (Barocas, 2012; Evans, 2012; Tufekci, 2013).
The use of data mining techniques is not limited to political campaigns; social movement
and non-profit organizations also deploy such tools online, raising additional concerns
about privacy and their effect on democratic processes (Delany, 2013; Karpf, 2009,
2010a; 2010b). Despite a number of empirical studies, then, there is as yet no scholarly
consensus on whether DICTs have had a net positive or a net negative effect on the
political realm, or on the context in which effects are likely to be positive or negative. A
debate between these two camps, and research on both sides continues.
These twin themes of optimism and pessimism speak directly to the present
project. Like the optimists, I am interested in examining the ways in which political
actors have used DICTs to innovate in the practice of contentious politics, to form new
collectives and new types of organizations, and to mobilize and engage citizens for
collective action. At the same time, however, in attempting to evaluate what leads to the
differential adoption of online affordances by political actors, I emphasize the limiting
7

factors that constrain patterns of adoption and usage. Like the pessimists, I am concerned
with gaps in online participation and usage and their relationship to material constraints,
as well as to the broader national and institutional contexts in which actors find
themselves. Thus, my project, like many contemporary accounts of DICTs and their
relationship to politics, will tread a middle ground between these poles, noting the ways
in which pre-existing and external structures of power, distributions of resources, and
legal and institutional arrangements limit the democratizing and empowering potential of
the internet, but also noting the ways in which online tools and new technologies have
enabled new forms of collective action, new political identities and coalitions, and new
means of political engagement that represent a change to the practice of politics. As we
move now to an exploration of research on social movements and on the role of DICTs in
collective action, these twin themes – the regressive tendencies and the revolutionary
power of DICTs – will form a backdrop to our overall understanding of the
internet/politics nexus.
Social Movements and Collective Action
The study of collective action has a long history. Early students of contentious
political activity by non-institutional actors, generally groups of citizens with grievances,
initially approached their subjects through the lens of extremism, deprivation, and
violence (Tarrow, 2011). Building on the work of eighteenth century sociologist Emile
Durkheim, disruptive collective action was seen as a symptom of anomie, of dislocation
from traditional roles and identities and the rootlessness that accompanied the Industrial
Revolution (Tilly, 1978, 2006). Scholars theorized that relative deprivation –
impoverishment or the denial to one group of resources that another group possessed –
8

led dislocated individuals in industrial society to embrace violent, disruptive, and deviant
behavior in a bid to redress their grievances. Such perspectives often had a Marxist
inflection; collective action was understood as the almost-inevitable consequence of
inequality and the capitalist production system, which disempowered and exploited
workers. The work of Chicago School sociologists Park and Burgess (1921) added the
idea of irrationality to the study of collective behavior; these scholars proposed the
irrationality of the mob as a model for how riots and protests occurred. The emphasis was
thus on the social psychology of collective action, the ways in which individuals’
deprivation and irrationality led them to embrace deviant, non-normative behavior.
Over time, however, this social psychological paradigm was challenged. Faced
with the peace and civil rights movements of the 1960s, scholars reevaluated their models
of collective action. Researchers, noting that while grievances are ubiquitous, movements
seeking their redress are not, began to ask why certain marginalized groups, but not
others, took action at particular times, but not at others. A new generation of scholars
began to build a theory that defined the object of study, namely social movements, with
greater care, and focused on questions of material, social and cultural resources and the
political environment, emphasizing the roles of organizations, social networks, and
movement and government tactics, a perspective that came to be known as the resource
mobilization paradigm (Olson, 1971; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tilly, 1993,
2004). The emphasis in the study of collective action moved from treating it as aberrant
to seeing it as a part of the political process in a democracy. By reconceptualizing
sustained collective action as a social movement, researchers were able to bring new
models to bear on the study of why and how collective action occurred. In their seminal
9

piece on the resource mobilization paradigm, McCarthy and Zald (1977) explained: “This
approach emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement
phenomena. It examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of
social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support
for success and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements.” (p.
121).
Scholars working in the resource mobilization paradigm have offered various
definitions of social movements that emphasized their distinctiveness from political
parties, interest groups, and revolutionaries. For example, Sydney Tarrow (2011) defined
social movements as “collective challenges [to elites, authorities, other groups or cultural
codes] by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with
elites, opponents and authorities.” (p. 18). He emphasized that social movements involve
sustained engagement – fleeting events like spontaneous riots are thus excluded. Social
movements also involve people who share a purpose and sense of solidarity, who have a
shared identity that inspires them to participate in the movement, and who seek to
challenge elites, thus marking them as a phenomenon distinct from interest groups and
political parties. Finally, social movements engage in sustained interactions with elites,
opponents, and authorities; unlike revolutionaries, they seek to interact with and alter the
system, rather than overthrow it through violent or other means. In a similar vein, Tilly
(2004) defined social movements as a series of contentious performances, displays and
campaigns through which ordinary people make collective claims. For Tilly, social
movements are among the primary vehicles through which citizens engage in politics;
because they involve ordinary people engaged in contention and making collective
10

claims, social movements are distinct from institutionalized collectives like political
parties or lobbying groups.
By clearly defining social movements as the object of study, the field thus moved
away from the social psychology perspective that pathologized collective behavior,
instead treating social movements as enduring, semi-institutional phenomena to be
understood through a structural lens.
Initially, the resource mobilization paradigm emphasized material and political
resources above all else (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). However, as the paradigm developed,
the almost-exclusive emphasis on the mobilization of resources evolved into a more
nuanced perspective that incorporated the role of external political opportunities and
actors, including the media and their framing of movements, as well as emotion,
communication, and the dynamics of political processes (Benford & Snow, 2000; Della
Porta & Diani, 2006; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; McAdam, 1999; Snow,
Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 2001, 2006). This led to the
development of broad frameworks for understanding the dynamics of collective action in
social movements, such as that provided by McAdam et al (1996), who offer three
interrelated factors to explain the emergence, development, and outcomes of social
movements: mobilizing structures, opportunity structures, and framing processes.
Mobilizing structures are those mechanisms that enable people to organize and
engage in collective action, including social structures (for example, the role played by
Black churches in the civil rights movement in the 1960s) and tactical repertoires (such as
the use of sit-ins, occupations, marches, and so on). Opportunity structures refer to
conditions in the environment conducive to social movement activity, including, for
11

example, the accessibility of the political system (how easily those with grievances can
make their needs known to those in power and influence the progress of policy), the
degree of elite alignment or disagreement (that is, the extent to which fractures in elite
coalitions may offer openings for changes to extant political and economic structures),
and the capacity and appetite of the state for repression. Finally, framing processes refer
to strategic attempts by social movement organizations or political entrepreneurs to craft
and disseminate materials that explain social problems in particular ways, to promote
particular attributions of responsibility for those problems, and to suggest certain
remedies. As we shall see, most of the work on the impact the internet has had on social
movements has focused on its effects on mobilizing structures and on framing processes.
Linked to these concerns, a number of challenges that social movements had to
overcome were identified within the resource mobilization paradigm. One of the primary
challenges is the so-called free rider problem, which Olson (1971) identified as a key
constraint to collective action. Essentially, even when people hold a common grievance,
they have little incentive to organize into a group to seek redress. Organizing and
participating in collective action is costly, while the benefit of such action is uncertain
and potentially limited. Thus, each individual in a potential collective has a material
incentive to free ride on the actions of others, reaping the reward of action without
personally incurring the costs. Overcoming this tendency came to be seen as one of the
primary tasks of social movements, and mobilizing structures, in particular formal
organizations, were seen as the most important way to do this (Bimber, Flanagin, &
Stohl, 2005). Specifically, formal organizations were seen as central to the
communicative and organizational work involved in collective action including “locating
12

and contacting appropriate participants, motivating them to make private resources
publicly available, persuading them to remain involved despite short-term setbacks and
long-term risks, and coordinating their efforts appropriately.” (Bimber, Flanagin, &
Stohl, 2005: p. 368). This paradigm thus placed social movement organizations (SMOs)
at the center of analysis, and focused on how such organizations emerged and developed,
coordinated the mobilization of people and resources, and guided the process of claimmaking.
The resource mobilization paradigm identified a second crucial challenge facing
social movements once it incorporated the social constructionist perspectives of framing
theory, namely the challenge of creating and disseminating compelling issue frames in
the face of usually hostile mass media (Benford & Snow, 2000; Della Porta & Diani,
2006; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford,
1986). Media attention is a crucial resource for social movements, but media are prone to
produce unfavorable representations of movements, with a tendency to emphasize
violence and deviant behavior, and to simplify or distort movement messages (Della
Porta, 2011; DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012; van Laer, 2007). Attracting media attention
and influencing the frames of the movements presented by the media thus posed a second
major challenge for social movements.
A great deal of scholarship on collective action has organized itself around these
concepts: around the life cycle of the social movement in terms of emergence,
development, and outcomes; around the structuralist framework of mobilizing structures,
opportunity structures, and framing processes; and around identifying the tactics social
movements use to overcome the challenges of free ridership and attracting sympathetic
13

media coverage. To some degree, the contemporary resource mobilization paradigm
captured in MacAdam et al’s (1996) framework remains a dominant model for the study
of social movements. However, increasingly an alternative model of contentious
collective action called new social movement (NSM) theory, which has a more social
constructionist bent, also informs scholarship.
As Buechler (1995) explains, NSM theory emerged in response to the resource
mobilization paradigm’s emphasis on material and structural factors, including the
material origins of grievances, which were often seen as rooted in Marxist economic
identities. For NSM theorists, a range of identities beyond those catalogued in Marxist
thought, including gender and sexual orientation, can serve as a source for collective
claims-makings. NSM theorists generally agree that symbolic action in the cultural
sphere can be seen as a legitimate form of political action, that post-materialist values
emphasizing quality-of-life issues beyond material sufficiency are a major contemporary
motivator of political and collective action, that collective grievances are socially
constructed rather than having a priori structural origins, and, importantly, that
submerged, latent, and temporary networks often undergird collective action rather that
the centralized and formal social movement organizations prominent in the resource
mobilization account (Buechler, 1995: p.442). This paradigm thus allows for a
conceptualization of collective action that is subtly different from that of the resource
mobilization paradigm, with an emphasis on a broader range of grievances, and multiple
forms of networked organization and political action, and a lesser focus on the role of
formal organizations and material resources – as we will see, these ideas have special
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resonance with the ways in which social movements and collective action have changed
with the spread of the internet.
If we incorporate NSM theory into the existing definitions offered by the resource
mobilization paradigm, we may define social movements as networks of individuals,
characterized by varying structural forms and degrees of centralization, that are engaged
in sustained collective action over grievances rooted in a shared identity, and who pursue
their goals using various forms of collective action and communication. This definition is
broad, and we can foresee some of the objections raised by various scholars to
conceptually separating social movements from interest groups, political parties, or even
voters during elections. In all cases, there are networks of people, shared identity, and
political goals pursued through various forms of collective action (Bennett, Breunig, &
Givens, 2008; Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005, 2012; Bimber, Stohl, & Flanagin, 2009;
Chadwick, 2005, 2007; Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006; Masket, Heaney, Miller, &
Strolovich, 2009; van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004). However, in the following discussion I
will maintain the distinction between institutional and non-institutional collective
contentious political action, and focus on the literature around social movements and
DICTs.
DICTs and Social Movements
From the earliest research on DICTs and politics, scholars anticipated that DICTs
would have a profound impact on social movements. Traditionally, as Chadwick (2007)
explains, “Social movements [have eschewed] hierarchy, and [depended] upon mass
mobilization to achieve their aims because they have usually been excluded from
participation in mainstream channels or because they have deliberately sought to work
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outside the system to avoid cooption. Typically, participants in social movements have
encouraged methods of organization and decision-making that are self-consciously
nonhierarchical, consensual, and participatory.” (p. 285).
As habitual outsiders in the political system, social movements’ ideological
preference for nonhierarchical, consensual, and participatory forms of organization was
seen as ideally suited to the internet age. The internet, conceptualized as a decentralized,
open, and flexible platform, and as a mass medium able to connect individuals across
time and space, seemed to offer enormous opportunities for social movements to organize
more cheaply and effectively, and to build more diverse networks. However, as time has
passed, social movement organizations have displayed a great deal of variation in the
extent to which and in the manner in which they have adopted DICTs.
To shape my discussion of how social movements’ adoption of DICTs has varied,
I will consider the matter under three headings: organization, communication, and
repertoires. Note that the separation into these three areas is largely arbitrary; the effect of
DICTs on movement practices and structures is dynamic, and effects on various aspects
of collective action are interrelated. The same mechanisms appear to mediate DICTs’
effects across these three areas, and as you will see, similar themes and arguments have
been made in each. However, this separation has the utility of providing a structure for
this discussion, and for suggesting particular expectations and variables that will be
useful for the present project. I will conclude the literature review by considering the
various explanatory hypotheses offered by the literature to account for differences in the
extent to which particular movements adopt online tools and new organizational forms.
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Organization. As I have defined them, social movements consist of networks of
individuals, whether in the form of a close-knit community or a loose-knit group of
strangers, who are mobilized to pursue a common goal through collective action. The
processes of finding potential movement participants, mobilizing them to participate in
collective action, and coordinating their actions in the pursuit of movement goals are the
primary organizing tasks facing social movements. Generally, the literature has found
that most social movements have their origins in the labors of political entrepreneurs,
highly motivated individuals or small groups who share a political identity and a
grievance and seek to organize a larger network of people around that identity and
grievance.
The main challenge facing these movement entrepreneurs, as alluded to earlier, is
the free-rider problem. The free-rider problem can be expressed by the question: how do
individuals overcome the lure of free ridership to form groups and take collective action?
Traditionally, the answer has been two-fold: first, that people must be inspired to
embrace a shared identity that makes movement participation seem necessary; and
second, that a formal organization must be created to manage movement participants’
activities and to maintain the movement network and the engagement of members. Both
of these processes – identity cultivation and institution formation – are the work of
organizing. Organization, both as process and as institution, is thus central to social
movements, and DICTs have had a number of dramatic and profound effects on social
movement organization in both senses (Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008; Bimber,
Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005, 2012; Bimber, Stohl, & Flanagin, 2009; Chadwick, 2005, 2007;
Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006; van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004).
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Shared identities. As described, social movements emerge when political
entrepreneurs begin to search for and recruit potential participants. In general, this
process involves tapping into existing social networks and spreading a sense of shared
identity and grievance among their members, and then coordinating those who identify
with the cause to take particular actions. DICTs have changed all of these aspects of this
process through their effect on costs, and their ability to activate networks and spread
identities. In order to mobilize people to take collective action, it is first necessary to
convince them of the need for such action, that is, to foster within them a political
identity and a sense of grievance, which generates feelings of solidarity and the desire to
engage in action. Shared identities, thus, are central to the formation and maintenance of
social movements. A number of scholars have argued that the internet can be used to
generate a sense of solidarity and to share common grievance frames across social
networks (Brainard & Siplon, 2000; Myers, 2000; Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, &
Albacete, n.d.; van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004). Many observers of the Arab Spring have
hypothesized that the formation of a shared identity was one of the key contributions that
online tools made to the movements. Harb (2011), for example, argues that the key role
that social media played in the Arab Spring was the dissemination of information, action
frames, and images through social networks that helped to foster a sense of collective
identity among protestors and thus to encourage them to participate in anti-regime
activities, an argument echoed by Zhuo, Wellman, and Yu (2011), Wolfsfeld, Segev, and
Sheafer (2013), Axford (2011), Howard and Hussain (2011), and Stepanova (2011).
In the online environment, political entrepreneurs are able to cheaply and easily
produce communications materials and disseminate them through social networking sites,
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e-mail chains, and websites. The internet is particularly good at facilitating the spread of
messages and frames through pre-existing social networks, as motivated individuals are
able to easily share them with friends and family on social networking sites and through
personal e-mails. As Kavada (2012) shows in her study of the use of social networking
sites for identity building by transnational progressive social movement organization
Avaaz, social movements make use of a number of web features such as comments, share
buttons, like buttons and so on, to promote shared identities and allow members to
communicate with one another to foster a sense of solidarity. In a similar vein, in their
study of the digitally organized protests against copyright reform in the European Union,
Breindl and Briatte (2013) find that one of the key roles of DICTs was to enable highly
interested parties (political entrepreneurs) to generate and share a collective action frame
around the issue of copyright, thus building an online, and ultimately offline,
transnational community with a shared identity, a sense of solidarity, and motivation to
engage in political action. Likewise, Calderaro (2010) noted the role that e-mail listservs
played in facilitating discussion, engagement, and the generation of shared identities
among protestors and activists at the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa.
The role of DICTs in fostering shared identities is not, however, uncontroversial.
Some scholars have argued that online tools and mediated communication cannot create
the type of strong bond among individuals that forms the basis for the intensive and longterm commitment required to cause political change, arguing that such tools are too
individualizing and remote to foster collective identity. Fenton and Barassi (2011), for
example, conducted ethnographic research among trade unionists in Britain, and found
that online tools such as social networking sites encourage a highly individualized style
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of engagement that activists viewed as inimical to the formation of collective identity and
the promotion of collective frames and action. In another example, in her study of the use
of e-mail listservs and the role of face-to-face communication among activists connected
to the Global Justice Movement, Kavada (2010) found that while e-mail enabled activists
to express their individuality and the movement to manage diversity, divergence, and
individual autonomy, face-to-face contact was critical for promoting unity, convergence,
and a sense of collectivity. DICTs alone, she argued, were not able to generate the sense
of solidarity and connection required to fully engage people in social movement.
In response to such criticism, however, one can point to work by Bennett (2012),
who contends that in the contemporary political environment, citizens increasingly reject
collectivist identities, instead seeking a more-personalized expression of their political
interests. He argues that contemporary social movements can, in the digital environment,
capitalize on this new feature of political engagement by offering potential movement
participants highly individualized access points to the movement. In a study of two social
movement organizations that arranged protest events during the 2009 G20 London
summit, for example, Bennett and Segerberg (2011) note that one organization, Put
People First (PPF) was able to mobilize citizens by offering them a broad frame for
action (putting people first) and allowing them to personalize their engagement with the
movement by attending protests with their own slogans, or providing their own messages
to G20 organizers through the PPF portal. In contrast, another organization, G20
Meltdown, offered highly specific frames for collective action and a particular identity
for participants, and was less able to motivate and mobilize citizens (see also Bennett,
2008; Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008; Bennett & Segerberg, 2009).
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Thus, we can conclude that one of the ways in which DICTs facilitate
organization for social movements is through the dissemination of collective action
frames that foster a shared political identity among potential movement participants,
whether that identity is highly specific or more diffuse – consider, for example, the
Occupy Wall Street frame “We are the 99%,” a broad catch-all that participants were able
to personalize to fit with their political orientations and personal identities while at the
same time serving as a collective identity that bound participants together (DeLuca,
Lawson, & Sun, 2012; Gaby & Caren, 2012; Juris, 2012).
Accordingly, one of the crucial ways in which I expect DICT adoption to vary
among organizations will be the extent to which they use online tools to foster collective
identity, and the ways in which they do so
The process of organizing and the form of organizations. Beyond spreading
identities through networks, however, DICTs also have an effect on the practical and
logistical side of social movements’ organization. One of the key mechanisms here is
cost. In Olson’s (1971) work, free ridership was understood to be an issue because the
cost of creating and of participation in a social movement was great; communication was
expensive, and large, costly organizations were needed to recruit and coordinate
members, and to solicit resources. The internet has the potential to dramatically lower all
of these costs (Bennett & Segerberg, 2009, 2012; Garrett, 2006, van Laer 2007). Mass
communication using DICTs displays an interesting cost pattern: the marginal cost of
reaching the nth recipient is virtually zero, and the cost of reaching multiple recipients is
virtually equal to the cost of reaching one – think of the cost of adding a single recipient
to an e-mail versus the cost of adding a hundred recipients, and compare that to the cost
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of mailing one letter versus the cost of mailing one hundred letters. In the internet age,
mass dissemination of movement messages becomes dramatically cheaper. In addition,
online tools like shared calendars, websites, online donation portals, and information
tools like electronic databases have the potential to make organizing, aggregating
resources, and coordinating efforts significantly cheaper and less complex. Thus, the
costs and labor of organizing are reduced in the information age.
This radical restructuring of the cost of organizing opens up an intriguing
possibility which Clay Shirky (2009) calls “organizing without organization.” The idea of
groups organizing in the absence of large, formal organizations has become a popular
preoccupation among academic researchers as a result of the remarkable successes of
projects like the development of the Linux operating system and the popular
encyclopedia project hosted at Wikipedia.com, which are made possible by the
development of cheap communication and workflow management tools that can be
accessed by individuals located anywhere (Shirky, 2009; Karpf 2010b, 2011; Lev-On &
Hardin, 2008). These projects have seen large groups of individuals seemingly
spontaneously organizing to produce complex goods, and have raised the idea of open
source politics, which is the notion of citizens spontaneously and without central
leadership forming groups to achieve complex political goals – social movements without
the social movement organizations (Karpf, 2010b, 2011; Kreiss, 2010; Lev-On & Hardin,
2008).
Many have seen this form of organization in the Occupy protests of 2011
(DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012; Gaby & Caren, 2012; Juris, 2012; Theocharis, Lowe,
van Deth, & Albacete, n.d.). Researchers have noted that no particular centralized body
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organized Occupy protests, although the idea for the protests was rooted in a call for the
occupation of Wall Street from Canadian anti-consumerist group Adbusters, who
themselves described the proposed occupation as America’s Tahrir, a reference to the
Tahrir Square protests in Egypt in 2010. Nevertheless, rather than relying on a central
formal organization, Occupiers used a range of social media tools to coordinate protests
and spread information (DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012; Gaby & Caren, 2012; Juris,
2012; Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, & Albacete, n.d.). Although Juris (2012) shows that
more-formal social movement organizations are now emerging from Occupy networks,
particularly at the local level, the main period of protest occurred without the central
presence of formal organizations. This may thus be seen as an example of organizing
without organizations.
However, as Karpf (2010b, 2011) notes, the example of Wikipedia suggests that
such open source projects ultimately require management structures in the form of
enforceable community norms, and that key individuals will emerge as more-central
nodes in the informal network, a phenomenon that Theocharis (2012) has documented in
Occupy-related Twitter networks. In other words, even without formal organizations,
organizers are necessary (an observation that many observers have drawn attention to in
the case of Linux production; the Linux open source production process works largely
thanks to the fact that there is a small, central group of people organized around founder
Linus Torvalds that contribute most of the work to the project and that organize and
monitor others’ contributions). Further, it appears as if the emergence of some kind of
formal organization is almost inevitable in such “organized without organization”
projects, such as the Wikipedia Foundation and the Linux Foundation (Karpf, 2010b,
23

2011). Thus, while the internet facilitates the spread of identities and to a certain extent
enables “organizing without organizations,” social movement organizations are by no
means obsolete in the internet age. Social movements still require some type of formal
organization in order to retain momentum and to act strategically over the long-term;
what is changing is the form and mode of operation of social movement organizations,
and this is an important topic for study (Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008; Bimber,
Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005, 2012; Bimber, Stohl, & Flanagin, 2009; Chadwick, 2005, 2007;
Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006).
Social movement organizations have long been a feature of the social movement
landscape, particularly since the 1970s, when enduring organizations emerged from the
major movements of the era (Karpf, 2009, 2012). Typically, social movement
organizations followed the usual bureaucratic organizational template, and tended
towards hierarchical and centralized structures. Consider, for example, the National
Organization for Women, an organization born in the 1980s from the women’s
movement (National Organization for Women, n.d.). This social movement organization
has a formal, hierarchical structure and a large staff, as well as offices in Washington
D.C.. It coordinates actions and campaigns among members, and priorities are decided
largely at the center of the organization, although individual chapters have some freedom
to pursue their own local agendas. The structure of NOW is typical of social movement
organizations that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, although even older organizations
have a similar structure – Karpf (2012), for example, described the structure of the prowilderness Sierra Club, founded in 1892, in terms of its centralization, reliance on
hierarchy, and tendency to follow particular bureaucratic routines.
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DICTs, however, allow social movement organizations to take new and powerful
forms by changing the costs and labors involved. Consider MoveOn.org, which was
founded in 1998 as an online petition which gathered half a million signatures to ask
Congress to censure then -president Bill Clinton and ‘move on’, instead of proceeding
with an impeachment over his sexual involvement with a White House intern.
MoveOn.org grew from there, defining itself as a progressive movement organization and
organizing protests, campaigns, and pledge drives for various progressive issues.
Although it may not appear to be a traditional social movement organization,
MoveOn.org does represent the organizational hub of a decentralized network of people
that share a political identity as progressives and pursue common goals through the use of
various protest tactics, and thus meets the requirements of the earlier definition of social
movements. Indeed, MoveOn.org is now widely regarded as the paradigm example of an
online, internet-age social movement organization, and is seen as having redefined the
concept of the social movement organization (Brasted, 2012; Carty, 2010, 2011; Kavada,
2012; Vromen & Coleman, 2013).
On the cost side, the effect of the internet on MoveOn.org’s structure is profound.
MoveOn.org has a very modest budget. It has no physical offices; its small staff generally
works from home. A rotating staff is hired during busy campaigns, with a lot of authority
over how those campaigns are run, but they are only temporary employees, for the most
part, MoveOn.org operates with a small staff, few of whom are located in Washington
D.C., where most social movement organizations typically base themselves. Since its
inception, MoveOn.org has relied on low-cost internet tools such as an easily accessible
online fundraising application hosted by actblue.com, the low-cost medium of e-mail,
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and, in its earlier days, the free internet service Meetup.com, which served as a portal for
coordinating volunteers before MoveOn.org started to host its own portal. In his book on
progressive online organizing, Karpf (2012) draws a contrast between the low budget and
limited staff complement of a decentralized and flexible organization like MoveOn.org,
which claims to have five million members, with the large budget and staff and complex,
hierarchical structure of an established advocacy group like the Sierra Club that has just
1.4 million members. The internet, he argues, and the many organizing tools it offers for
little to no cost, changes the underlying structure of social movement organizations
(Karpf, 2012).
Admittedly, the literature has not been unequivocal on this point. At least one
author has found that the process of moving organizing efforts online can in fact create
new, burdensome costs for organizers of collective action, including a dramatic increase
in the amount (and a concomitant reduction in the value) of communication which places
a drain on time and cognitive capacity, as well as difficulties in coordinating across
multiple platforms and ensuring that efforts are not replicated (Nielsen, 2009). In the
course of an ethnographic study of a volunteer group involved in the 2008 Democratic
U.S. presidential primaries, Nielsen (2009) found that volunteers described being
overwhelmed with the volume and disorganization of information and communication
generated by active participants online, to the point where they reportedly abandoned the
use of online tools during the busiest organizing period of their campaign. Nevertheless,
most of the literature agrees that cost reduction on the organizational end is a key feature
of internet-enabled activism. Thus, I anticipate finding that social movements will tend to
utilize DICTs to reduce their costs, although their use of low-cost online tools will differ.
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Moreover, the effect of DICTs on social movement organizations goes beyond
reducing their budgets; the day-to-day practices social movement organizations engage in
and the ways in which they coordinate activities, set priorities, and engage with members
have also changed with the advent of DICTs. MoveOn.org, for example, uses DICTs to
give its members greater voice in the decision-making processes of the organization.
MoveOn.org staff develop a list of possible priorities for the organization each year, and
members vote on which they believe should be the top ones, and the organization
frequently circulates polls to a subsample of its five-million member mailing list
soliciting feedback on current campaigns, member priorities, and other topics. Thanks to
DICTs, member polls and feedback can be quickly analyzed and incorporated into
movement strategies. MoveOn.org also uses so-called a-b testing, which involves sending
different versions of a message to two random samples of the mailing list and observing
which message generates greater feedback or higher contributions and then using these
observations to refine messages that are then circulated among the rest of the membership
mailing list (Karpf, 2012). This use of rapid online testing means that MoveOn.org is able
to quickly refine messages and respond to member preferences, thus making it better able
to mobilize members. MoveOn.org also frequently invites members to create videos, host
their own events, start MoveOn Councils in their areas through the MoveOn.org website,
create their own online petitions, and engage in a number of other actions that offer
members opportunities to engage, contribute to the movement’s agenda, and, as discussed
in the previous section, participate in the creation and maintenance of a shared identity.
These structures for engagement and participation are innovations in the social
movement space and in the use of DICTs. By using the communications infrastructure
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and interactive tools of the internet, MoveOn.org has found new ways to engage and
organize members. DICTs have enabled social movement organizations to take on a new
form – small, lightly staffed, decentralized and not located in any particular physical
place, with an emphasis on using digital tools to solicit member feedback, either with
their conscious knowledge, as in the case of inviting members to vote on priorities, or
without it, for example, by monitoring which e-mail appeals are more likely to be opened
and using those data to design future appeals. Carty (2011) describes MoveOn.org and
similar organizations like GetUp! in Australia and Avaaz on a global level as multi-issue
internet-mediated organizations in recognition of their tendency to switch across a
number of issues in line with trending topics in the news, and of their absolute reliance on
DICTs for their operation (Carty, 2011; Karpf, 2012).
However, the extent to which social movement organizations adopt new
organizational forms and incorporate digital tools in their organizational management
repertoires differs. Indeed, most social movement organizations do not deploy DICTs to
the same degree or in the same manner as MoveOn.org. In a study examining American
social movement organizations’ web use, for example, Stein (2009) surveyed a number of
organizational websites and measured the extent to which they incorporated various
functionalities. She found that organizations primarily used their websites for information
provision, with few websites offering functionalities or tools related to coordinating
action, engaging in fundraising, making lateral linkages with other organizations, or,
especially, allowing for interaction and dialog, and permitting creative expression from
members. Thus, I anticipate that social movement organizations will adopt the new
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organizational forms enabled by DICTs to different degrees; this will be another key
dimension along which actors’ adoption of DICTs will vary.
Communication. In the preceding section, I noted the ways in which DICTs
affect the cost of communication, and the role that cheap communication tools like e-mail
can play in fostering collective identity and thus helping to overcome the free-rider
problem. However, these technologies affect communication in social movements in
other ways too. In particular, DICTs offer social movements a tool to overcome another
key challenge: spreading their message beyond movement participants and ensuring that
they are framed in a favorable way in the mass media. As I alluded to in the discussion of
the history of collective action research, work in the framing paradigm has informed the
study of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000; Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Gamson,
Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986).
Essentially, this literature argues that one of the key tasks facing social movements is
creating resonant frames for social problems that can be adopted by non-participants and
that can then inform policymaking.
For Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986) frames are schemata that
organize information and provide structures for interpretation, and are used to make sense
of the world and to influence people. By promoting particular frames – for example,
framing gun control as an encroachment on personal freedom – social movements unite
people and prompt them to take action. In describing the mechanics of framing, Entman
(1993: 53) writes “To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them
more salient … in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
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interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendations for the item
described.”
Entman identifies four aspects of frames: first, problem definition, which
identifies the problem, conflict or controversy under consideration; second, causal
interpretation, which suggests the causes underlying the problem; third, moral evaluation,
which suggests to the reader how the event should be morally categorized; and finally,
treatment recommendation, which concerns the course of action suggested, either
implicitly or explicitly, to remedy the problem. The task of social movements is to create
resonant frames for understanding the issues with which they engage and to promote that
frame among non-participants. In doing this, movements face two challenges. First, they
must develop frames that have cultural and political resonance and that appeal to a broad
group of people. Second, they must find ways to promote their frames in the face of mass
media that generally resist movement attempts to control framing and that tend to focus
on the deviant or disruptive aspects of collective action rather than the political messages
activists are attempting to share (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). DICTs offer tools for
overcoming both of these challenges.
Creating resonant frames. In the online environment, social movements are more
easily able to generate resonant frames. First, through commons-based production,
movements can incorporate suggestions and improvements from many members into
movement messages (Tatarchevskiy, 2011). Members can contribute images, videos,
poetry, essays and many other pieces of media that can frame the movement’s message in
various ways. Then, a second aspect of the internet, namely its ability to monitor
feedback and use reputation systems such as “likes” to raise or lower the profile of an
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item, can help winnow out less-appealing frames and draw attention to successful ones.
For example, Gaby and Caren (2012) described how certain posts on Occupy Facebook
pages attracted a large number of “Likes” and how those “Likes” corresponded to more
members joining Occupy groups. In one example, a photograph of an elderly man with a
particularly touching and well-crafted protest sign became the most popular picture on
one Occupy group page – movement members can track what frames resonate with
audiences through feedback mechanisms like this. Finally, virality on the internet, which
is the phenomenon whereby certain items such as online videos become suddenly
popular, attracting a very large number of views in a very short period of time, can act as
another tool indicating to social movements when they have found a resonant message
(Nahon, Hemsley, Walker, & Hussain, 2011).
Frame circulation. A second way in which DICTs have affected communication
in social movements is by offering movements new options for circulating their frames.
Traditionally, social movements were highly reliant on mass media for spreading their
messages. Indeed, many movement tactics, such as sit-ins or large protest marches, were
designed specifically to attract media attention in the hope of spreading movement
messages to a broader public (Benford & Snow, 2000; Della Porta & Diani, 2006;
Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; McAdam, 1999; Snow, Rochford, Worden,
& Benford, 1986; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 2001, 2006).
With the emergence and spread of DICTs, however, social movements have a
range of new options for communicating their messages. For example, DeLuca, Lawson
and Sun (2012) show how, in the early days of the Occupy Wall Street occupation of
Zuccotti Park in downtown Manhattan, while the mass media largely ignored the
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activists, occupiers were still able to circulate their messages through political blogs,
social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook, and mass e-mails. While the few early
news stories published on the Zuccotti Park occupation tended to treat it as a laughable
exercise, multiple framings of the event were diffused through the internet, with millions
of people reading blog posts, Tweets, e-mails and status updates that offered alternative
frames (DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012). The authors also offer evidence that such frames
spread among non-participants by noting post-Occupation changes in poll data indicating
the degree to which Americans perceived income inequality as an important problem.
This suggests that, at least to some degree, movements today are able to influence frames
by circumventing news media. This change in the media environment is quite profound;
indeed, Cammaerts (2012) argues that the communicative environment in which social
movements operate has altered to such a degree that he introduces a new concept, the
mediation opportunity structure, to capture the new opportunities available to movements
in their engagements with discourse, media, and networks of people. In the new
environment, social movements have a greater number of tools available to them for
circulating frames and producing media content, and this creates new opportunities for
movements to promote their frames and achieve political goals (Cammaerts, 2012). By
using low-cost digital tools to produce and circulate media, and by tapping into social
networks among participants and beyond to source and spread messages, social
movements can, in the internet age, create and circulate messages outside traditional
channels, thus overcoming the challenge of disseminating their messages to a broad
audience.
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Repertoires. As discussed earlier, from the perspective of movement organizers,
DICTs have changed the cost of organizing and thus helped to overcome the free-rider
problem. But beyond this, DICTs have also changed the cost calculus for potential
participants and thus had a far more direct impact on the centrality of the free-rider
problem for social movements. Indeed, in their various collaborations looking at
collective action and behavior in the digital age, Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl (2005,
2006, 2009, 2012) argue, inter alia, that DICTs lower the cost of participation to the point
where it is no longer sensible to speak of individuals making a binary, cost-based
decision on whether or not to participate in movements. As Bimber et al (2005) explain,
many of the first steps to participation in social movements in the internet age are
virtually costless – sharing information about an issue with friends through a social
networking profile, for example, or signing an e-petition. Thus, individuals do not make a
single, cost-based decision to participate or not, but instead incrementally involve
themselves in collective action through small, iterative and low-cost steps. This, the
authors argue, reduces the centrality of the free rider problem in contemporary collective
action. Instead of inducing potential participants to make a single decision to participate,
movements can now move people along an action tree, from easy, low-cost/costless
action to donation to offline activity (Bimber et al., 2005). In other words, by adding to
social movements’ tactical repertoires and creating a new menu of potential actions for
participants to take, DICTs have altered the process of member recruitment as well as the
nature of the collective actions taken by movement participants.
Much empirical work has noted the widespread use of low-cost online action
tactics by social movements (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010; Harlow & Harp, 2012;
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Mosca, 2010; Breindl, 2010b, 2013). Brunsting and Postmes (2002), for example, in an
early study on the topic of online and offline activism, describe in some detail how the
internet opens up new methods of protest, including online versions of offline tactics such
as petitioning and letter-writing, and more extreme forms of action such as rioting and
sabotage, which find online expression through things like dedicated denial of service
(DDoS) attacks or malicious hacking and website vandalism. In another example,
Badouard and Monnoyer-Smith (2013) examined how activists have used website linking
strategies to influence policymaking in the European Union with a relatively high degree
of success (see also Breindl, 2010b, 2013 for a discussion of how activists effectively
used various online actions to influence EU policy on intellectual property). Van Laer
and Van Aelst (2010) usefully offer a two-dimensional typology for understanding the on
and offline tactical repertoires used by contemporary social movements (see Figure 1.1,
taken from Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010: p. 4, below).
Along the first dimension, activism is understood as either internet-supported or
internet-based. The internet can facilitate internet-supported actions, such as sit-ins and
occupations, in that online tools can help organize such actions, but they are not native to
the internet. In contrast, internet-based tactics expand the toolkit available to social
movements by introducing innovative new tactics that are only possible online, such as
hacktivism, which refers to aggressive online tactics such as the previously mentioned
DDoS attacks. The second dimension ranges from low to high-threshold actions. Lowthreshold actions require relatively little effort, commitment, or risk on the part of those
taking action, while high-threshold actions are risky, and difficult, and require a high
degree of commitment. It is actions in the bottom right quadrant of the matrix formed by
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these dimensions that are the kind of “virtually costless action” that Bimber et al. (2005)
argue have reduced the centrality of the free rider problem for contemporary social
movements. Sending an e-mail as part of an e-mail bomb campaign is a costless, low-risk
action that is easily taken by a person who sympathizes with the goals of a particular
social movement but is not yet ready to undertake a more intensive action; it is a
plausible first step on the ladder to greater participation.

Internet
Supported
High
Threshold

Internet
Based

More violent action/
destruction of property

Hacktivism
Culture
jamming

Sit-in/occupation

Transnational meeting/
demonstration

Protest website/
alternative media
Email bomb/
virtual sit in

Legal
demonstration
Consumer
behavior

Low
Threshold

Donate
money

Online
petition

Figure 1.1: A typology of a new digitalized action repertoire (Van Laer & Van Aelst,
2010 p. 4)
Some observers have criticized such low-cost online action as “clicktivism” or
“slacktivism”, arguing that this kind of remote, costless activism lacks the impact of
traditional collective action, often conceptualized in terms of use of physical bodies in
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space, as in protest marches or occupations (Gladwell, 2010; Shulman, 2009). They have
also expressed concerns that such clicktivism could result in displacement, that those who
would ordinarily participate in costlier and more effective forms of collective action may
substitute low-cost online actions, thus rendering social movements less potent as a force
for change (Cornelissen, Karelaia, & Soyer, n.d.).
However, scholars have offered rebuttals to this argument. Karpf (2010a), for
example, points out that low-cost online actions are typically only one aspect of a given
social movement’s repertoire, and that such actions often serve not only as a means of
engagement for participants, but also as a way for organizers to collect data on matters
such as which issues are particularly important to potential members. Furthermore, such
low-cost online actions have been found in some studies to be correlated with offline
actions – taking an online action can, it seems, lead potential participants in a social
movement to greater levels of participation. In a survey of activists in the United States
and Latin America, for example, Harlow and Harp (2012) find that online activism was
seen as a precursor or complement to more costly offline activism, and Brunsting and
Postmes (2002) found a high correlation between taking offline action and taking online
action, suggesting that perhaps online action does not substitute for offline action among
highly engaged participants; such individuals take part in both forms of action.
In summary, new forms of online action offer social movements new
opportunities to engage participants. They offer non-participants a low-cost way to begin
to engage in collective action, and can lead to higher levels of engagement. Further, such
actions can serve as a useful source of data for social movement organizations.
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Having outlined the various dimensions of social movements’ adoption of DICTs,
I will now discuss some of the explanations offered for the differing degree to which
various movements and social movement organizations adopt online tools. In the
preceding sections, my emphasis has been on the dimensions along which social
movements’ adoption of DICTs is expected to vary. In the sections that follow, I will
present a comprehensive account of the explanatory variables that the literature offers to
account for this variation.

37

CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS AN EXPLANATORY MODE OF VARIATION IN
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ORGANIZATIONS’ ADOPTION OF DICTS
In the literature there is relatively little theorizing on what determines the extent
to which particular social movements will utilize DICTs. Implicitly, most work seems to
assume that if the tools are available, political entrepreneurs will adopt them as needed.
Further, there is no work of which I am aware that considers the influence of national
context on the extent to which social movements adopt DICTs. Most scholarship on this
subject implicitly assumes that movements will adopt DICTs, regardless of national
context or individual characteristics, simply because such technologies have obvious
utility for movements. This is, thus, a relatively under-theorized aspect of social
movement studies. There is, however, some scholarship suggesting various movementlevel factors that may influence the degree to which a given social movement or social
movement organization will adopt DICTs and incorporate them in daily praxis. I will
examine these briefly.
Diffusion
Some researchers suggest that diffusion processes are one way in which the use of
online tools for collective action spreads; one might thus anticipate that groups that are
connected to other groups that already use online tools are more likely to make use of
them themselves (Earl, 2010). For example, as Vromen and Coleman (2013) note in their
study of Australian social movement organization GetUp!, many of GetUp!’s tactics are
drawn from the repertoire of America’s MoveOn.org, with which GetUp! has many
personal contacts and shared political goals. Similarly, in work on the Arab Spring,
several scholars noted that the innovative online (and offline) tactics used in Tunisia were
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adopted by Egyptian activists during their protests thanks to both media reports on
Tunisian tactics and contacts between Tunisian organizers and their Egyptian
counterparts, including the use of social networking sites for repertoire sharing
(Comunello & Anzera, 2012; Khondker, 2011; Sabadello, 2011; Skinner, 2011;
Stepanova, 2011).
Indeed, one of the main features of the internet is that it allows for activists in one
country or location to easily communicate with activists in another country or location –
it facilitates transnational and inter-organizational linkages (Mosca, 2010; Calderaro,
2010; Garrett, 2006; Van De Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004). These linkages can
serve as a pathway for the transmission of best online practices. Thus, one would
anticipate that social movements and social movement organizations that cultivate
linkages with peers in other countries or with successful organizations in their own
country are more likely to be exposed to and to adopt innovative online practices. As
Karpf (2009, 2012) points out, such linkages are most likely to be between movements or
groups that share a similar ideological position, as for example the links between
MoveOn.org and GetUp!, which are both progressive, are and thus certain practices may
be more common among ideologically similar groups across countries than ideologically
dissimilar groups within them. When examining my data, I will look for evidence that
groups that cultivate linkages with peers at home and abroad are more likely to adopt
innovative online tactics and tools, although this may vary between ideological networks
depending on the extent to which ideologically similar peers have themselves adopted
such tools.
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Group Characteristics
A common assumption in the literature is that younger people are more likely to
make use of online tools than their older counterparts, who may be less comfortable in
the digital environment (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010; Collin, 2010). Xenos and Foot
(2008), in particular, make a strong argument that young people have a different
relationship to DICTs than their older counterparts, and are significantly more
comfortable using online spaces to take political action and interact with others. Indeed,
Bennett (2008, 2012) argues that among the young, political participation looks very
different than it does among older cohorts thanks in large part to the development of
DICTs. Bennett (2008) notes that in many developed Western democracies, young people
are increasingly disengaged from conventional politics – they do not vote at the same rate
as older people, and do not join political parties and so on. Nevertheless, they engage in
political action by other means; Bennett describes their approach as “social movement
citizenship” (Bennett, 2008: p. 8), a form of engagement that involves online and offline
collective action in the pursuit of goals like human rights promotion, environmental
protection and so on. He attributes this in part to dysfunction in traditional political
institutions, but also to the more personalized, interactive, and creative style of political
engagement facilitated by DICTs. Overall, younger people are seen as more likely to use
DICTs for political purposes and more comfortable with doing so. There is reason to
think that this youth advantage in online politics may extend to the realm of collective
action and social movements.
In my own unpublished research on the Tea Party, for example, I found that local
Tea Party groups across the northeast of the United States were unlikely to use DICTs for
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organizing beyond the use of e-mail newsletters. I hypothesized that one of the reasons
why the movement failed to adopt online tools was that many of its local-level organizers
were retired people who expressed discomfort with DICTs. These individuals, who also
tended to be older, expressed a reluctance to take online actions and engage with the
movement through DICTs; this hypothesis is in line with the finding of a survey by the
Pew Research Center that Tea Party members tended to be older than the average for the
United States (Frome, 2010). The demographics of Tea Party participants and organizers
thus made online tools an unsuitable choice for organizing. We may therefore conclude
that the characteristics of social movements’ organizers and members – their
demographics and personal comfort with online tools – may play a role in determining
the degree to which a social movement will adopt DICTs.
Ideology
In his dissertation and in the updated book version thereof, Karpf (2009, 2012)
notes a substantial innovation and adoption gap between how progressives, or the Left, in
the United States use DICTs compared to their conservative counterparts on the Right.
While the Left has innovative social movement organizations like MoveOn.org, highly
active online political communities like the blog-based community of the Daily Kos, and
institutions to support online activism such as the aforementioned ActBlue online
fundraising toolkit and the New Organizing Institute, a training and networking
organization for progressive activists, the Right has failed to develop a competing online
architecture (Karpf, 2009, 2012). This gap in online facility has translated, he argues, into
an electoral advantage for the Democrats in the United States, which is likely to be
sustained unless Republicans and the Right are able to build their own online capacity.
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In seeking to explain this gap, Karpf posits three tentative hypotheses. The first is
that there may be an inherently top-down quality to conservatism that diminishes the
Right’s interest in developing interactive, open, and democratizing online portals. As
Karpf (2009) explains, this argument holds that the Right in the United States is less
populist and less interested in mass mobilization or community organizing than the Left,
and that its members are embedded in more traditional organizations such as churches,
and thus do not need to look online for community (p. 238-242). Karpf himself dismisses
this explanation, arguing that it does not stand up to historical scrutiny in that the Right
has a long tradition of community organizing and collective action innovation, as well as
a tradition of engagement with new media technologies such as talk radio. Nevertheless,
given the many examples of progressive online organizing in democracies worldwide,
such as the global justice movement (Kavada, 2010; Mosca, 2010) and the environmental
movement, it is worth exploring what role, if any, ideology plays in the adoption of
particular internet-based organizational structures and organizing practices. It may be
that, when examining social movements and collective action writ large, rather than just
in the American context, the role of ideology is central to explaining variation in the
usage of DICTs for political purposes.
Out-party Innovation
The second hypothesis that Karpf (2009, 2012) advances to explain the digital gap
between the Left and Right in the United States is that the Left was forced to innovate
online because the Democrats were out of power when interactive web technologies
initially developed, a period which he dates to the mid-2000s, and specifically to the
second administration of former U.S. President George Bush. Karpf hypothesizes that the
42

Left’s out-party status encouraged it to experiment with new organizing tactics, and that
because the emergence of interactive web technologies happened to coincide with the
period in which the Left was out of power, progressive activists chose DICTs as the
venue for their political experimentation.
The idea that being under political pressure encourages innovation has venerable
antecedents. Mayhew (1974/2004), in his discussion of legislators’ actions, argued that
legislators facing a greater electoral challenge were more likely to innovate in their
campaigns, and such dynamics have indeed been found to play out in campaigns over
time. Karpf argues that a similar process may have driven progressive activists to
innovate during the Bush years; because they had little formal voice in politics as a result
of the electoral losses of the Democratic Party, progressive activists were driven to use
innovative tactics to make themselves heard, to influence policy, and to engage networks
of people who shared a progressive identity during a period in which that identity found
little expression in institutional politics. As DICTs were, at the time, emerging and
developing, they were a natural forum for Left wing innovation at a time when the Left
found it difficult to make its political voice heard.
It is important to note that this hypothesis hinges on the existence of a close
relationship between social movement organizations and political parties. After all, social
movements are generally conceptualized as being outside of formal institutional politics,
and so would have a perpetual incentive to innovate in that they would always be an “outparty.” In Karpf’s argument, however, social movements and social movement
organizations are seen as being integrated, to a greater or lesser degree, with formal
political parties. This view sees political parties through a particular lens, the parties-as43

networks lens that understand political parties in the United States as networks made up
of “candidates and officeholders, formal party officers, loyal donors, campaign staffers,
activists, allied interest groups, social movements, and friendly media outlets.” (Masket
et al, 2009: p. 4; see also Schlesinger, 1985; Koger, Masket, & Noel, 2009; Skinner,
Masket, & Dulio, 2012).
In order for the out-party innovation hypothesis to be credible, close ties – either
ideological or in the form of overlapping networks of members – must exist between a
social movement and a party that is out of power. In the American context, it is clear that
such ties exist. For example, Heaney and Rojas (2011) demonstrate how the peace
movement in the United States has been strongly influenced by the electoral fate of the
Democratic Party. When the Democrats were out of power in 2007/2008, anti-war
protests saw a large increase in participants, many of whom, as Heaney and Rojas (2011)
determined through the use of surveys, identified themselves as Democratic Party
members and activists. However, when the Democrats returned to power in 2008/2009,
participation in anti-war protests declined and, as the authors discovered, that decline was
due to the absence of participants who identified themselves as Democrats. To the extent
that similar ties exist between parties and movements in other countries, I expect that
those social movements that are aligned with parties that are out of power will be more
likely to innovate than those that are aligned with incumbent parties, and that this
innovation will take place in part online, where there are opportunities for groups that are
unable to make themselves heard in the mainstream to craft and disseminate messages, as
discussed earlier. This is the explanation Karpf (2009, 2012) favors for explaining the
relative innovativeness of the American Left. I intend to conduct research that will test
44

this explanation. As I will describe more fully in my methods section, I will be including
data from three culturally similar advanced democracies, in order to explore the extent to
which this explanation is generally applicable (rather than being unique to the American
progressive institutions that Karpf considers).
First-mover Advantage
The final explanation Karpf (2009, 2012) advances for explaining differential
levels of online innovation between the American Left and Right is a corollary of the outparty innovation hypothesis. Essentially, he suggests that the Left, because it was forced
to innovate during the second Bush administration, enjoys a first-mover advantage
online, and that this limits the Right’s ability to develop interactive online portals and
communities. Karpf gives many examples of how, when the Right attempts to open up
online forums to user input, they face ‘trolling’ by the multitudes of already-active
progressive internet users, while online progressive forums enjoy such scale that
conservative trolls are unable to overwhelm them in a similar fashion. For example,
when, in the wake of Barack Obama’s victory in the 2008 presidential elections, a group
of young Republicans launched a website called ideas.rebuildtheparty.com to solicit input
from conservatives on how to improve the party’s campaign strategies, progressive
pranksters flooded the site with joke recommendations such as “Hire more ninjas,” which
became the most popular suggestion on the site (Karpf, 2009: p. 253-254).
Karpf argues that this vulnerability to trolling is a function of the development life
cycle of online hubs. Citing the example of Wikipedia, he describes how online sites
experience a five-stage growth process, which he describes as: “(1) beginning with a tiny
group of lead adopters who co-create the good, (2) expanding to a larger early adopter
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class which is highly motivated but less technically skilled, (3) launching into the much
larger early majority class, whose motivation and skill level is more varied and whose
size pressures the system to adapt, (4) adopting protections against spammers and
malicious attacks as the site attracts the late majority class and becomes recognized as
“valuable online real estate,” and (5) dealing with challenges to institutional power
structures.” (Karpf, 2010b: p. 14). In this process, it is only when a site has developed in
scale and reach at the fourth stage that it becomes valuable online real estate, or, put
another way, that it becomes effective and important. He argues that prior to reaching this
scale, online hubs need to be free to develop under the radar starting with a small group
of early innovators. However, because of the first-mover advantage enjoyed by online
progressives, conservative online hubs do not have the luxury of developing organically;
instead, “nascent [conservative] communities … face challenges and attacks before the
necessary community-of-interest has formed to protect [them].” (Karpf, 2009: p. 252). It
is plausible to imagine the first mover advantage accruing to any group in a particular
issue space. For example, if anti-immigration activists in a particular country are able to
develop a strong online presence and a large, engaged network of interested supporters,
subsequent attempts to develop an online presence by those favoring immigration may
face difficulties if the existing community of anti-immigration activists chooses to troll
their sites or otherwise resist their development. I thus anticipate that social movements’
tendency to adopt DICTs will be influenced by the extent to which they face oppositional
first-movers in the online space, and will search for evidence of such a relationship in my
data.
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A Proposed Model for Understanding Social Movement Adoption of DICTs
While the extant literatures on DICTS and politics, social movements, and the use
of DICTS by social movement organizations do not provide anything like a
comprehensive model for DICT adoption by social movement organizations, they do
provide the building blocks for constructing a contingent and partial one. Consistent with
the “hybrid” and “iterative” approach to research I mentioned in my introduction (and
will develop further below), the purpose of developing such a model is largely heuristic;
that is, to help guide my research and initial expectations, while allowing for my findings
to in turn refine my conceptual model. Drawing on prior research, my model includes
five possible explanatory factors for explaining DICT adoption, with the latter
conceptualized as having six interconnected components (see Figure 2.1). Further, I nest
the overall model within national context, as I will explain below.
As can be seen, my explanatory variables include “diffusion,” or the adoption and
use of DICTS through a kind of learning from other organizations with which one
regularly interacts; “group characteristics” such as the age or income levels of a
movement’s membership and/or organizational leadership; “ideology,” or how a
movement’s philosophy does or does not fit with the arguably more interactive, less
hierarchical qualities of DICTS; “out-party innovation,” or the extent to which DICTS
are most useful to organizations with less access to more mainstream forms of
communication and information dissemination; and “first-mover advantage,” or the
extent to which the DICT environment becomes controlled by whomever “colonizes” this
space first.
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In addition, and again drawing on the literature discussed above, my heuristic
model also lays out the specific uses to which DICTS can be put by social movement
organizations, and that collectively make up what I mean by “DICT Adoption.” These
include: fostering shared identities among members; facilitating new forms of
organizational structure and logistics; developing and producing frames for
understanding the issue(s) central to the movement and disseminating these frames
(directly and through other media outlets) to members, other relevant organizations, and
the larger public; motivating and facilitating action among members/participants through
the provision of low-cost forms of participation; gathering and utilizing online data to
assist in the activities described above; and, embracing internet-based activism as a
legitimate and valuable form of social action.

National context

Diffusion
Adoption of DICTs
Group characteristics

1.
2.
3.

Ideology

4.
5.

Out-party innovation

6.

Fostering shared identities
Organizational structure
Developing, producing and
disseminating frames
Engaging participants with lowcost action
Gathering and utilizing online
data
Embracing internet-based
activism

First-mover advantage

National context
Figure 2.1: Model of social movement organizations’ adoption of DICTs
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While my approach to exploring the relationships among these five explanatory
variables and six outcome variables will be inductive and grounded, the literature
discussed earlier does provide suggestions for starting points. Specifically, the literature
leads me to the following expectations.
First, I expect that the more connected a social movement organization is to other
organizations, the greater will be its adoption of DICTs. Second, I anticipate that the
demographic characteristics of social movement organizations’ members and organizers
will affect the degree to which organizations adopt DICTs. In particular, I expect that
organizations with younger, wealthier, and more educated members and organizers will
adopt DICTs to a greater extent than organizations with older, less wealthy, and less
educated members and organizers. Third, in the literature there is a suggestion that
movement ideology plays a role in DICTs adoption, specifically, that organizations that
are more politically progressive are more likely to adopt the democratizing, engaging,
and open tools available in the internet age. I thus anticipate that the more progressive an
organization, the more likely it is to be an intensive adopter of DICTs. Fourth, as
discussed in the literature review, social movement organizations that are at political odds
with the incumbent party may have a greater incentive to innovate with DICTs, and thus I
expect that the less aligned with a social movement organization’s objectives the political
party in power is, the higher that social movement organization’s adoption score will be.
Finally, I have noted that some scholars have theorized that social movement
organizations attempting to use DICTs may face an uphill struggle if ideological
opponents are already highly active online, and thus I expect that the less active social
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activists who are ideologically opposed to a given movement are online, the higher that
social movements’ adoption score
The above expectations will serve as a guide to the both the types of data I will
gather and to the analysis to which I will subject that data. I hope to assess my data in the
light of these expectations, noting areas of convergence and divergence with my
expectations, and using these as a springboard to develop an account of why social
movement organizations use DICTs in different ways.
A core part of my argument throughout will be that the use of DICTS by social
movement organizations is likely to be context dependent. This context includes the
kinds of factors shown in my model, which capture the context particular to individual
social movement organizations, but also variations that are tied to different national
political, social and cultural conditions and histories. Without considering these nationlevel differences it is difficult to know how “transportable” empirical findings (and the
theories on which they are based) are. This is a particular concern in the present study as
most of the research identifying factors that influence the use of DICTS by social
movement organizations that informs my approach has been conducted in the United
States. In order to better understand the relationship among democratic political systems,
social movement organizations, and the role of DICTs, then, it is helpful to examine
movements in a cross-national perspective. Such an approach will enable me to begin to
draw out what aspects of national culture and politics may be affecting the ways in which
social movement organizations deploy DICTs in the pursuit of their political goals. As I
will describe in chapter three, I will therefore select various countries for inclusion in my
study, and explore how DICT adoption varies across national contexts. Although my
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conclusions will therefore be subject to certain limitations imposed by my research
design, I nevertheless offer insight into the role that national level factors play in DICT
adoption by comparing organizations to peers in other nations, an issue that has
heretofore been neglected by the literature.
Conceptually, then, I will be examining the extent to which the model described
above, supplemented by any additional factors that emerge during my inductive research
process, explains variation in social movement organizations’ adoption of DICTs across
the countries I select, and comparing the levels and patterns of adoption within the three
countries to see whether or not I can identify any salient differences across different
national contexts. I will then attempt to link such differences to country-specific factors
that offer possible explanations for national variation.
Having offered a simple model of the specific elements I will be exploring in an
attempt to better understand how and why organizations adopt DICTs to different
degrees, I will now turn to a discussion of the specific methodologies I will be using to
examine these, and the types of data I will bring to bear on these elements.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODS
This project aims to examine the extent to which the organizational factors that I
have drawn from the literature and outlined in Figure 2.1 are associated with differences
in the adoption of DICTs by social movement organizations, to assess whether part of the
variation in social movement organizations’ adoption of DICTs is explained by their
national context (as opposed to their individual characteristics), and finally, to offer
additional, inductively developed explanations for variations in adoption with reference
to both organizational and country characteristics. To achieve this, I propose a multipronged, small-n methodological approach, drawing on data gathered through the
analysis of secondary sources, an organizational survey, semi-structured elite interviews,
and a systematic examination of the content and structure of organizations’ websites.
Using these data, I will attempt to parse out the degree to which the various explanations
advanced by the literature hold true for the organizations I examine, to note any crossnational differences in patterns of DICT adoption, and to develop additional explanations
for variation in the use of DICTs.
While my approach cannot offer conclusive evidence of causal relationships
between the proposed explanatory and outcome variables2, I argue that it offers a great
deal of value to the literature on the topic of the use of DICTs for political purposes. As
the only systematic, cross-national examination of these questions of which I am aware,

2

There is an extensive philosophical literature on the subject of causality, and much debate on the nature of
the phenomenon and the appropriate methods for demonstrating its existence (for overviews, see Brady &
Collier, 2010; King, Keohane & Verba, 1994; see also Falleti & Lynch, 2009; Gerring, 2010; GrzymalaBusse, 2011). Broadly speaking, however, scholars agree that for a causal relationship to exist between two
variables, the following criteria must be met. First, the causal factor must precede the outcome factor in
time. Second, there must be a demonstrable association between the causal factor and the outcome factor
such that variation in the first is associated with change in the second. Finally, all other potential causal
factors must be accounted for. Measured against these criteria, the qualitative, cross-sectional study I am
proposing is inadequate to the task of demonstrating causality.
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the present study will contribute to the field by offering an empirical test of proposed
explanations, by documenting cross-national variation, and by providing evidence as to
whether or not suggested explanatory factors are similarly important across national
contexts. This will have the ancillary benefit of contributing to ongoing debates about the
homogenizing power of the internet versus the determining power of national context.
The Selection of Countries for Analysis
The first step in conducting this project is to select countries for inclusion in the
study. Generally speaking, there are two possible approaches one might take to
conducting a transnational comparison. The first is to choose countries that maximize
differences across key explanatory variables; for example comparing nations with
radically different political systems, economic development, or technological
sophistication that have similar values on an outcome variable. Such an approach enables
a researcher to explore how different levels and sets of explanatory variables lead to
broadly similar outcomes, and enables him or her to hypothesize about the relationships
between various explanations and the outcome. The second approach is to compare
similar nations that vary in terms of the outcome in order to control for certain broad
explanatory variables and to enable the researcher to determine what more-subtle
differences may account for differences in the outcome.
My approach comes closer to the latter. I made this choice for several reasons.
First, I am interested in the factors that explain DICT use by social movements beyond
the obvious, such as those related to the availability of these technologies. This means the
nations I choose should be similar in their levels of DICT development. Second, I am
interested in understanding variations in the use of DICTS by social movements in
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developed democracies. Scholars have argued that political activists in the Middle East
turned to DICTs in order to circumvent state-owned media and to preserve their
anonymity in the face of political repression (Axford, 2011; Harb, 2011; Howard and
Hussain, 2011; Stepanova, 2011; Wolfsfeld, Segev, & Sheafer, 2013; Zhuo, Wellman, &
Yu, 2011). One would not reasonably expect such dynamics to influence the behavior of
social movement organizations in a democratic country like the U.S., where the media
system is more accessible and where state repression is more limited. Similarly, the use
of DICTs by activists in poor and technologically underdeveloped nations is also likely to
be driven by different factors than their use by peers in advanced economies, as the levels
of access, penetration, and available resources are different. Thus, comparing countries
with very different forms of government would not enable me to distinguish unique
factors that operate specifically in developed democracies. Third, as I will discuss below,
I am interested in holding constant the nature of the specific issue(s) focused on by the
social movement organizations I study; this requires me to choose cases where similar
issues are politically relevant. Fourth, practical considerations of language, access,
availability of relevant data, etc., necessarily influenced my choice of nations.
I therefore chose to conduct a most-similar-systems study, comparing countries
that are similar on several key independent variables such as their political systems and
levels of economic development, in order to identify what other, more-subtle national
differences might lead to differences in the adoption of DICTS by social movement
organizations. Specifically, the countries I have selected – Ireland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States – share many common characteristics. First, they share a number of
political features including civil rights that permit citizens to organize and act
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collectively, and regular, competitive elections, which suggests that contentious
collective action in these countries will follow broadly similar patterns; this is in contrast
to autocratic countries, for example, in which contentious politics and the role of the
internet therein are quite different (Axford, 2011; Baron, 2012). They also have similar
levels of economic development – according to the World Bank they are all high-income
countries; in 2011 per capita income in US dollars in the United Kingdom was $37,780, it
was $48,620 in the United States, and $39,150 in Ireland (World Bank, 2013a). These
similarities will enable me to control, to a certain extent, for the effect of democracy, free
speech, and socio-economic development on the use of the internet in collective action.
In addition, these countries have similar levels of internet penetration: according to
World Bank data, in 2011 U.S. had 78.2 internet users per 100 people, the United
Kingdom had 81.7, and Ireland had 76.8 (World Bank, 2013b). Thus, any differences in
patterns of DICTs adoption by social movement organizations cannot be plausibly
attributed to differences in access to technology. Furthermore, there are ideological
similarities among these nations. All three are characterized by a left-right political
spectrum, all three have tended to embrace, to a greater or lesser degree, neoliberal
economic policies, and all face similar societal divisions over social issues such gay
rights, abortion and reproductive rights (Bartlett, 2010; Bew, 2007; Childs, 2012; Jenkins,
2012; Jones, & Norton, 2013; Kuklick, 2009; Weaver, & Rockman, 1993). Thus, the
persuasive task facing social movement organizations in all three countries are similar,
and the contexts in which they operate are also broadly similar. By comparing similar
systems, I will be able to control, to a certain degree, for these obvious independent
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variables, and thus more easily to identify less-obvious factors that may account for
different patterns of adoption in the three countries under consideration.
There are, of course, also many differences among the countries; differences that I
hope will help me better understand the dynamics of DICT adoption in developed
democracies. For example, the laws governing the online realm differ across countries, as
do their political cultures, histories, and partisan dynamics, and any of these differences
that could be plausibly expected to affect patterns of DICT adoption by social movement
organizations within these three countries. As I showed, the question of country-level
factors that may affect social movement organizations’ adoption of DICTs has not yet
been addressed by the literature, and I therefore have no systematic expectations for how
the pattern of DICT adoption will vary across countries. Nevertheless, by comparing
three similar systems and drawing on various sources of data, including my elite
interviews, I hope to be able to make some tentative suggestions as to how national
context may affect the ways in which social movement organizations engage with DICTs
beyond those organization-level explanations covered in the model presented above.
The Selection of an Issue for Analysis
In considering how best to select organizations within my chosen country, I
explored the ways in which other studies selected their subjects. Most of the studies I
considered confined themselves to a single country and often, to a single organization
selected for convenience, and no study that I am aware of that offered a convincing
method for randomly sampling from a clearly defined population of social movement
organizations. However, a study by Stein (2009) that used a random sampling technique
to gather a sample of social movement organizations in order to analyze their websites
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provided some inspiration. Stein (2009) drew a random sample from organizations listed
in the Encyclopedia of Associations: National, which provides information on non-profit
membership associations in the U.S. that have national scope and reach. Stein (2009)
used the index to find organizations that are associated with keywords linked to particular
social issues such as the environment and media reform, and then selected a stratified
random sample based on those issues. A key benefit of her approach was that, by
selecting organizations on the basis of the issues with which they engage, she was able to
obtain a sample of organizations that deal with politically important social issues that
have attained national prominence; in other words, she was able to ensure that her sample
included organizations that are actively involved with topical social issues. I thus elected
to begin the process of identifying suitable organizations for inclusion in my study by
identifying an issue that has attained prominence in the three countries under study.
I made this choice for a number of reasons. First, I chose to focus on a single
issue out of a desire to avoid introducing too many potential explanatory variables into
my analysis. I am already considering three countries. If I were to then consider multiple
issues across these countries, my analysis would be made unnecessarily complex. My
goal was to identify a single issue that was attracting the attention of social movement
organizations, political players, and the general public in all three of the countries under
study. Further, I looked for an issue that involves a degree of contention between liberal
and progressive elements, as one of the key factors in my heuristic model relates to the
role of ideology in DICT adoption. I also wanted an issue that had attracted the support of
similar groups across the three countries under question. For example, I rejected
immigration as an option, as the differences among the countries under study were too
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great. In the United States immigration has supporters and detractors across the political
spectrum, and the issue is made more complex by the American tradition of welcoming
immigrants and the unique economic relations that exist between the United States and its
neighbors. In Ireland, immigration debates are intertwined with debates about Ireland’s
relationship to the European Union, from which most of its immigrants originate, and
Ireland’s long history as a source of emigrants, while in the United Kingdom, most
migrants hail from former British colonies, and immigration debates tend to split more
clearly along partisan lines. I thus preferred to find an issue that had a greater degree of
similarity across the three countries under study.
Ultimately, I identified gay rights as the issue I would focus on. Gay rights, and in
particular, the issue of marriage equality for same-sex couples, has attracted attention
from both conservative and progressive elements in the countries under consideration. As
noted, one of my goals is to compare conservative and progressive organizations, and the
selection of organizations that have played some role in debates around gay rights makes
such a comparison possible. Over the last few years, the issue of same-sex marriage has
attained a high degree of prominence in the three countries under consideration, with
proponents and opponents engaging in protests, marches, and other forms of collective
action. In the U.K., same-sex marriage was recently legalized after a significant battle for
public opinion (“Same-sex marriage becomes law,” 2013); in the U.S., a Supreme Court
battle over the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in late 2013, and the
legalization or prohibition of same-sex marriage by a number of states has raised the
prominence of the issue (“Supreme Court bolsters gay marriage,” 2013); and in Ireland, a
referendum will be held in 2015 on the issue of same-sex marriage in the wake of
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extensive campaigning on the issue (“Referendum on gay marriage,” 2013). The issue
was thus prominent and actively contested in all three countries under study during the
period in which I gathered my data.
In addition, the contours of the debate around marriage equality were similar in all
of the countries under consideration. In all three countries, as I will show, liberal and
progressive political parties, organizations, and individuals advanced the cause of samesex marriage citing the principles of equality before the law, fairness, and personal
freedom as reasons for the legalization of same sex marriage. In all three countries,
conservative groups, individuals, and political parties opposed same-sex marriage, citing
religious prohibitions and traditional family values as key reasons for their rejection of
marriage equality. Economic issues played only a marginal role in the debate, typically
when issues of access to tax benefits for married couples were discussed, and by and
large, the tenor of the debates in both countries was broadly similar, an assessment I
made based on reading 338 news articles on the topic of gay rights and marriage equality,
as I will discuss below.
The Selection of Organizations for Analysis
Having thus identified both the countries and an issue to focus on, my next task
was to identify the particular organizations that would be included in my study. In
deciding how best to select subjects, I considered a number of alternative methods. First,
I considered using a list of registered organizations such as that used by Stein (2009).
Registered non-profits or charities, lists of which are available in all three countries under
consideration, are, however, not identical with social movement organizations; they
include organizations providing services in an apolitical fashion, and thus do not fulfill
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the terms of the definition of social movements provided in the literature review. The
U.S. offers lists of registered lobbyists, which capture a certain type of politically
engaged organization, but the definition of a lobbyist is also not identical with that of a
social movement organization, and neither the U.K. nor Ireland currently maintains a
registry of lobbyists. There is no standardized list of registered social movement
organizations in any of the countries under study, and thus no readymade sampling frame
that I could access. I then considered using a web search to identify suitable
organizations. However, as my interest is in the use of DICTs by social movement
organizations, relying on an online search to identify suitable organizations would put me
at risk of selecting on the dependent variable, which can lead to biased estimation of
relationships among independent and dependent variables in any regression-type analysis
where a researcher is attempting to link explanations to outcomes (Collier & Mahoney,
1996; Geddes, 1990; Lustick, 1996). Ultimately, I chose to select organizations based on
neither their legal status nor their web presence, but rather on the basis of their media
prominence. Specifically, I identified organizations for inclusion in my study by
conducting a search of newspaper archives for references to organizations that were
involved in collective action around the issue of gay rights.
In order to identify suitable pro- and anti-gay rights organizations, I conducted a
search of the archives of two national newspapers in each of the countries under study,
namely the New York Times and The Wall Street Journal in the U.S., The Guardian and
The Times in the U.K., and The Irish Times and The Irish Independent in Ireland. I
searched two years of archived material, from September 2011 to September 2013 for
reference to gay rights, same-sex marriage, and marriage equality. After eliminating
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duplicates and irrelevant pieces, I was left with 338 articles. I examined each of the 338
articles I found, and listed any organizations that were identified in the articles as having
been involved in some form of collective action with respect to gay rights, noting those
organizations that were mentioned most frequently. Using this approach I identified 53
organizations in the three countries under study that were mentioned in the news
coverage. These organizations are listed in Table 3.1 below. Thirty of the organizations
were described advocating on behalf of gay rights and marriage equality, while twentythree were reported as opposing the extension of certain civil rights such as the right to
marry to homosexuals. The organizations listed in Table 3.1 meet my definition of social
movement organizations as they have been engaged in collective political action over
shared grievances related to a prominent social issue. In addition, they represent a group
of organizations that has succeeded at the tasks of fostering shared identity, mobilizing
individuals, and taking action. There is a possibility that there is a relationship between
the degree to which the organizations use DICTs and their success in attracting media
attention. However, this is not necessarily the case. Organizations that attract media
attention will typically be those that have coordinated a significant collective action
event, such as a large protest, which is certainly possible in the absence of DICTs, as the
long history of collective action indicates. Indeed, using this method is perhaps the only
way to identify organizations that have succeeded in organizing without using DICTs, as
well as those that have succeeded with using them. Thus, by using this method I have a
reasonable chance of finding successful social movement organizations that have
organized without using DICTs, as well as those that rely on DICTs for their
effectiveness.
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Table 3.1: Organizations involved in collective action around the issue of gay rights
United Kingdom

United States

Pro-gay rights

Anti-gay rights

Pro-gay rights

Campaign for
Homosexual Equality

Society for the
Protection of Unborn
Children

LGBT+ Liberal
Democrats

Gay marriage no thanks

Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and
Defenders
Gay and Lesbian
Alliance Against
Defamation

Gay and Lesbian
Humanist Association

Catholic Truth

Homosexual Law
Reform Society

Ireland

Anti-gay rights

Pro-gay rights

Anti-gay rights

American Family
Association

Gay & Lesbian
Equality Network

Iona Institute

MassResistance

LGBT Noise

Irish Episcopal
Conference

Marriage Equality USA

Concerned Women for
America

Marriage Equality
Ireland

Youth Defence

Anglican Mainstream

DignityUSA (Catholic
Church)

Focus on the Family

Changing Attitude
Ireland

Family & Life

The Lesbian & Gay
Foundation (LGF)

La Manif Pour Tous

Out & Equal

National Organization
for Marriage

Gay & Lesbian Unions
Eire

Evangelical Alliance
Ireland

LGBT Network

Evangelical Alliance

Human Rights
Campaign

Defend the Family

L.inC

Ireland Stand Up

OutRage!

Freedom to Marry

Campaign for Children
and Families

Outhouse

Council for the Status
of the Family

Queer Youth Network
(Q.Y.N.)

Family Equality
Council

Institute for Marriage
and Public Policy

OutWest

Lesbian and Gay
Christian Movement

Gender Public
Advocacy Campaign

Stonewall

Lamda Legal

Americans for Truth
About Homosexuality
Heterosexuals
Organized for a Moral
Environment
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Rainbow Support
Services
BeLoGTo

By selecting only the most active organizations, I am also biasing my sample
towards organizations that have succeeded. However, this is not necessarily a conceptual
problem for this study. My goal is not to determine whether DICTs affect organizations’
success, but rather to identify what factors are associated with the use or non-use of
DICTs by organizations. Thus, selecting successful organizations should not bias my
analysis, but will rather aid me by making it easier to obtain the information I need.
I do not claim that this selection process has resulted in my obtaining a random
sample representative of a population. My sample is non-random, and includes only
successful organizations that have attracted media attention and that engage with a
particular subset of social issues. However, my sample has been selected to ensure that I
obtain a selection of organizations that are free to differ in terms of their adoption of
DICTs, that meet the criteria for the type of organization that interests me, and that are
sufficiently large and successful to be able to provide the type of information I require for
my analysis. As I analyze the patterns of relationships among the factors I plan to explore
in this portion of the study, I will keep in mind the limitations of the set of organizations
that I have selected.
Having outlined how I selected my cases for this study, I will now move to a
discussion of the specific methods I used to gather the data I needed in order to evaluate
and explore my heuristic model, as well as providing some detail on the types of data I
have collected.
Gathering Data on Political and Legislative Environments
In order to contextualize the environments in which the organizations I have
selected operate, I gathered data on each country’s key political institutions, system of
63

government, and communications environment. These data were drawn from secondary
sources, and included data related to laws governing the behavior of social movement
organizations, with particular attention to any laws addressing the use of DICTs. The goal
of my analysis of national context is to explore any cross-national differences I find in
how organizations in these three countries adopt DICTs. Thus, my goal in gathering data
on the political and legislative contexts within each country is to find information that
will be useful for understanding the ways in which the countries under study are similar
or different, with the intention of ultimately linking these differences to any crossnational variation.
As noted, I was unable to identify any country-level variables in the literature that
scholars have advanced as explanations for transnational variation in the adoption of
DICTs by social movement organizations in developed democracies. Thus, my task is to
determine whether the patterns of adoption differ across the three countries under
consideration by gathering data on these organizations, and then to offer plausible
explanations of the particular national factors that may affect their adoption of DICTs.
The background research I have conducted serves as a starting point for such
theorization; it will be supplemented with qualitative data drawn from interviews, as I
will explain below. Although I do not know a priori which particular factors will prove to
be important, I anticipate that three core areas of difference are likely candidates:
differences in the laws involving internet governance, differences in political culture, and
differences in the intensity of competition over social issues.
As an example of how such issues may be relevant, consider laws around the use
of data on the internet. The laws related to the use of cookies differ in the U.S. and the
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European Union; in the E.U. websites are required to provide visitors with a notice saying
that they use cookies and requesting user permission to do so. This may potentially
discourage organizations in Ireland and the U.K. from using cookies as intensively as
organizations in the United States. However, the warning only notes that cookies are
used, and offers no information on the number or full purpose thereof, and so this may
not be a disincentive to use a large number of cookies, but may only affect the decision of
whether or not to use cookies at all. I will, therefore pay close attention to such laws and,
during my collection of organizational data, to any national variation in the pattern of
cookie use. Should the sites in the E.U. show less inclination to use cookies, this may
suggest that disclosure laws affect organizations’ propensity to gather data online, an
important issue for scholars who argue that regulation is needed to protect online privacy.
This is one example of how national context may inform my theorizing about what
factors affect organizations’ adoption of DICTs. In chapter five, I discuss cross-national
differences in patterns of adoption, and attempt to theoretically link those to the data I
have gathered on national political and legislative contexts.
Gathering Data on Organizations
Having outlined the manner in which I selected social movement organizations
for inclusion in my study and how I collected background data on the environments in
which they operate, I will now turn to a closer consideration of the types of data I
collected about the organizations themselves. My data-gathering efforts fell into four
primary categories. First, I conducted an in-depth analysis of each organization’s web
presence. I did both a close reading and a systematic cataloging of web materials,
including organizational websites, social media, forums, cookies, privacy policies,
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disclosure statements, and terms of use agreements, in order to gather data on a range of
factors. Second, I fielded an online survey to each organization, asking a range of
questions about DICT usage, online strategies, organizational structure, and online
experiences. Third, I conducted twelve in-depth elite interviews with people at ten of the
organizations under study, building insight into their relationship to DICTs and the role
such technologies play in their organizations. Finally, I used a number of secondary
sources such as newspaper articles, political party policy documents, public opinion data,
and offline materials published by the organizations under study to further supplement
the data I gather using other methods.
Analysis of web materials. To gather data on DICT adoption, I relied primarily
on in-depth analysis of each organization’s web presence. I visited each organization’s
website several times between October 2013 and June 2014, using a codebook (included
in appendix one) to empirically measure various aspects of the site, as well as spending
time exploring each site to get a sense of the way in which it was updated, how people
interacted through and with the site, and what types of content were most regularly
created and shared. I took extensive notes while examining the websites, building up my
understanding of what each organization appeared to be doing with its online portals, and
how intensively such portals were updated and visited. In addition, I examined the
organizations’ Facebook pages where available, followed their Twitter accounts where
available, and visited any other social or external media sites they mentioned, including
YouTube and external blogs. I also took notes on patterns of interactivity, such as the
frequency of retweeting of organizations’ tweets, the number of comments on their blogs
and Facebook posts, and other forms of online interaction. In order to assess
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organizations’ data-gathering processes, I included data-gathering questions in my survey
(see appendix two), but also used data collected in my analysis of organizations’
websites. Specifically, I took note of what cookies each site used, and whether or not
third-party cookies were used. To do this, I used two approaches. First, I visited each site
with a newly installed and cookie-free Chrome browser, using the cookie monitoring
browser utility Collusion (https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/collusion-forchrome/ganlifbpkcplnldliibcbegplfmcfigp?hl=en) to note the number of cookies used on
each site’s homepage and the presence or absence of third-party tracking cookies. I then
repeated the process of visiting each site, this time using a newly installed and cookie free
copy of Firefox and the browser utility Lightbeam, again noting the number of cookies
that the homepage inserted into my browser and whether or not third party cookies were
included. Wherever possible, I also read through the sites’ privacy policies, user
agreements, and site disclosures, although only six sites had such documentation.
To supplement my web material data pool, and for purposes of comparison,
wherever possible I tracked organizations’ offline activities, relying on news alerts to
monitor offline meetings and events, and asking interview subjects about their offline
tactics. My goal in gathering these data was to develop a sense of each organization’s
DICT adoption, usage practices, and relative sophistication, as well as to assess how
successful each organization has been at using various online tools, and whether or not
each organization displayed a clear preference for online or offline activities. With
specific reference to my heuristic model, the data I gathered from my analysis of web
materials was used to measure and evaluate a number of elements. These data were
brought to bear on my analysis of a number of dimensions of DICT adoption, including
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the promotion of shared identities, organizational structure, framing, low-cost online
actions, data-gathering and data-mining, and internet-based activism. Furthermore, these
data informed my assessment of organizational connectedness, member and organizer
characteristics, organizational ideological orientation, and first-mover advantage (see
Table 3.2).
I conducted a range of simple statistical analyses of the data I gathered using the
codebook in appendix one, the results of which I will present in my analytical chapters
below. I also qualitatively analyzed the notes I took describing and assessing each of the
sites under study, noting patterns and interesting aspects of the sites and incorporating
these observations into my evaluation of my heuristic model and into my theory-building
process, as I will recount more fully in my analytical chapter.
Organizational survey. My second data-gathering tool was an organizational
survey, which I fielded between January and March of 2014. The survey was built using
Qualtrics software, and was hosted on the Qualtrics server; I have included a full copy of
the survey questionnaire and the accompanying consent form in appendix two. I initially
contacted 48 of the 53 organizations under study with an e-mail invitation to participate
in the online survey on January 6th, 2014. Four of the organizations under study, namely
Gay & Lesbian Unions Eire, Gender Public Advocacy Campaign, Homosexual Law
Reform Society, and Rainbow Support Services, did not have active websites providing
e-mail addresses, only cached sites. One organization, Council for the Status of the
Family, had no web presence at all. I attempted to contact these five organizations
through other means, including the postal service, but was unable to connect with them; I
believe the organizations in question to be defunct, and excluded them from my analysis.
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Table 3.2: Summary of variables and methodologies
Factor

Method

Adoption
Promotion of shared identities
Organizational structure
Framing
Low-cost online action

Data-gathering and data-mining

Internet-based activism
Organizational connectedness

Member characteristics

Organizer characteristics
Ideological orientation

Analysis of web content, assessment
of offline activity
Analysis of web content,
organizational survey
Analysis of web content, assessment
of offline activity
Analysis of web content, assessment
of offline activity
Cookie monitoring software,
analysis of privacy policies,
disclosures, and terms of use,
organizational survey
Analysis of web content, assessment
of offline activity
Analysis of web content, link
analysis, news coverage analysis,
organizational survey
Public opinion poll data,
organizational survey, analysis of
web content
Analysis of web content, news
coverage analysis, organizational
survey
Analysis of web content, news
coverage analysis

Out-party status

Analysis of incumbent party policy

First-mover advantage

Analysis of web content,
organizational survey

I made follow-up contacts by e-mail with the organizations that had not yet
completed the survey on January 27th, 2014, and again by e-mail and phone between
February 24th and February 26th, 2014. Twenty-six organizations initiated the survey
(49% of the total), but only sixteen fully completed it, giving me a 30.2% response rate.
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Of the sixteen complete surveys, liberal organizations completed ten and conservative
organizations completed six. Note that my measure of the ideological orientation of an
organization is straightforward; I considered an organization to be progressive if it favors
marriage equality, protection from hate crimes, anti-discrimination legislation, and
adoption rights for gay couples, and conservative if it opposes marriage equality, rejects
anti-discrimination laws, or opposes allowing gay couples to adopt children. Importantly,
many of the organizations under study are not primarily concerned with LGBTQ issues.
Because I included organizations that were mentioned in news coverage of gay rights
issues, some of the organizations included in the study are not ones that lobby exclusively
around such issues, but rather organizations that take a generally liberal or conservative
position on social issues and were solicited by reporters for comment on gay rights, or
participated in some type of protest action on the issue. Thus, these organizations should
not be thought of as exclusively gay rights organizations, but rather as organizations that
have been involved in some capacity in gay rights issues. My assessment of the
organizations’ ideological orientations was made based on data drawn from newspaper
coverage and my analysis of online and to a lesser extent printed materials produced by
each organization; Table 3.1, presented earlier, reflects my assessment of the ideological
positions of the organizations under study based on my analysis.
The organizational survey addressed a number of issues, including the structure of
the organization, its target audiences and preferred means of engagement therewith, as
well as issues of data-gathering and of the experiences the organization has had online (a
full copy of the survey is included in appendix two). The survey data served to enrich my
analysis and assessment of a number of the elements of my heuristic model, including
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organizational structure, data-gathering and data-mining, organizational connectedness,
member and organizer characteristics, and first-mover advantage (see Table 3.2). I will
discuss the survey results and my analysis thereof, in the analytical chapters below.
Elite interviews. As my goal is not only to evaluate the heuristic model I
provided earlier, but also to inductively develop additional and supplemental
explanations for why certain organizations use DICTs in particular ways, I conducted a
series of in-depth interviews with subjects who work at several of the organizations under
study (a copy of the consent form provided to all interview subjects is included in
appendix three). By gathering this type of qualitative data, I was able to refine my
interpretation of the data I gathered by other means, and to develop some fresh insights
into organizations’ DICT-related choices and practices. I began the interview process by
interviewing eight subjects at eight different organizations, five of them liberal and three
conservative. As I gathered and began to evaluate survey and website data, I conducted
further interviews. I re-interviewed two individuals employed at two of the conservative
organizations I had previously interviewed, and conducted interviews with two more
individuals, one at a liberal organization and one at a conservative organization. In total, I
conducted twelve interviews with ten subjects, representing six liberal organizations and
four conservative organizations. The initial wave of interviews I conducted in January
and February 2014 primarily addressed questions related to my heuristic model,
supplemented with fresh questions arising out of the conversations I had. My second
wave of interviews, conducted in March 2014 and May 2014, served to reassess some of
my conclusions and concepts, and to further develop some of my emerging ideas. The
data gathered with these elite interviews informed my analysis of all aspects of my
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heuristic model, and supplied me with data that enabled me to develop fresh ideas on
what drives organizations to adopt DICTs; I will fully discuss these interviews and the
data I gathered through them in my analytical chapters.
Secondary sources. The final tool I used to gather relevant data was an
examination of various secondary sources. First, I used the newspaper articles I collected
when identifying subjects for my research to help identify organizations’ offline activities
related to the promotion of shared identities, framing efforts, and propensity to organize
low-cost online activities and to embrace internet activism. My analysis of these
materials also informed my assessment of these organizations’ relations with other
organizations, organizer and member characteristics, and ideological orientation (see
Table 3.2).
Second, I evaluated the policy statements of the incumbent political parties of the
countries under study in January 2014 in order to identify their policies with respect to
gay rights and same-sex marriage, with the goal of determining whether the organizations
under study should be considered in or out parties (see Table 3.2). I defined the
incumbent party as the party that controlled the most senior branch of the legislature. In
the United States, the Senate was controlled by the Democratic Party in January 2014, as
was the presidency, so I considered that the incumbent party. In the United Kingdom, the
House of Commons and the Cabinet was dominated by a coalition between the
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, with the Conservative Party holding a
greater number of seats and ministerial appointments. I thus considered the Conservative
Party to be the incumbents, but analyzed both Conservative and Liberal Democrat policy
documents to determine the state of current British governmental policy on LGBTQ
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issues. In Ireland, the incumbent 31st Dáil was a coalition between Fine Gael and the
Labour Party, with Fine Gael holding more seats and having won a greater proportion of
the vote. I considered Fine Gael to be the incumbent party, but analyzed both Fine Gael’s
and the Labour Party’s policy documents to determine current Irish policy towards gay
rights.
Finally, I assessed previously collected public opinion data in order to draw some
conclusions about the likely characteristics of the audiences for the various organizations
under study (see Table 3.2). I assumed that organizations promoting gay rights would
tend to target individuals whom they believe will be inclined to support them and viceversa for conservative organizations. Therefore, I assumed that by examining public
opinion data indicating the demographic and other characteristics of individuals who
supported or opposed various aspects of gay rights, such as marriage equality, I could
draw some inferences about the type of individuals that conservative and liberal
organizations were trying to communicate with. Happily, such data were freely available.
In the United Kingdom, quarterly surveys have been conducted by public opinion polling
organization YouGov that have measured support for gay marriage, broken down by age,
gender, political partisanship, and socioeconomic status since 2011 (YouGov, 2013). In
addition, in 2014, polling organization ComRes conducted a poll of British adults on the
topic of gay marriage (ComRes, 2014), and a 2012 poll by Angus Reid Global examined
attitudes to marriage equality (Angus Reid Public Opinion, 2012). In the United States,
polls measuring support for gay marriage and other gay rights broken down by a range of
demographic characteristics include polls by public opinion research firm Gallup (2013),
the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2011), the Public Religion
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Research Institute (2014) and Quinnipiac University (2013). In Ireland, polls addressing
support for gay marriage among the Irish broken down by various demographic
characteristics include a 2011 survey by the Department of Public Expenditure and
Reform (2012) and a 2012 public opinion survey by polling organization MillwardBrown
(2012). As I will discuss below, I examined all of these polls, and selected a single poll
from each country that provided both detailed demographic data for those who support
and oppose gay rights and information on methodology, and that was conducted in the
months before my data collection period began, thus ensuring that the data were relevant
to the period I examined. I will discuss the details of these various data in the analytical
chapters below, when I address the issue of the relationship between member or
supported characteristics and the propensity to adopt DICTs.
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CHAPTER 4: EXPLORING THE HEURISTIC MODEL: DICT ADOPTION AND
FACTORS THAT PREDICT IT
The first analytical task I face is exploring how well the heuristic model I
developed earlier explains what I found when I examined my data. In the model I
proposed five drivers of DICT adoption by social movement organizations: diffusion,
group characteristics, ideology, out-party innovation, and first-mover advantage. I further
proposed that there would be differences between organizations grouped by country,
arguing that national context was likely to play some role in the degree to which
organizations hosted in a particular nation adopted DICTs. Per this model, DICT
adoption is my key dependent variable, which is to say, it is the outcome that I am
primarily interested in explaining. Therefore, I will begin this section with a discussion of
how I developed an assessment of the degree to which different organizations adopted
DICTs. I will then move on to a discussion of the other elements of my model, namely
the factors that I anticipate will influence the degree to which organizations adopt DICTs.
DICT Adoption
My analysis of the organizations’ DICT adoption was informed primarily by my
assessment of their websites, supplemented with other forms of data as I will discuss
below. The first step was determining whether or not each organization listed above did
or did not have a website. As noted earlier, 48 out of the 53 organizations under study did
indeed have websites. Four of the organizations under study, namely Gay & Lesbian
Unions Eire, Gender Public Advocacy Campaign, Homosexual Law Reform Society, and
Rainbow Support Services, did not have active websites, only partial, cached sites. One
organization, Council for the Status of the Family, had no web presence at all that I was
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able to find. As all my offline efforts to locate these organizations failed, I considered
them to be defunct, and excluded them from my analysis, as I was unable to gather any
meaningful data about them. However, the study of organizations that eschew the use of
online tools would doubtless add a great deal of insight into the processes of DICT
adoption, and future research should be directed at such organizations.
Using the codebook reproduced in appendix one, I evaluated the remaining 48
organizations’ online activities. I noted the degree to which different organizations used
various forms of social media, including their proclivity to post and the number of likes,
followers, or views they collected. I considered the features of their websites. As
discussed in the literature review, one of the ways in which DICT adoption can serve
organizations is by providing them with a range of low to no-cost actions that individuals
can take that will move them towards full participation in the organizations’ work. Thus,
I measured elements such as the inclusion of an online donation option, the invitation to
subscribe to an e-newsletter, and the provision of information about concrete actions site
visitors could take to support the organization (other than donation). I was also interested
in interactive elements, as much of the literature is concerned with the ways in which
online affordances can make social movement organizations more interactive and open to
member input. Thus, I measured elements such as the incorporation of user-generated
content, the provision of a forum in which site visitors could interact with one another,
and the presence or absence of contact details that would make it relatively simple for a
site visitor to contact the organization directly. I measured organizations’ use of cookies,
as detailed earlier, as one of the elements in my analysis of their data gathering
sophistication. In the pages that follow, I will begin by discussing my specific findings
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with respect to the various elements of organizational DICT adoption that I gathered in
the course of my analysis of online materials. I will then describe how these relate to my
heuristic model, and explain how I developed my overall evaluation of organizations’
degree of DICT adoption.
Use of basic web affordances. The first dimension along which I explored DICT
adoption was what I called the use of basic web affordances. In order to examine this
dimension, I combined my dichotomous measures of whether or not a site had a media
section – I interpreted this as a marker of sophistication as it indicated that the site was
built to serve multiple audiences – along with my dichotomous measures of whether or
not the site included an online donation option, whether or not the site included video (as
an indicator of multimedia sophistication), whether or not the site included an
organizational blog, whether or not the site included a section with options for taking
action, and whether or not the site offered the option to sign up for an e-mail newsletter.
Table 4.1: Use of basic web affordances
Yes

No

Online donation option

77% 23%

Blog

77% 23%

Take action section

69% 31%

E-mail newsletter signup

65% 35%

Video

58% 42%

Media section

50% 50%
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Table 4.1 provides a summary of my results for each measure. As you can see, the
majority of sites offered each of the elements considered. However, few sites included all
of them.
As Figure 4.1 shows, over half of the organizations under study used five or six of
the basic web affordances described above. However, 38% of organizations used just
one, two, or three of these affordances, suggesting meaningful variation on this
dimension – some websites were much more sophisticated and complex than others. As
part of my evaluation of organizations adoption of DICTs, I used my dichotomous
measures of whether or not each organization used each of the web affordances listed in
Table 4.1 to create a single measure of web affordance usage use scaled from 0 to 6. The
mean score on this dimension for all organizations was 4.11.
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Figure 4.1: Frequency distribution of web affordances
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In terms of my qualitative evaluation of these sites’ contents, one of the things
that struck me was the extent to which organizations that included blogs used those blogs
to discuss and interpret news articles and materials from elsewhere on the web. The vast
majority of the posts published in organizations’ blogs referred to a news event or news
articles, and discussed the implications and interpretation of that event. Indeed, as one of
my interview subjects, Keith3, a man who founded and runs a conservative organization
in the United States, said, the primary reason that his organization produces and
maintains a website is to provide site visitors with an alternative interpretation of news,
and to increase their awareness of news stories that did not receive significant attention in
the mainstream media. Similarly, Sara, a young woman responsible for communications
at an Irish organization that is lobbying for marriage equality ahead of the Irish
referendum, said that one of the most important things her website does is to collect news
stories related to LGBTQ issues from around the world and to share them with members
and site visitors along with commentary highlighting the moral rightness of marriage
equality and equal rights. Said Sara, “We want people to understand that this is a
worldwide issue, and that Ireland needs to be on the right side of it. We want to show
people that this is a human rights issue, and something that other people and really, other
places and countries, that they’re wrestling with this too. We want to show that this is a
moral issue, human rights, you know, an equality issue. People need to think about same
sex marriage as being an issue about equality and equal rights. And so we write about
these news and events and share these articles to help educate people on this.” In other

2
Not his real name. My interview subjects all requested anonymity, and I have therefore used pseudonyms
in the text in order to facilitate readers’ comprehension while maintaining the anonymity of my
respondents.
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words, the organizations that included blogs on their sites almost all used those blogs to
frame issues for site visitors to a greater or lesser degree – blogging was the most
prominent way in which organizations attempted to frame events and issues for their
members.
As discussed in the literature review above, one of the core tasks of an advocacy
organization is building frames, or promoting a particular interpretation of a social
problem, and a particular solution thereto. The organizations under study used their blogs
to develop and promote frames, and to reframe news and events in such a way as to
promote their perspective on the issue of marriage equality. Whether or not this is an
effective strategy is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of the present study; I gathered no
evidence on whether site visitors adopted organizational framing of the issue, or whether
the frames developed in organizations’ blogs had an impact on the framing of gay rights
issues in the mainstream media (for some evidence on this topic, see DeLuca, Lawson, &
Sun, 2012, whom I cited earlier). While the ultimate question of whether or not attempts
at alternative framing online are successful at altering social conversations around issues
remains unanswered in the present study, it is nevertheless interesting to note that
attempts at framing are a key feature of organizations’ online efforts.
Social media. The second key dimension I evaluated using the data I collected on
organizations’ websites was their use of social media. Table 4.2 indicates the proportions
of organizations’ using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. I selected these three social
media platforms, and no others, for two reasons. First, these are the most popular
platforms among internet users in the three countries under study. According to a
proprietary report by global digital media and marketing research firm eMarketer, in the
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United Kindgom, Facebook and Twitter were the most popular social networking sites by
unique visitors in 2012, and in the United States, Facebook and Twitter were the most
popular social media sites by share of visits (eMarketer, 2013). The report provided no
data on Ireland, however, the Irish government reports that Facebook and Twitter are the
country’s most popular social networking sites (Passport to trade 2.0, 2013).
Furthermore, a report by Sandvine, a Canadian broadband provider, showed that
YouTube accounted for 15.43% of US internet traffic in 2012, second only to Netflix
with 28.9%, and for 21.3% of internet traffic in Europe, making it the single largest
online destination in the region (Sandvine, 2013). In other words, these three site are
among the most popular web destinations in the countries under study. Second, these
three sites were by far the most common social networking sites I encountered in my
analysis of these organizations’ online web presence. Only very rarely were other sites
linked to or updated, and when they were, it was typically a site like Digg, which
aggregates news and allows for its sharing, but which does not allow for much interaction
or community building beyond the sharing of web articles. Typically, certain
organizations would include a Digg button on their blogs, to enable readers to share the
content, but otherwise not engaging with the site at all. I therefore focused my efforts on
the platforms that organizations use, namely Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.
Table 4.2: Social media
Yes

No

Facebook

75%

25%

Twitter

75%

25%

YouTube

52%

48%
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As can be seen in Table 4.2, most organizations use Facebook and Twitter, and a
majority have a YouTube channel. When looking at the distribution of organizations by
social media usage, I found that 21% of organizations used no social media at all, 2%
used one form of social media, 31% used two forms of social media, and 46% used all
three of the social media tools I measured, indicating some variance in social media
usage. As part of my evaluation of organizations adoption of DICTs, I used my
dichotomous measures of whether or not each organization used each of the tools listed to
create a single measure of social media use scaled from 0 to 3. The mean score on this
variable was 2.02; the frequency distribution is graphed below in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Frequency distribution of social media usage
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In addition, there was some variation in how frequently organizations updated
their social media, and how many followers they manage to attract. Among those
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organizations that have a Facebook page, 86% update their pages weekly, and 75%
update them daily; some organizations that have Facebook pages – some 14% – are thus
relatively infrequent updaters. On Twitter, 92% of organizations with a Twitter feed
Tweeted weekly, and 69% daily, while on YouTube, 52% of organizations loaded new
video regularly. Thus, there was variation in how intensively organizations updated their
social media outlets, with YouTube being the least frequently updated, which makes
sense given the complexity of creating a video compared with the relative simplicity of
writing a short Tweet or Facebook update. Furthermore, there was a great deal of
variation in the attention organizations managed to garner on social media. Among
organizations that maintained Facebook pages, the number of likes their pages attracted
ranged from 74 for Ireland Stand up to 1,603,798 for the Human Rights Campaign;
among organizations that maintained a Twitter feed, the number of followers they
attracted ranged from 233 for OutWest to 372,000 for the Human Rights Campaign; and
among organizations that maintained a YouTube channel, the number of subscribers they
attracted ranged from 56 for the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children to 21,228
for the Human Rights Campaign. Thus, organizations displayed varying degrees of social
media success, despite the widespread use of social media, with the Human Rights
Campaign clearly dominating the social media space among these organizations.
Interestingly, the Human Rights Campaign, which had almost 500,000 more
Facebook likes than the next most-popular organization, Focus on the Family, with
1,116,649, is an organization that attracted a lot of attention with its viral Facebook
campaign in March, 2013. The organization devised a simple red and pink logo (see
Figure 4.1), that it encouraged followers to use as their profile pictures on Facebook in
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the weeks immediately preceding two US Supreme Court cases addressing the issue of
marriage equality, namely United States v. Windsor and Hollingworth v. Perry (Human
Rights Campaign, n.d.). Although I do not have historical data, the Human Rights
Campaign itself notes that its social media following grew significantly following the
success of the profile picture campaign and the media attention that the campaign
garnered, a powerful illustration of the power that virality can have on the internet.
Figure 4.3: Human Rights Campaign Facebook logo

Interactivity. The third dimension that my analysis of organizations’ web
presence explored is interactivity. My data included a number of measures of
interactivity, including dichotomous variables measuring the provision of forums that
enabled unmediated or minimally edited debate and discussion between site visitors, the
inclusion of user-generated content on the website in blog posts or other areas, comments
functionality on blog or other posts that allow site visitors to leave comments about
website content, and the inclusion of contact details and media contact details to enable
different audiences to engage directly with organizational staff. Table 4.3 summarizes the
proportions of organizational websites incorporating these elements. As you can see,
interactive elements were much less common than the other elements I have thus far
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described. Although most sites included contact details, few sites allowed comments or
incorporated forums or user-generated content, and the majority of sites did not provide
media contacts. It is interesting that so few organizations appear to be taking advantage
of the opportunity for interaction permitted by contemporary DICTs. I was concerned
that perhaps there was a substitution effect occurring, and that organizations were
interacting primarily through social media rather than through their web portals.
However, I examined all the organizational Facebook pages, Twitter feeds, and YouTube
channels, and found very little evidence of interactivity. While the organizations with the
biggest following on each social medium did attract some comments, I found only a
handful of examples of organizations responding to Facebook or YouTube comments,
and very little interaction on Twitter beyond organizations retweeting, saying “thank
you” for retweets, or acknowledging mentions.
Table 4.3: Interactive elements
Yes

No

Contact details

94%

6%

Media contact details

46% 54%

Comments

25% 75%

User-generated content

13% 88%

Forum

10% 90%

My overall impression was that only a few organizations truly embraced online
interactivity and invited site visitors or followers to interact with them and co-create
online content or messages. Despite the interactive power of the web, organizations
primarily seem to use the internet as a one-way medium. As I will discuss below, I do not
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believe that this is the result of organizations being unaware of the potential for
interactivity online, or resistant to engaging with external audiences, but rather it is a
consequence of the fact that organizations have limited time and resources, and cannot
afford to devote staff time to responding to comments and monitoring online feedback.
In order to further summarize organizational adoption of interactive elements, I combined
my dichotomous variables for the inclusion of forums, UGC, and comments in a single
variable ranging from 0 to 3 that I describe as web 2.0 interactivity. This variable is
intended to capture how much the organization engages with the unique interactive
affordances that the internet provides; I excluded contact details and media contact details
from this variable as these serve to facilitate offline or e-mail interaction, which I do not
consider to be unique web affordances.
Organizational structures and DICTs. The fourth aspect of DICT adoption that
I considered was the extent to which organizations displayed internal structures
influenced by digital tools like those Karpf (2012) describes as characterizing
Moveon.org. According to Karpf (2012), DICTs allow organizations to operate with
much lighter staff complements than previously, and to take on decentralized and
diffused structures with limited staff co-presence. I do not have systematically organized
data on staff numbers, as this information was not always available. Thus, the data I
collected on this aspect of DICT adoption includes staff details taken from the websites
where available, data from the survey I conducted, and supplementary data taken from
my interviews and in some cases from newspaper accounts. Overall, I found that there
was a lot of variation in the number of staff members at each organization, ranging from
a single full-time staff member at MassResistance to around 650 full-time staff members
86

at Focus on the Family. There was also a loose correlation between staff numbers and
other aspects of DICT adoption. In other words, the more staff members an organization
employed, the more sophisticated its adoption of DICTs tended to be as measured by the
other dimensions I have discussed. This is contrary to what one might expect based on
the existing literature, which suggests that organizations that intensively use and adopt
DICTs can operate with a lighter staff complement than traditional organizations. As I
will explain in my discussion section, there are a number of reasons why, in my
assessment, these organizations display this pattern, primary among them being that
often, the sophistication with which an organization adopts DICTs is in fact a function of
the resources the organization is able to devote to DICTs.
Online data-gathering and analysis. Finally, I gathered data on organizations’
use of cookies, and of third-party cookies, which are cookies that do not belong to the
host website, but to a third party, typically an advertising firm (Turow, 2010, 2013).
While first-party cookies typically are used to track users within the website visited and
to remember their preferences and login data, third-party cookies allow the third party to
track users across websites, building a profile of their web browsing habits and enabling
third parties such as Google to serve targeted advertising to web users. The average
number of cookies that the organizations’ websites inserted into my browser was 4.5,
with a minimum of 0 from LGBT Noise and LGBT+ Liberal Democrats and a maximum
of 13 from Americans for Truth about Homosexuality, Concerned Women for America,
and Freedom to Marry. Furthermore, 92% of organizations’ cookies included third-party
cookies. However, these results should not be interpreted as indicating a high degree of
sophisticated data gathering and analysis by the organizations under study. The majority
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of sites inserted third-party cookies from Google, Google Analytics, Facebook, and
Twitter. Many of these organizations rely on blogging software to design their sites, and
such software often includes Google Analytics and social media cookies as a matter of
routine. In addition, many of these organizations use free Google services in building,
hosting, and maintaining their websites, and Google routinely includes its cookies when
such tools are used (Google, n.d.). Having spoken with people from these organizations,
who uniformly said that their organization did not use online tracking tools, and having
examined my survey data, which indicate that most of the data that organizations gather
and use about their members is related to donors, and includes personally identifiable
data such as names, addresses, phone numbers and so on – data which are not collected
by cookies – I conclude that online data gathering tactics are relatively underdeveloped
among these organizations. Indeed, among my survey respondents, only 30% reported
using online tracking tools (with 54% saying they did not use such tools and 15% saying
they weren’t certain if their organization did or did not use them), and among the
organizations that reported using online tools, all of them cited Google Analytics as the
data tool they used. Unless users subscribe to premium services, Google Analytics offers
websites information about how many visitors their site has, what devices they are using
to access the site, and where in the world they are accessing the site from; the basic data
are neither complex nor comprehensive, and do not constitute the kind of in-depth,
behavioral tracking with which experts are concerned. Furthermore, all organizations
denied using data gathered by other organizations to target users online, which is the
primary use of third-party cookies. Thus, with respect to online data gathering, I found
that these organizations generally do little to no structured online data gathering and
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display relatively low levels of sophistication around online data gathering tools and
technologies. It is possible that there is a degree of deception involved on the part of my
respondents and interview subjects; however, I noticed that I did not see any Google
advertisements for the sites I had visited after visiting them with my usual browser,
which allows and monitors cookies, nor did I receive any communication from those
groups on any social media that I did not directly request. Thus, the data from my web
analysis, interviews, survey, and my qualitative experience of engaging with these
organizations online and through social media all suggest that they do not engage in
sophisticated online data gathering, nor do they use third-party data to track and monitor
online activities and develop targeted messages. Although I will again touch on issues of
online data-gathering when I address cross-national differences, for the purposes of
assessing organizations’ overall adoption of DICTs, I did not find the data I gathered on
online data-gathering to be a useful addition to my analysis, and I thus did not include it
in my overall assessment of organizations’ DICTs adoption.
Overall assessments of organizations’ DICT adoption. Taken together, the
findings described above informed my overall analysis of the organizations’ DICT
adoption. My heuristic model served to inform the types of data I gathered. As discussed
in my literature review, one of the ways in which organizations can use DICTs is to foster
shared identities. In order to incorporate this in my assessment of DICT adoption, I
included the measures of interactivity that I described above, which captures the degree
to which organizations create online communities and allow their audiences to interact
with them and with others to foster a sense of shared identity. I also included the use of
web affordances like blogs, which as I explained earlier, organizations tended to use to
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promote interpretations of events and thus to foster a shared interpretation of the world
among members. A second aspect of organizational DICTs adoption, as indicated in my
model, is the use of DICTs to develop and disseminate frames. In order to capture the
extent to which organizations use DICTs to build frames, I measured their use of blogs,
which were typically used to provide interpretations of events and promote solutions to
social problems, which is the essence of framing. I also considered organizations’
tendencies to use social media, which are a way for organizations to expand their reach
beyond people who visit their website and to reach broader audiences with their frames,
helping to disseminate them. As my model illustrates, the internet offers organizations a
unique opportunity to engage potential members and interested audiences through the
provision of accessible and often low-cost actions that individuals can take, and the
inclusion of options for online activism. For example, by offering options for people to
donate online, to subscribe to e-mail newsletters, and to take other forms of action,
usually organized under a “Take Action” button on organizations’ web pages that link to
online e-petitions, upcoming events and so on, organizations can engage interested
parties, and deepen their involvement with organizational goals related to social
movement priorities. I thus measured the extent to which the various organizations under
study provided these tools and opportunities. Finally, as described above, I gathered data
on organizations’ internal and staff structures to determine the extent to which DICTs
adoption had influenced how they arrange their work, and I gathered data on the use of
cookies to assess their online data-gathering practices. As you can see, several of the
individual items I measured related to multiple aspects of my heuristic model, and thus I
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sought to build an overall assessment of organizations’ adoption of DICTs based on my
data.
Specifically, to facilitate the rest of my analysis of my heuristic model, I
summarized much of the data I collected in a single score, which considered the degree to
which each organization under study used the basic web affordances, social, and
interactive elements that captured the key dimensions of DICTs adoption as summarized
in my heuristic model. In particular, the score incorporated my dichotomous measures for
the following: the inclusion of a separate media section, the inclusion of an online
donation option, the inclusion of video, the inclusion of blogs, the inclusion of a ‘take
action’ section, the provision of an e-mail newsletter, the use of an organizational
Facebook page, the use of an organizational Twitter stream, the use of an organizational
YouTube channel, the provision of contact details, the provision of media contact details,
the inclusion of comments, the inclusion of user-generated content, the inclusion of a
forum, and finally, five dichotomous variables measuring the frequency with which
organizations updated their social media pages (see appendix one for details). These
nineteen dichotomous variables were summed to form a new variable, which was then
rescaled to run from 0 to 10. Table 4.4 provides the scores for all of the organizations
under study. Note that these scores do not include any measures of data gathering or of
DICT-influenced organizational structures. As discussed, I do not believe that any of
these organizations engage in sophisticated data-gathering and analysis, nor do I find the
quantitative data I gathered on the subject to be a useful indicator of DICT adoption. In
addition, due to the varying degrees of information I was able to gather about each
organization’s internal structures, it was not possible to include those data in this score.
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Table 4.4: Overall DICT adoption score (out of 10)
Organization

Score

Concerned Women for America

8.9

Freedom to Marry

8.9

Human Rights Campaign

8.9

Lamda Legal

8.9

Marriage Equality Ireland

8.9

DignityUSA (Catholic Church)

8.4

Focus on the Family

8.4

Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD)

8.4

Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD)

8.4

Society for the Protection of Unborn Children

8.4

La Manif Pour Tous (French organization active in the UK)

7.9

National Organization for Marriage

7.9

Stonewall

7.9

The Lesbian & Gay Foundation (LGF)

7.9

Campaign for Children and Families

7.4

Evangelical Alliance

7.4

Family Equality Council

7.4

Irish Episcopal Conference

7.4

Out & Equal

7.4

Youth Defence

7.4

Americans for Truth About Homosexuality

6.8

Marriage Equality USA

6.3

American Family Association

5.8
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BeLoGTo

5.8

LGBT Noise

5.8

MassResistance

5.8

L.inC

5.3

Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement

5.3

LGBT+ Liberal Democrats

5.3

LGBT Network

4.7

Outhouse

4.7

Family & Life

4.2

Gay & Lesbian Equality Network

4.2

Iona Institute

4.2

Queer Youth Network (Q.Y.N.)

4.2

Evangelical Alliance Ireland

3.7

Anglican Mainstream

3.2

Gay and Lesbian Humanist Association (GALHA)

3.2

Ireland Stand Up

3.2

OutWest

2.6

Catholic Truth

2.1

Institute for Marriage and Public Policy

2.1

Campaign for Homosexual Equality

1.6

Gay marriage no thanks

1.6

Changing Attitude Ireland

1.1

Defend the Family

1.1

Heterosexuals Organized for a Moral Environment

1.1

OutRage!

1.1
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To compensate for these limitations, in addition to calculating these scores, I
revisited each organization’s website, considered my notes on each, and compared my
subjective impressions, including my data on their internal structures, to the score I had
calculated for each organization. Overall, I found that there was a strong relationship
between my impression of how intensively an organization had adopted DICTs, and the
score that organization received. Although these scores constitute a quantitative measure
of organizations’ DICTs adoption, their primary utility was as a shorthand that I used
when exploring various aspects of my heuristic model. I did not do any sophisticated
statistical modeling of these scores, but instead used them to guide my analysis of the
relationships between my explanatory factors and DICT adoption, and for some basic ttests. In the discussion that follows, I will provide some numbers, drawn from these
scores, to bolster my arguments. However, I will also discuss the extent to which my
qualitative data support or contradict my expectations, and I do not consider this
quantitative measure to be an absolute indicator of DICT sophistication, but rather one
suggestive piece of evidence among several. Having developed a sense of the degree of
DICT adoption displayed by each of the organizations under study, summarized by the
score given in Table 4.4 and supplemented by my notes and my qualitative evaluations, I
can now move to exploring at the next key element of my heuristic model, namely those
factors that the literature suggests should influence the degree to which a given
organization adopts available DICTs.
Diffusion
The first factor that I anticipated would play a role in DICT adoption is diffusion,
or the degree to which an organization interacts with other organizations and thus has an
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opportunity to learn from other organizations’ experiences with digital technologies.
Measuring this proved to be challenging. One of the tools I used was my organizational
survey, which included a question asking whether or not the respondent’s organization
interacted with other organizations. Of the sixteen organizations that completed the
survey, 75% said that they did interact with other organizations, with 6% saying they did
not know whether or not their organization interacted with other organizations, and the
remaining 19% saying that they did not interact with other organizations. There is some
evidence of a positive relationship between whether or not organizations reported
interacting with other organizations in the survey and their overall DICT adoption score.
The adoption scores of the organizations that reported interacting with other
organizations ranged from 1.1 to 8.9 and averaged 5.5, while the scores for the few
organizations that reported not interacting with other organizations ranged from 2.1 to 6.3
and averaged 3.9.
Clearly, the organizations that reported interacting with other organizations
tended to have slightly higher adoption scores. However, the number of observations here
is naturally too small to allow for any reliable inferences to be drawn. Furthermore, my
survey questions simply asked whether or not interaction took place, and did not address
the complexity, frequency, or depth of that interaction, all of which are key to
understanding the structure of the networks in which the organizations operate. Thus, my
survey provided very limited evidence of the role of diffusion in DICT adoption.
I then turned to my analysis of news accounts and online materials. For all of the
websites I examined, I noted whether or not the site linked to the websites of other
organizations. With no exceptions, the sites I examined included links to external sites,
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including the sites of other organizations lobbying on similar issues. Given the
widespread inclusion of such links, I concluded that they were an unreliable indicator of
the degree to which organizations interacted meaningfully with other organizations. I
then examined organizational press releases where available, looking for mentions of
partnerships with other organizations and participation in joint events, as well as any
mention of conferences or workshops. This was a somewhat more fruitful approach. I
found a number of references to participation in shared events. For example, BeLonGTo,
an national Irish organization that supports LGBTQ youth, organizes an annual Stand Up
Against Homo/Transphobic Bullying week in Ireland, which a number of other
organizations participate in, particularly school and government groups, indicating that
BeLonGTo has strong relationships with other organizations. Similarly, Concerned
Women for America, a conservative Christian women’s activist group that lobbies on a
number of issues including marriage equality, hosts a number of events in which multiple
organizations participate, including other conservative organizations and churches. Not
all organizations provided press releases or such data, but for the organizations that do
provide that type of information, I made note of their activities, and then examined the
degree to which such activities were associated with increased DICT adoption. This
process revealed a reasonably clear degree of association between interaction with other
organizations and DICT adoption. In particular, I found that there were a number of
organizations that were highly involved in planning and participating in multiorganization events, and that those organizations, which appeared to act almost as a node
connecting multiple other organizations, typically displayed a sophisticated degree of
DICT adoption. For example, Freedom to Marry is an organized coalition of US
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organizations that promote marriage equality. Freedom to Marry has arranged a number
of multi-organization events, frequently holds conferences for gay rights organizers, and
engages deeply with multiple organizations; it is also an organization with one of the
highest DICT adoption scores in my study. Similarly, the Human Rights Campaign,
which I have previously mentioned, displays both a high propensity to engage with other
organizations and a high degree of DICT sophistication. However, as I will discuss more
comprehensively in the discussion section below, this does not necessarily indicate a
causal relationship. Instead, it may be that large, well-funded organizations with
significant staff complements are able to devote resources to cultivating relationships
with other organizations and developing DICT capacity. Furthermore, the data I collected
are insufficient to fully explore the role of diffusion in DICT adoption by organizations.
In order to properly assess the effect of diffusion, it would be necessary to gather detailed
information on the nature, frequency, and depth of inter-organizational interactions. Such
data would enable me to build a network map for the organizations under study, and to
then trace the ways in which practices and ideas migrate through the network. I was able
only to gather limited information on whether or not interactions occurred. Overall, the
data I was able to gather suggest that my expectations with respect to the relationship
between inter-organizational interaction and DICT adoption have been met, and that
organizations that interact more with other organizations are also more likely to
intensively adopt and deploy DICTs. However, further study is needed to properly assess
the role of diffusion in DICT adoption.
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Group Characteristics and Ideology
As noted, the literature I reviewed led me to anticipate that the characteristics of
the types of people that organizations employ and try to reach will influence the degree to
which those organizations adopt DICTs.
The role of audience characteristics. I will begin by discussing the data I
gathered about the external audiences that these organizations targeted. My first step was
to examine data drawn from public opinion surveys in the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Ireland. I will describe the findings of each in turn. In the course of the
discussion, all the differences among groups to which I refer are statistically significant,
unless other specified.
First, for the United Kingdom, I examined a number of polls, including those
mentioned earlier by YouGov, Angus Reid Public Opinion, and ComRes. The data across
most of the polls was broadly consistent, but I elected to rely primarily on a YouGov poll
conducted in May 2013, as this was the poll that most immediately preceded the start of
my data collection process, and thus captured the distribution of public opinion about
marriage equality in the United Kingdom at the time of my data collection (the findings
closely mirror those of the later ComRes poll). Table 4.5 provides a summary of support
for gay marriage by various demographic characteristics for the three countries under
study. Note that “social grade” refers to a set of measures developed by the National
Readership Survey and used widely in public opinion polling in the United Kingdom; it
measures respondents’ social status based on their occupation, and is used as a proxy for
income and education (National Readership Survey, 2013).
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Category A includes those in higher managerial, administrative or professional
occupations, B refers to those in intermediate managerial, administrative and professional
occupations, category C1 refers to those in supervisory, clerical and junior management,
administrative and professional occupations, category C2 refers to skilled manual
laborers, category D refers to semi-skilled and unskilled manual laborers, and category E
refers to those receiving a state pension, casual workers, and the unemployed receiving
state benefits (National Readership Survey, 2013). As can be seen, in terms of significant
differences, conservative Britons are more likely to oppose marriage equality than their
more-liberal counterparts, women are more likely to support marriage equality than men,
and younger people (under 40) are more likely to support marriage equality than those
over 40. There is no significant difference in support for marriage equality between those
with a higher socioeconomic status and than their lower-status peers, and they are equally
likely to oppose it.
Turning to the United States, I had a wealth of public opinion data to choose
from, and I elected to focus on a 2013 poll by the Public Religion Research Institute. This
organization provided in-depth detail about its methodology, as well as a detailed
breakdown of its results, and the poll was conducted in mid-2013, meaning that it
immediately preceded my data collection period and thus captured the characteristics of
the people who would be targeted by my organizations during the period under study
(Public Religion Research Institute, 2014).
As can be seen in Table 4.5, there are many similarities between American
marriage equality supporters and opponents and their British peers. As was the case in the
United Kingdom, liberals are more likely to support marriage equality than conservatives,
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women are more likely to support marriage equality than men, and the young are more
supportive of marriage equality than those over 49. The U.K. did not provide data on the
racial characteristics of those who favor or oppose marriage equality, but in the U.S.,
blacks are significantly less likely to support marriage equality than whites or Hispanics.
Finally, in the U.S., those with a college education tend to be markedly more supportive
of marriage equality than those with only high school; this is in contrast to the U.K.,
where socio-economic status, as measured by social grade, was not associated with a
major difference in opposition to or support for marriage equality. The two measures are
not directly comparable, but both capture some aspect of the socio-economic
characteristics of gay marriage supporters and opponents, and it is thus interesting to note
this difference.
Finally, I examined public opinion data from Ireland. In contrast to the U.K. and
U.S., there were far fewer opinion polls from which to select in the case of Ireland. I
elected to use data from a November 2013 poll by Red C Research (Red C Research,
2013). As can be seen in Table 4.5, Irish support for marriage equality is much higher
overall than support in the U.K. and U.S.; however, there are some similar patterns.
Liberals tend to be more favorably disposed to marriage equality than conservatives,
women are more likely to support marriage equality than men, and those under 65 are
significantly more likely to support marriage equality than those 65 and over. As was the
case in the U.K., there is no significant difference among people of different socioeconomic status.
Overall, and perhaps unsurprisingly, it is clear that there are some general
differences between those who are more likely to support marriage equality, and those
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who are more likely to oppose it in all three of the countries under study. Overall,
conservatives, males, and older people are more likely to oppose marriage equality, while
liberals, females, and younger people are more likely to support it. There is also some
evidence that more educated people are more likely to support marriage equality in the
United States, while there were no significant differences in support for marriage equality
among different socio-economic status groups in the U.K. and Ireland This assessment of
the typical characteristics of supporters of and opponents to marriage equality is echoed
by much of the literature on the subject, and applies more broadly to issues of gay rights
(see, for example, Herek, 2002; Lewis & Gossett, 2008; Romero, 2013). Furthermore, the
data from my survey broadly support this assessment – liberal organizations were more
likely to say that they targeted younger people and more educated people, and vice-versa.
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Table 4.5: Public opinion poll data on support for or opposition to marriage equality
United Kingdom
Characteristic

United States
Total
Total
Characteristic
support oppose

Voting intention

Ireland
Total
Total
Characteristic
support oppose

Party affiliation

Total
Total
support oppose

Party affiliation

Conservative

48%

41%

Democrat

64%

36%

Fine Gael

73%

27%

Labour

60%

29%

Independent

57%

43%

Labour

96%

4%

Liberal
Democrats

69%

24%

Republican

34%

66%

Fianna Fail

71%

29%

Tea Party

32%

68%

Sinn Fein

84%

16%

Gender
Male

47%

40%

Gender

Female

58%

30%

Male

48%

52%

Male

76%

24%

Female

57%

43%

Female

85%

15%

Age

Gender

18-24

68%

17%

Age

25-39

70%

18%

18-33

69%

31%

18-24

89%

11%

40-59

53%

35%

34-48

55%

45%

25-34

86%

14%

60+

28%

61%

49-67

45%

55%

35-44

89%

11%

68+

37%

63%

45-54

79%

21%

Age
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Social grade

Race

54-65

78%

22%

60%

40%

84%

16%

82%

18%

ABC1

55%

36%

White, non-Hispanic

55%

45%

65+

C2DE

50%

36%

Hispanic

53%

47%

Social class

Black, non-Hispanic

39%

61%

Educational
attainment
Post-graduate

66%

34%

College graduate

60%

40%

Some college

57%

43%

High school or less

46%

54%

Higher social
grades
Lower social
grades

Source: YouGov, 2013; Public Religion Research Institute, 2014; Red C Research, 2013
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Second, in order to link these data to my findings on DICT adoption, I assumed
that the organizations that are involved with lobbying to preserve marriage as a
heterosexual institution are likely to seek to reach and engage those individuals who are
more likely to support their position and take action on the issue, which is to say, older,
conservative, male, and perhaps less educated individuals, while organizations that lobby
to expand the right to marry to same sex couples will target those likely to support and
aid them, namely younger, liberal, female, and perhaps more educated individuals. At
this point, it became clear that it is almost impossible for my analysis to clearly separate
the effect of ideology from the effect of group characteristics. Earlier, I suggested that,
ceteris paribus, conservative organizations might be innately less likely to adopt DICTs
than their liberal peers. However, it is impossible, given the limitations of my data, for
me to tell whether liberals are innately more likely to adopt DICTs or whether the rate at
which the liberal organizations in my study adopt DICTs is a function of the fact that they
are likely to target people who have a higher propensity to support gay marriage. In
particular, it is difficult to separate the effects of age and ideology. In the U.S., younger
people are more likely to describe themselves as moderate, while older people are more
likely to describe themselves as conservative (Gallup, 2012); in the U.K., support for the
Conservative Party is significantly higher among those 55 and over, while support for the
Liberal Democrats is significantly higher among those under 44 compared to those over
55, indicating that younger Britons tend to be more liberal than older Britons (Ipsos
MORI, 2010); finally, in Ireland, I was unable to obtain data indicating the relationship
between age and ideology or party affiliation, but it is likely to follow a similar pattern.
Thus, conservative organizations are likely to target conservatives, who are likely to be
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older, and liberals are likely to target liberals, who are likely to be younger. I therefore
folded my analysis of the effect of ideology into my analysis of the effect of group
characteristics.
Proceeding with my analysis, then, I sought to determine whether there were
patterns of internet and DICT usage associated with any of the characteristics I found to
be related to propensity to support marriage equality. For example, if data indicate that
women are significantly less likely to use DICTs than men are, organizations that target
women may favor offline methods of communication over DICTs in order to reach their
target audiences. According to data from the Pew Research Internet Project, in the United
States, there is no significant difference between men and women when it comes to their
usage of the internet, e-mail, or mobile internet (Pew Research Internet Project, 2014).
There are, however, significant differences in internet usage among people 64 and
younger and people over 65 – younger people are much more likely to use the internet
than their older peers. In addition, those under 30 are more likely than those over 50 to
use the internet. Furthermore, those with an income above $50,000 a year and those with
at least some college are significantly more likely to use the internet than those who earn
less than $50,000 a year and those with only a high school education. In the U.K., data
from the Office for National Statistics found only minor differences between men’s and
women’s propensity to engage in various activities online (Office for National Statistics
2013). However, age was found to be significantly associated with the propensity to
engage in different internet activities, with those under 55 much more likely to use the
internet than those 55 and over. Finally, there was a small but significant difference
between the propensities of those with a high income to use the internet compared to
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those with a very low income, with the higher-income group more likely to use the
internet in more ways. In Ireland, statistics from the Central Statistics Office indicated
that, as was the case in the U.K. and U.S., there was no major difference in internet usage
between men and women (Central Statistics Office, 2013). However, those under 45 were
significantly more likely to use the internet than those 45 and older, and those aged
between 45 and 59 were much more likely to use the internet than those aged 60 and
over. In terms of the relationship between socio-economic status and internet usage, the
Central Statistics Office reported that university students and the employed were more
likely to use the internet than the unemployed, homemakers, and the retired. In short,
then, in all of the countries under study, younger, wealthier, and more educated people
were more likely to use the internet and to use it for multiple purposes than older, lower
income, and less-educated people. Combining these observations then, I would anticipate
that organizations that oppose marriage equality would favor offline over online
communication methods, while those in favor of marriage equality would be more
intensive users of online communication tools. In order to explore this, I used several
pieces of data. First, I considered the overall adoption scores of the pro- and antimarriage equality organizations under study. Second, I referred to my survey data, in
particular, to the questions related to preferred methods of communication. Finally, I
discussed the issue with my interview subjects.
Looking at their overall levels of DICT adoption, I did not, in the course of my
qualitative examination of the organizations’ online materials, note any clear and
systematic differences in online sophistication between conservative and liberal
organizations. Looking at their quantitative adoption scores too, there was only a modest
106

difference in the mean adoption scores of conservative (5.26) and liberal (5.87)
organizations, though this small difference is in the expected direction4. However, in my
qualitative exploration, I did note that some differences, specifically that the conservative
organizations tended to have more sophisticated websites, and that the liberal
organizations tended to offer more interactive online options and, to a degree, to use
social media more intensively. I looked at the individual components of my quantitative
adoption score to support this impression. In terms of website sophistication, by which I
mean the use of basic web affordances, conservative organization did score slightly
higher on average than liberal organizations, with an average of 4.1 to liberal
organizations’ 3.95. When looking at organizations use of social media, I created two
metrics. First, I had a simple 0 to 3 scaled measure of whether or not organizations used
the three social media platforms I measures. Second, I created a measure that included the
variables measuring the use of the social media platforms and the five measure of the
frequency with which they are updated. On the first measure, conservative organizations
scored 1.8 and liberal organizations scored 2.2, suggesting there was a small difference
between organizations’ propensity to use social media by ideology6. On the second
measure, however, there was a clearer difference – conservative organizations scored an
average of 4.1, while liberal organizations scored an average of 5.27. Finally, when
considering my measure of interactivity, on average, liberal organizations scored slightly

4

My sample was too small for meaningful statistical testing. However, I did run a t-test of the difference
between the two means, and found that there no statistically significant difference between the means,
which adds weight to my impression that there was little clear overall difference.
5
This difference is not statistically significant, but it is suggestive.
6
Again, the difference was not statistically significant, but was in the expected direction.
7
This difference, too, was not statistically significant, but is in the expected direction.
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higher with 2 than conservative organizations did with 1.78. Overall, then, conservative
websites showed a slight tendency to have better developed websites, while liberal
organizations showed a slight tendency to use and update social media more and to be
slightly more interactive. The number of organizations under study is too small for formal
statistical analysis – the small differences I found might reach statistical significance in a
larger sample – but it is interesting that the differences are generally in the expected
direction, even though they are not meaningful in size.
However, overall, the online activities of conservative organizations were, on
average, no less sophisticated than those of liberal organizations. This first piece of
evidence, then, suggests that ideology and the characteristics of organizations’ target
audiences are unrelated to the sophistication with which organizations adopt DICTs.
However, without a comparison to offline activities, this analysis is partial at best. I thus
turned to an analysis of secondary sources and to my survey and interview data to attempt
to determine the extent to which organizations used offline communication methods.
An analysis of my survey materials showed some interesting patterns. There was
no difference between conservative and liberal organizations’ tendency to use online
tools like e-mail, their websites, and social media. However, when it came to offline
technologies like postal mail and the telephone, conservative organizations reported a
greater tendency to utilize these tools9. My interview respondents echoed this finding.

8

Again, the difference is not statistically significant, but is in the expected direction.
The sample size for my organizational survey is far too small for statistical analysis, what I report here are
differences for which I did not test significance. For example, among the organizations I surveyed, no
liberal organizations reported frequently using the postal service to communicate with members or the
public, but four conservative organizations did; and while two liberal organizations reported never using
the postal service to communicate with members or the public, no conservative organization did. Chisquare tests were impossible due to the small cell numbers.
9
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Ted10, who is responsible for updating and maintaining the website of an English
organization that lobbies religious bodies to maintain traditional family values, noted that
his organization frequently used postal mail to communicate with supporters and solicit
donations, saying, “We put a lot of effort into maintaining and updating our site, of
course, but a lot of our members are older folks who prefer not to bother with the
internet. So, for them, we produce snail-mail stuff, and send it out to them in the post. We
get good response from those mailing too, people will ring us up at the offices to chat
over something we mentioned in the mailings.”
Sara11, the young woman responsible for communications at a pro-marriage
equality Irish organization, said, “We don’t really bother that much with the post. I mean,
we find our members are mostly happier if we get in touch with them on e-mail – they’re
responsive to that form. When we’ve tried a blanket mailing, we just haven’t found it to
be worthwhile. No one responds, and it’s hard to know if it worked at all. So we like to
stick with our e-mail, and our site.”
I did not find a great deal of relevant secondary evidence; news reports tended to
focus on mass events and on lobbying campaigns such as petition drives, and there did
not seem to be any clear differences between liberal and conservative organizations’
propensity to engage in these behaviors. Nevertheless, based on my analysis of online
materials and my survey data and of my interviews, I suggest that ideology and target
audience do not significantly influence organizations’ propensity to use online tools, but
rather their propensity to use offline tools. While liberal organizations targeting younger
people were just as likely to use various DICTs as conservative organizations targeting
10
11

Not his real name, see footnote 2
Not her real name, see footnote 2

109

older people, they were less likely to use offline technologies. Based on my interviews, I
conclude that this is driven by two factors. First, conservative organizations are acutely
aware of the imperative to have an online presence and to be engaged with new
technologies. Although at present there is a sizeable gap between the use of the internet
by the young and by older people, this gap is likely to shrink over the years as people age
and as the internet becomes ever-more embedded in daily life. Thus, for organizations
and advocacy workers that anticipate a long-term involvement in social issues, it is
important to begin building online skills and capacities. Furthermore, as several of my
interview subjects pointed out, large donors expect to see online efforts at the
organizations that they fund. An organization that is not seen to be active online may find
it more difficult to raise money from large donors and organizations. Therefore,
conservative organizations have a number of incentives to make an effort to develop their
online capacity.
Second, however, they are also aware that many of their members are less
comfortable online, and therefore of the need to communicate using offline tools. While
conservative organizations have incentives to pursue online efforts, they are also aware
that their members and supporters are often more comfortable with offline
communication. Older people may, for example, be more comfortable donating with a
check in the mail than through an online portal, and thus conservative organizations see
value in maintaining their offline communications efforts. In contrast, the younger people
who are more likely to donate to and participate in liberal organizations that promote
same-sex marriage are likely to be more comfortable online. Liberal organizations,
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therefore, have no incentive to engage in extensive offline communications efforts;
instead, they have many reasons to focus on online communication.
Angela12, a young woman responsible for communications activities at a
conservative organization based in London, explained these pressures: “Well, we have to
be online. Everyone is online these days, and if you don’t have a good website, or
Twitter, then some members ask why not. They want to see you moving into the twentyfirst century, and talking to young people. But then, of course, a lot of our older members
want their newsletters in the post and their donation forms. So we do both. We have to do
both, and be seen doing both, if you understand me.”
These findings have some interesting implications for conservative organizations,
not least of which is that it could tend to impose higher costs on them. While liberal
organizations may be able to minimize their use of offline technologies like the postal
service, which tend to be more expensive than online equivalents like e-mail,
conservative organizations must find room in their budgets both to develop their online
presence and to deploy offline tools. Thus, social activism could potentially be costlier
for conservative organizations than their liberal peers, at least at present. It is also
interesting that I found little meaningful overall difference between conservative and
liberal organizations’ online adoption practices, given that much of the literature suggests
that there would be a notable gap. In chapters five and six I delve more deeply into this
finding in my discussion section, as it made such a marked contrast to the existing
evidence, and I propose some explanations as to why I found this.

12

Not her real name, see footnote 2
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The role of staff characteristics. As discussed in earlier chapters, it was not only
member characteristics that I anticipated may play a role in organizations’ propensity to
adopt DICTs, it was also the characteristics of their staff. Specifically, I argued that it
might be that younger, more-educated staff would be associated with a greater propensity
to adopt DICTs. In order to explore this relationship, I gathered various types of data
about organizational staff. First, when analyzing organizations’ web presence, I took
notes about staff wherever possible. Not all websites offered this information, and in
some cases, the only data on offer was a photograph of a staff event shared on Twitter, or
a similarly unstructured piece of evidence. I made notes of all the online evidence I was
able to find. Second, I considered the data from my survey, which inquired about staff
characteristics. Third, I examined news coverage to try and identify staff members and
their characteristics. Finally, I discussed organizational staff and their influence on
communications processes with my interview subjects. Not all of the organizations under
study were included in my survey and interviews, nor did they all provide information on
their staff. I was therefore unable to gather comparable information on all of the
organizations under study. However, by considering data drawn from my survey and
interviews, and the data I was able to glean from organizational websites and press
coverage of organizations, I was able to draw some tentative conclusions about the
relationship between staff and DICT adoption.
First, as I noted earlier, somewhat unexpectedly, organizations with a larger staff
tended to score higher on DICT adoption than organizations with a smaller staff. While
the literature hypothesized that organizations that engaged intensively with DICTs would
tend to have smaller staff complements due to the cost savings and efficiencies generated
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by DICTs, I found the opposite to be true; overall, the bigger an organizations’ staff, the
better it tended to score in terms of DICT adoption. It seems that while DICT tools like
Facebook or Twitter may, themselves, be free to use, the management and maintenance
thereof demands a reasonably large organization that is able to devote time and resources
to DICT-related tasks. I will discuss this insight further in chapter six. Second, in the
course of my exploration of the relationship between staff characteristics and DICT
adoption, I also found that organizations that employed more young people as a
proportion of their staff showed a slight tendency to score higher on DICT adoption. This
pattern was less clear, but this was primarily because it was challenging to get good data
on staff age and so I could consider only the small number of organizations for such data
were available. Nevertheless, I did find some relationship between having a more
youthful staff and DICT adoption; in particular, organizations with a greater proportion
of younger staff members tended to update their social media slightly more frequently.
This impression was supported by a comment from Angela13, a young employee at a
conservative organization, who said, “In a way it’s helpful to have younger staff. Like,
for example, it’s easier to get our younger staff to just dash off some Twitter updates.
They just do it without a fuss, whereas the older staff forget to do it or just don’t think
about it. So, maybe, the habits that the younger staff people have are a little bit helpful.”
Similarly, Keith noted, “Well, for me, it would be great to have someone younger
and more interested in the social media onboard. I think that the lack of a young person or
two in the team makes it – I don’t want to say harder – just makes it more instinctive to
use those things.”

13

Not her real name, see footnote 2
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There were no other clear patterns of relationships between staff characteristics
and DICT adoption; for example, I was unable to find a relationship between staff
education or social status and DICT adoption. However, it may be that I simply wasn’t
able to detect the differences that exist due to the limitations of my data. Overall, the only
patterns I was able to identify with respect the relationship between DICT adoption and
staff characteristics was that a higher proportion of young staff members tended to be
associated with more intensive use of DICTs, and a larger staff was associated with more
intensive DICT adoption.
Upon considering the data I had gathered and my qualitative notes, I further noted
some suggestive patterns in the relationship between staff and DICT adoption and
organizational ideology. Overall, conservative organizations tended to employ slightly
more staff members than liberal organizations. This was not uniformly true; there were
many liberal organizations with a large number of employees such as the Human Rights
Campaign with its staff of around 160, and many conservative organizations with a very
small staff. However, among the organizations for which I was able to determine staff
numbers with some degree of certainty, including the organizations that responded to my
survey, the conservative organizations tended to employ slightly more people than the
liberal ones14. Further, the organizations with the biggest staffs were both conservative15.
As noted, the more staff an organization has, the more sophisticated its DICT adoption
14

The difference in the average number of staff members between liberal and conservative organizations
was 2 people, with the liberal organizations averaging 21 employees and the conservative organizations
averaging 23. However, in calculating this I excluded the two biggest conservative organizations, Focus on
the Family and Concerned Women for America, which both had several hundred staff members, and the
Human Rights Campaign which had 160, as including these have a distorted picture of staff numbers. Most
organizations had around 22 staff members.
15
As noted in the previous footnote, Focus on the Family had around 650 staff members, and Concerned
Women for America had around 540. These organizations, however, focus on a range of issues beyond gay
rights, and are not therefore directly comparable to the other organizations I studied, many of which were
focused exclusively on marriage equality.
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tends to be. Yet, liberal organizations, which tend to employ slightly fewer staff members
than conservative ones, perform as well as their conservative peers when it comes to
DICT adoption. This conundrum is explained, in part, by the fact that liberal
organizations show some tendency to employ younger people than conservative ones,
which is unsurprising given my earlier argument that younger people are more likely to
support the goals of gay rights organizations. Conservative organizations do employ
young people, but young people tend to make up a smaller proportion of their staff than is
the case at liberal organizations16. In other words, a typical conservative organization’s
staff will be slightly larger than a typical liberal organization’s staff, and will have a
slightly lower proportion of young people. As I will discuss in more detail in chapter six,
this finding, together with data from my interviews with conservative organizations, lead
me to tentatively hypothesize that conservative organizations have actively expanded
their staff and sought out younger employees in part to improve their online profile. In
other words, conservative organizations have compensated for any online disadvantages
that their slightly older staff may have imposed by increasing the number of staff they
employ. Again, this would tend to add to the costs that conservative organizations must
incur in order to engage in activism, and explains in part why liberal and conservative
organizations tend to score equally well on DICT adoption measures; liberal
organizations have the advantage of younger staff members, while conservative
organizations have the advantage of slightly larger staff complements. This is an
16

The data I was able to gather about staff age was limited. However, using the information I gathered in
my organizational survey, and the elite interviews I conducted, I was able to determine some detail about
the staff ages at twenty four organizations. Typically, liberal organizations were more likely to report
having staff members aged 18 to 24 – some conservative organizations reported having no staff members
aged 18 to 24, and fewer conservative organizations had staff members aged 25 to 34 than liberal
organizations. They were, however, equally likely to report having staff members in all other age categories
(see appendix two for details on age categories).
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interesting difference that was not apparent when I considered only the relationship
between staff size and DICT adoption, because on average, the relationship between the
two is, as described, a positive one.
Out-party Innovation
The fourth key factor that I anticipated would affect the degree to which the
organizations under study adopted DICTs was their position in the political landscape. As
discussed in the literature review, Karpf (2012) has argued that, according to Mayhew
(1974/2004), one of the factors that may drive political entities to innovate online is the
position that they hold in the field of discourse. Specifically, if an individual is promoting
a policy or political position that is marginal in the politics of his or her country, he or she
is more likely to look for innovative ways to spread his or her messages, including
innovating online. Similarly, an individual promoting a policy or political position that
enjoys widespread support in his or her country is less likely to innovate. The underlying
idea here is that when a political entity like a campaign or an advocacy organization finds
itself promoting an idea that runs contrary to the tide of popular opinion, it must look for
innovative ways to reach and persuade people. Conservatives in the United States, for
example, once found themselves struggling to get their messages into mainstream media
outlets. In response, they engaged in innovative practices with direct mailing and talk
radio (Jamieson & Capella, 2008; Viguerie & Frank, 2004). Similarly, Karpf (2009,
2012) argues that when liberals found themselves marginalized by the political
mainstream during the Bush years, they engaged in innovation online to try to build and
reach constituencies. I therefore argued in the preceding chapters that organizations that
found themselves marginalized by the tide of public opinion, legislative policy and media
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coverage would have an incentive to find innovative ways to share their messages and
reach supporters. I further argued that it was likely that some of this innovation would
occur online, as DICTs offer organizations a way to reach mass audiences without the
intermediation of mainstream traditional media outlets, and a way to activate and
capitalize on the social networks of supporters. I thus anticipated that organizations that
held out-party views would be more likely to adopt DICTs in innovative and intensive
ways.
The first step in analyzing the extent to which this was true, I had to determine
which organizations would be considered out-parties. In order to assess whether or not
the organizations under study would be considered in- or out-parties, I analyzed the
positions of the governments of the countries in which these organizations operate with
respect to gay rights, and considered the tone of public opinion, which I discussed earlier
in my evaluation of public opinion polling data from the three countries under study.
In the US, as discussed earlier, the Democratic Party can be considered the
incumbent party for the period under study. The Democratic Party explicitly supports
marriage equality; the 2012 Democratic Party Platform states: “We support the right of
all families to have equal respect, responsibilities, and protections under the law. We
support marriage equality and support the movement to secure equal treatment under law
for same-sex couples …We oppose discriminatory federal and state constitutional
amendments and other attempts to deny equal protection of the laws to committed samesex couples who seek the same respect and responsibilities as other married couples. We
support the full repeal of the so-called Defense of Marriage Act and the passage of the
Respect for Marriage Act.” In addition, as the survey data cited earlier indicates, a slim
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majority of Americans support marriage equality. Thus, I consider organizations in the
United States that support marriage equality and gay rights to be in-parties, and those that
oppose marriage equality to be out-parties.
In the United Kingdom, a coalition government with the Conservative Party as the
senior partner and the Liberal Democrats as the junior partner ruled during the period
under study. The Liberal Democrats are long-time supporters of marriage equality and
gay rights (Liberal Democrats, n.d.). The Conservative Party has a more mixed record of
support for gay marriage, and while Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron
endorsed gay marriage and supported Britain’s move to legalizing same-sex marriage,
many Conservatives opposed the move (Taylor, 2014). Nevertheless, given the majority
support for marriage equality in Britain, the position of the incumbent Liberal Democrats,
and the position of the leadership of the Conservative Party, I consider organizations in
the United Kingdom that support marriage equality and gay rights to be in-parties, and
those that oppose marriage equality to be out-parties.
In Ireland, a coalition government of Fine Gael and the Labour Party ruled during
the period under study. At its 2012 annual meeting, Fine Gael, the stronger partner,
endorsed a motion calling on government to prioritize consideration of same-sex
marriage, an at its 2014 meeting, voted to support marriage equality in Irelands upcoming
referendum (GLEN, 2012, 2014). For its part, the Labour Party has long supported
marriage equality and gay rights (Gilmore, 2009). The support of the incumbent parties,
together with widespread support for gay marriage in Ireland leads me to consider
organizations in Ireland that support marriage equality and gay rights to be in-parties, and
those that oppose marriage equality to be out-parties.
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I therefore determined that, during the period under study, in all of the countries
under study organizations that support gay rights were in-parties while their conservative
counterparts were out-parties, in the sense that in all cases, the incumbent political parties
supported marriage equality, as did majority public opinion. Per Karpf (2012) and
Mayhew (1974/2004) , this would likely give organizations that oppose marriage equality
an incentive to find new and innovative ways to communicate their messages.
I then examined the relationship between out-party status and organizations’
tendency to adopt DICTs. Once again, it is difficult to separate ideology from out-party
status, as the two are closely intertwined in the countries under study. Nevertheless it is
worth noting that, while the literature leads me to anticipate that the out-party
organizations will tend to adopt DICTs more intensively, in actuality, out-party
conservative organizations displayed a comparable level of DICT adoption to their liberal
peers; if anything, conservative organizations were slightly, but not meaningfully, less
likely to adopt DICTs to favor potentially innovative tools like online interactivity and
social media. In other words, it seems that conservative organizations did not react as
expected to their out-party status. In terms of the literature, one would expect that as
conservative organizations found themselves advocating for a position that was losing
favor among the public and in the halls of power, namely the preservation of marriage as
a heterosexual institution, they would turn to innovative online strategies to try and gain
new supporters and turn the tide; this is the process that Karpf (2012) argues goes some
way to explaining Moveon.org’s success; progressives who found their goals and ideas
out of favor turned to online innovation to reverse their fortunes. We might thus
reasonably expect that conservative organizations, finding themselves the out-party in an
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important debate, would have a strong incentive to innovate online in order to fight the
tide of opinion. Instead, conservative organizations, while committed to a strong online
presence, seem somewhat less eager to embrace potentially innovative tools like social
media and online interactivity than their liberal peers.
There are several potential explanations for this. First, it is possible that, in the
period under study, conservative opponents of marriage equality were not, in fact, the
out-party. Same-sex marriage was, at the time, still illegal in almost all cases in the
countries under study, and thus in a sense, those who oppose it were, by default,
victorious. However, I do not think this is an adequate explanation. While it is true that
same-sex marriage was still illegal, in all of the countries under study, marriage equality
advocates had won major victories. As I will discuss in detail in chapters five and six,
public opinion had undergone major changes, swinging from disapproval to approval in a
relatively short time, and in all the countries under study, major political parties had
reversed their stance on the issue or made clear policy statements in support of marriage
equality. A number of ballots, amendments, and new laws were either pending or being
implemented permitting same-sex marriage, and there were moves in all three countries
to permit marriage equality at the national level. Thus, I would argue that at the time,
conservative organizations in fact felt their out-party status keenly, an observation that
was substantiated by comments from my interview subjects to the effect that they felt
themselves to be on the outside of the debate and losing ground. If, as Karpf (2012)
explains, being the out-party means feeling that your organization’s stance on an issue is
unable to gain traction in political debate and has little support, and that your
organization is struggling to make itself heard in the public arena, I argue that in the
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period under study, conservative organizations were certainly out-parties. I am furthered
strengthened in this conviction by the fact that, in my interviews with gay rights
organizations, they expressed a sense that they had the ears of the powerful, the support
of the public, and momentum for their ideological victory, which qualities define in-party
status.
A second possible explanation is that it might be that conservative organizations
believe that the fight around marriage equality is unwinnable and that it is therefore
improvident to dedicate resources to it. However, this seems unlikely, given the deep
conviction of many of these organizations. As Angela17 said, “We don’t pick our issues
based on if we can win, they come from our convictions and from spiritual imperatives.
It’s not that we think one thing is a good issue for us and another is hopeless, so we pick
the first. We work on issues that matter to people of faith, no matter if they seem hopeless
or what public opinion is.” This kind of dedication to social issues is fairly common at
conservative organizations, as I found in my study of their web materials and in
conversations with them. Thus, I do not believe that apathy is a plausible explanation of
the failure of conservative organizations to innovate when they find themselves in an outparty position.
A third possible explanation is that conservative organizations may be responding
to their position in the political landscape with innovation, but that this innovation is not
occurring online. I found some evidence for this. For example, Ted explained that much
of the work his organization does involves lobbying within the structures of the church
and among political leaders. “The website matter to us, of course it does. We invest in it.

17

Not her real name, see footnote 2
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But a lot of the real action of what we do is happening offline. We are in the churches,
talking to church leadership and encouraging them to take a stand with parishioners. We
are talking to local leaders who rely on support from parishioners, and telling them that
this matters to us. We are face-to-face, a lot of the time, we’re talking face-to-face with
people and building institutional levels of support.” Comments like this one, coupled with
my finding that conservative organizations are more active with offline communication
than their liberal peers, suggests that conservative organizations may be attempting to
develop innovative strategies to counteract their position as an out-party outside of the
online world. Given their imperative to target the older people who are more likely to
support them, this would make sense; it may be that for conservative organizations, it is
more important to innovate offline and attempt to reach older people who are more likely
to support them than it is to innovate online and attempt to sway resistant young people.
This is an area for future research, but I suggest that this tentative finding may indicate
that online innovation is just one among many avenues open to organizations, even those
in developed democracies, and that organizations invest resources and make strategic
decisions based on what is likely to best serve their ends, even if that means neglecting
online opportunities. In other words, despite the assumption in much of the literature that
organizations will necessarily turn to DICTs more and more as time goes on because such
tools have some obvious advantages for such organizations, it may be that the process is
more complex, and that organizations will adopt DICTs only if they believe that such
tools will in fact help them achieve their goals. Further study of organizations that choose
to eschew online tools would be helpful in exploring this issue.
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A fourth possible explanation is that conservative organizations would like to
innovate online, but are unable to do so due to a lack of skills or opportunity. It seems
unlikely that skills are a limiting factor for conservative organizations. As noted, they
tend to have slightly larger staffs than liberal organizations, which suggests that they
would have the resources to hire people with relevant online skills should they be needed.
It is possible, of course, that their relative lack of younger staff members when compared
to liberal organizations means that they tend to have a smaller pool of informal online
skills among their staff, but the differences in staff ages did not seem stark enough for
this explanation to suffice. In terms of opportunity, it is possible that, as a maturing
phenomenon, the internet offers less potential for innovation than it did in the early
2000s, the period during which much of the literature cited was produced. Being the first
organization to deploy e-mail as a tool for political mobilization, as Moveon.org was, was
only possible when e-mail was a relatively new technology; the same holds true for the
use of Facebook and so on. However, innovations in mobile internet, the development of
apps for mobile devices, and so on seem to offer the potential for innovation by advocacy
organizations, and this seems an inadequate explanation for the failure of conservative
organizations to innovate online in response to their out-party statues. As I will discuss in
the next section, though, it is possible that conservative organizations’ ability to innovate
online has been stifled by their opponents’ first-mover advantage.
First-mover Advantage
The present study is cross-sectional. I did not study the evolution of my selected
organizations’ online activities over a period of several years, and thus it was difficult for
me to gather good data the extent to which different organizations benefited from first123

mover advantage. Nevertheless, by combining several sources of data, I was able to draw
some conclusions about the role that first-mover advantage plays in the adoption of
DICTs by the organizations under study.
As outlined in the literature review, one of the explanations proposed for why
some organizations fail to adopt DICTs was that, because they were slower to move
online as the technology emerged, when they belatedly arrived in the online space, they
found that it had already been colonized by their ideological opponents and that they
were therefore unable to build their own ideological communities online due to trolling
by the already-established communities of their opponents. In order to evaluate the extent
to which this was a factor driving DICT adoption among my organizations, I gathered
several types of data. First, I explored organizations’ online forums and the comments on
their blogs, websites, and social media pages in order to note whether or not their posts
attracted critics. Here, I made several interesting observations. Among the organizations I
surveyed, a higher proportion of liberal organizations offered online forums (11.5%) and
allowed comments (30.7%) than conservative organizations (9% and 18.2%,
respectively). Overall, a very small proportion of the organizations under study included
web 2.0 interactive elements (31.3%), but they were more common among liberal
organizations18. In addition, in my qualitative evaluation of online materials, while I
seldom found critical comments from conservatives on liberal forums or blogs, I found
quite a number of critical comments from liberals on conservative blogs and forums. In
other words, liberals were more likely to criticize conservatives on conservative pages
18

I ran statistical tests on each of the interactive elements, and for the combined interactive variable, and
none of the differences were statistically significant. Nevertheless, the sample size is small, and a larger
sample may have the power to detect significant differences; it is still suggestive that all of the differences
were in the same direction, namely that liberal organizations were more likely to include each of the
interactive elements I measured.
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than vice-versa (it was, however, extremely common for conservatives to criticize
liberals on their own forums and vice-versa). Karpf (2012) describes online trolling as a
key mechanism through which first-mover advantage acts to limit the activity of
ideological opponents, and the evidence I found that conservatives appeared to be
avoiding interactive options and that, where available, such interactive venues attracted
liberal critics, suggests that liberals enjoy a first-mover advantage online when it comes
to issues of gay rights and marriage equality in the three countries under study. This
conclusion is supported by the other data I considered.
My second data source here was my organizational survey, which is included in
appendix two. In the survey, I asked respondents to rank their online communities’
strength and the strength of the online communities of their ideological opponents. Table
4.6 summarizes my results. As can be seen, the liberal organizations I surveyed reported
that their supporters’ online communities were relatively strong, and that the
communities of their opponents were weaker than theirs. In contrast, the conservative
organizations surveyed were confident of the strength of their supporters’ online
communities, but evaluated the online communities of their ideological opponents as
stronger than their own. The sample size here is, of course, small, but coupled with the
earlier evidence I described, these findings strengthen the argument that supporters of
marriage equality and progressive issues have a more robust online presence than their
conservative peers.
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Table 4.6: Organizations' perception of the strength of their supporters' and
opponents' online communities
Strength of your
supporters' online
community

Strength of your
opponents' online
community

Liberal

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative

Very weak

0

0

1

0

Somewhat weak

0

0

3

0

About average

5

1

2

0

Somewhat strong

5

3

3

4

Very strong

0

2

1

2

Finally, my elite interviews confirmed this finding. For example, when asked why
his organization’s website did not include comments from users, Geoff19, the
communications manager for a conservative American group responded, “Well, what we
deal with is controversial, obviously, and I find, that is, we find that if we allow
comments then we get a lot of negative talk. We experimented a bit with this, and
comments just don’t work for us. There are some organizations that have comments and
it works great, but for us, it doesn’t. We get a lot of critical voices, not helpful critical
people, you understand, just people who disagree with us. And that’s discouraging, you
know, for the people who agree with us and who want to comment, they feel like they
can’t comment if there are these negative things there. So we just find it doesn’t work for
us.”
Overall, then, the balance of my evidence suggests that the conservative
organizations I studied have faced resistance as they try to build communities online from
19

Not his real name, see footnote 2
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liberals, who appear to enjoy a first-mover advantage. Their forums and blogs have
attracted liberal trolls, and they have thus been discouraged from offering forums or
allowing comments. Although my lack of time series data makes it difficult for me to
trace the sequences of events that lead to liberals’ stronger online communities, I have
been able to identify what appear to be the consequences of first-mover advantage –
liberals appear to have a robust online community of supporters who are able to act to
limit the ability of conservatives to build similar interactive communities online. Thus, it
appears that one of the reasons why conservative organizations have failed to innovate
online, as might be expected given their out-party status, is the strength of the alreadyestablished online community of liberals. In a sense, then, I find that first-mover
advantage does indeed play a role in the adoption of DICTs; specifically, that when one
group has a first-mover advantage online, it is difficult for another group to build
interactive communities even when incentives exist to doing so, such as out-party status.
Having thoroughly discussed the five factors that I anticipated would play a role
in organizations’ propensity to adopt DICTs, I can now turn to the final element of my
heuristic model, the role of national context.
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLORING THE HEURSTIC MODEL: THE ROLE OF
NATIONAL CONTEXT IN DICT ADOPTION BY SOCIAL MOVEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS
As discussed, the literature contains little suggestion of how organizations’
adoption of DICTs may vary across nations. In much of the scholarship on DICTs and
politics, there seems to be an implicit assumption that, given availability, these
technologies will be universally embraced, and universally used in a way that promotes
democracy, regardless of the broader national context (Pool, 1984). Although this view is
more nuanced in recent scholarship, there has still been little systematic attention paid to
the ways in which national context may influence DICT adoption by advocacy
organizations within democratic countries. In an attempt to address this, I will discuss
how DICT adoption varied across the countries under study, explore how the relationship
between the factors I expected to influence DICT adoption and adoption itself varied
across the countries under study, and suggests some additional reasons for the variation.
Cross-National Differences in DICT Adoption.
There were some clear differences in adoption across the three countries under
study. As table 5.1 illustrates, organizations based in United States scored higher on their
overall adoption scores and on their social media scores than the combined averages for
their Irish and British counterparts; the differences in terms of interactivity were,
however, negligible20.

20

My sample was too small for meaningful statistical tests. Nevertheless, in order to strengthen my
assumption that the differences between organizations in the U.S. and their European counterparts were
meaningful, I ran a t-test on the difference between the average for organizations in the United States and
the combined average for organizations in Ireland and the United Kingdom. The differences between the
U.K. and Ireland were very small and insignificant; while, the US scored significantly higher than both
groups. I therefore elected to compare the U.S. to the combined scores for Ireland and the U.K., which
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Country

Table 5.1: Average adoption scores by country
Average
Average
social
overall
media
adoption
score
score

Average
interactivit
y score

United States

6.8

5.8

2

United Kingdom

4.8

3.7

1.8

Ireland

4.9

4.3

1.7

Qualitatively, I noted several differences between the US websites and their Irish
and British peers (there were far fewer differences between the Irish and British sites). In
particular, my exploration of web materials suggested that a greater proportion of U.S.
sites were highly sophisticated than was the case in Ireland or Britain. An examination of
the frequency distributions for the overall adoption scores of organizations based in the
different countries offers some support for this impression. Figure 5.1 shows the
frequency distribution of the adoption scores of U.S. organizations. As you can see, there
are two distinct groups of organizations: a small cluster of unsophisticated sites, and a
larger cluster of more sophisticated sites. In addition, there is a large group of sites right
at the top of the range.
Contrast this with figure 5.2, which shows the distribution for British
organizations. As can be seen, the distribution of adoption scores is closer to a normal

enabled me to combine all my cases in the t-test, giving it more power. I found that the difference in overall
adoption score and social media score were statistically significant, while the interactivity difference was
not. My sample included only 48 organizations, 19 of which were American and 29 of which were Irish
and British. Thus, although this test should not be relied upon, it does strengthen my argument that
American organizations outperformed their European counterparts.
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distribution, with organizations spread more evenly along the spectrum of sophistication,
and with relatively fewer organizations at the high-end of the range.

Figure 5.1: Frequency distribution of overall adoption score for American
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Figure 5.2: Frequency distribution of overall adoption score for British
organizations
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Figure 5.3: Frequency distribution of overall adoption score for Irish organizations
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Finally, consider figure 5.3, which shows the distribution for Irish organizations.
Once again, there is a more even spread across the range of scores, with fewer
organizations at the high and low ends.
These are suggestive patterns. In my assessment, the pattern in Figure 5.1
indicates that the typical American organization is likely to be a relatively intensive
adopter of DICTs, and that the reason I did not find even more-striking differences in the
scores when grouped cross-nationally is that my sample included three organizations that
were clearly outliers. The three organizations that scored on the low end of the U.S. range
were Defend the Family, Heterosexuals Organized for a Moral Environment, and the
Institute for Marriage and Public Policy. These organizations are unusual compared to the
rest of the organizations in the sample, including the British and Irish organizations. Both
Heterosexuals Organized for a Moral Environment and the Institute for Marriage and
Public Policy are organizations established and, as far as I was able to determine, staffed
by a single person; Defend the Family is a religious group associated with Abiding Truth
Ministries, an organization best known for promoting legislation in Uganda that imposes
the death penalty for homosexual activity (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.).. A close
reading of the content of these three sites and that of the sites of other conservative
groups in all three countries revealed that these three sites tend to promote arguments that
are more extreme than those of their conservative peers; they argue, for example, that
homosexuals intentionally indoctrinate heterosexual young people into gay lifestyles, and
that there is a secret homosexual agenda dedicated to abolishing the family unit and
heterosexual relationships. None of the conservative American sites that had higher
adoption scores included such extreme rhetoric, and none of the Irish or British sites did
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either; typically their arguments emphasized scriptural reasons for the prohibition of
same-sex marriage and issues related to building and maintaining stable family units in
the face of changing definitions of marriage. In the next chapter, which addresses
supplemental organization-level factors that may drive DICT adoption, I will discuss how
the DICT adoption of this organizations may be related to the relatively extreme rhetoric
these three sites promote, and the position this places them in with relation to the broader
political discourse. More generally, and pertinently to the issue of cross-national
difference, the data indicate that American organizations are more sophisticated than their
European peers; I will address some potential explanations for this in the sections below.
Another set of cross-national differences that I noted related to social media
usage. First, I noted that the U.S.-based organizations tended to attract more likes,
followers, and subscribers on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube than their British and Irish
peers. However, it is likely that this is in large part a function of the fact that the
population of America is much larger than the population of the U.K. and Ireland. Social
movement organizations based in these different countries would primarily be of interest
to citizens of those countries, and thus Irish organizations would have a smaller potential
audience of citizens than American organizations. According to the World Bank, in 2013
the population of Ireland was 4.6 million, the population of the U.K. was 64 million, and
the population of the U.S. was 316 million (World Bank, 2013c). This pattern is echoed
by the pattern of social media popularity in my data. For example, the U.S. attracted the
greatest number of followers on Twitter, with an average of 51,483, followed by the U.K.
with an average of 15,244, and then Ireland with an average of 2,119; the number of
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followers follows the pattern one might expect if it was driven, at least in part, by total
population21.
Table 5.2: Organizational social media use by country
% using
Facebook

% using
Twitter

% using
YouTube

%
updating
Facebook
daily

United States

79%

84%

74%

68%

68%

42%

United
Kingdom

67%

67%

27%

33%

47%

27%

Ireland

79%

71%

50%

64%

36%

7%

Country

%
updating
Twitter
daily

%
updating
YouTube
fortnightly

Second, as I mentioned earlier, U.S. organizations scored higher on an index of
social media adoption than their British and Irish peers. Table 5.2 breaks down some of
the key elements of the index22; there are some clear differences that are in line with the
overall finding that U.S. organizations are more intensive adopters of DICTs than their
European peers. Interestingly, in terms of social media use, organizations in the U.K. tend
to lag organizations in both the U.S. and Ireland, but, while fewer British organizations
use social media than Irish organizations, they also tend to update them more regularly
(with the exception of Facebook). However, U.S. organizations are more likely to use and
update social media than organizations in either European country.
In terms of issues of interactivity, I did not note any major cross-national
differences. Interactive options were relatively rare across all organizations, and there
was no clear pattern linked to national context.

21
The patterns were broadly the same for Facebook and YouTube, although the magnitudes of the
differences varied.
22
For brevity, I excluded my measures of whether or not the organization had updated Facebook and
Twitter in the previous week.
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Overall, then, my data shows clear cross-national differences. In particular,
American organizations are significantly more sophisticated in terms of the DICT
adoption than their peers in Ireland and England, and more engaged with social media. In
the following section, I will note some key cross-national differences in the factors
driving DICT adoption that were included in my heuristic model and how they relate to
the cross-national differences in DICT adoption that I have identified; I will then move to
a discussion of possible explanations for these differences.
Cross-National Differences in the Factors Driving DICT Adoption
There were a number of suggestive cross-national differences among
organizations related to the factors in my heuristic model. For the purposes of this
discussion, I will discuss only those differences that were meaningful, and that offer
some insight into the different patterns of DICT adoption that I found in the three
countries under study.
Ideology. One difference that stood out upon analyzing my data was how the
relationship between ideology and DICT adoption differed dramatically across the
countries under study. Table 5.3 shows mean overall adoption scores for organizations
grouped by country and by ideology. As you can see, there were no major differences
between liberal and conservative organizations in Britain and Ireland, but overall,
conservative organizations tended to score slightly higher than liberal organizations23. In
the United States, in contrast, there was a stark difference between liberal and
conservative organizations, with liberals scoring much higher than their conservative
23

I conducted t-tests of the group differences, and found that only the difference between conservative and
liberal groups in the United States was statistically significant. However, once again, the small and nonrandom nature of my sample means that this is not irrefutable evidence of a difference. It is, however, clear
that differences were bigger in the United States, a finding that was echoed in my qualitative notes about
the web materials I examined.
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peers. In fact, liberal U.S. organizations were the highest scorers overall. This is an
interesting finding. First, it suggests that the negligible ideology-related differences I
found when examining all of the organizations pooled together was a function of the fact
that in the U.S., conservative organizations score poorly compared to liberal
organizations while in Ireland and the U.K., conservative organizations have a slight but
not meaningful edge over their liberal counterparts. This underscores the fact that a
pattern that applies in the U.S. context may not apply elsewhere, and that cross-national
comparison has a role to play in identifying ways in which the use of DICTs varies across
nations and in explaining why that may be so.
Table 5.3: Mean adoption scores by country and ideology
Mean adoption score:
Mean adoption score:
Country
Liberal
Conservative
United States

8.1

5.5

United
Kingdom

4.5

5.1

Ireland

4.8

5

However, these aggregates do not convey the whole story. As discussed earlier,
three conservative organizations in the United States appeared to be outliers with respect
to their DICT adoption, and these organizations skewed the overall results24. More
importantly, I do not believe that the differences I have identified here are a consequence
of ideology itself. If it were the case that liberals had an inherent, ideological advantage
online then one would expect that advantage to manifest across all three of the countries

24
Excluding the three outlier organizations, the mean adoption score for conservative organizations rises to
7.3, and there is no longer a statistically significant difference between conservative and liberal American
organizations. This is in keeping with my impression of the sophistication of mainstream conservative
organizations’ DICT adoption.
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under study. Given that liberals enjoy a clear advantage in the U.S. and lag conservatives
in the U.K. and Ireland, it seems clear that there is no inherent advantage accruing to
organizations based solely on their ideological orientation. This is, I believe, positive
finding as it suggests that there is no innate reason why groups espousing conservative
rhetoric should find themselves at a disadvantage when attempting to use new
communication technologies. From the perspective of encouraging broad political debate
and allowing multiple viewpoints to impress themselves on public discussion, this is a
positive finding.
As I will discuss in the following sections, I suggest that, rather than springing
from ideology, the differences in DICT adoption I have observed are a consequence of
several factors, including liberal first-mover advantage, and several unique characteristics
of the U.S., British, and Irish political environments, and of the outlier U.S. conservative
organizations. One interesting point to note here is that these findings provide evidence
that it is not the characteristics of groups or organizational staff that lead to particular
patterns of DICT adoption. In all three of the countries, individuals who opposed
marriage equality shared the same relevant demographic characteristics, in particular, that
they tended to be older; they were also more likely to be male and to an extent, less
educated. Given the relationship between age and DICT usage, then, we might expect
that, if it is the characteristics of the people that organizations target that drives their
DICT adoption, conservative organizations would show a lower propensity to adopt
DICTs than their liberal peers. However, this cross-national comparison shows clearly
that this is not so, because although conservative individuals’ characteristics are very
similar across all three countries, the patterns of difference between the adoption of
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DICTs by liberal and conservative organizations vary. In other words, this study provides
good evidence that it is not the individual characteristics of groups or their ideology that
drives DICT adoption, but rather other factors related to the political environment and the
historical development of online activism; this is an important finding that would not
have been possible in the absence of a cross-national comparison. In the sections that
follow, I will discuss some of these factors.
Out-party status and first mover advantage. When I previously discussed outparty status, I concluded that, overall, in all three of the countries under study
conservative organizations were out-parties in the politics of marriage equality and gay
rights. However, while this is true, the degree to which conservative organizations find
themselves on the margin of the debates of the day differs by country. In Ireland, for
example, public opinion is strongly in favor of marriage equality, with 76% of Irish
voters expressing support for the upcoming referendum on the issue (Red C Research,
2013). In the U.K., however, support is much lower, with 55% of voters saying they
support marriage equality (YouGov, 2013). Finally, in the U.S., support for marriage
equality is around 52%, although it should be noted that there has been a rapid and
significant shift in American attitudes towards same-sex marriage; support for marriage
equality increased by 21 percentage points between 2003 and 2013 (Public Religion
Research Institute, 2014). In terms of political support, in the U.K, two of the three major
parties have long advocated in favor of marriage equality, as has Conservative Prime
Minister David Cameron; among the traditional opponents of marriage equality in the
Conservative party, there is a split, and the party has no unified position on the issue. In
Ireland, all of the major political parties have endorsed same sex marriage. Meanwhile, in
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the U.S., the Republican Party has a firm and almost-unified stance on the issue; only
eight of the 279 Republicans in Congress supported marriage equality in July 2014, and
that number was lower during the period under study (Bradshaw, 2014). Thus, while Irish
marriage equality advocates enjoy both widespread public and broad political party
support for their cause, American advocates face a more-deeply divided electorate and
unified opposition from one of the country’s two parties; British advocates face a mixed
bag of moderate public opinion support and broad political party support. Irish
conservative groups, therefore, are more of an out-party, in a sense, than their British and
American peers. This has some possible consequences, as I will discuss in the next
section of this chapter.
For the purposes of this discussion, however, the logic of the arguments outlined
in the literature related to the role of out-party status in the adoption of DICTs would still
suggest that, in all of the countries under study, conservative organizations that oppose
same-sex marriage would have a strong incentive to innovate online in pursuit of their
political goals, as in all cases, they are either clearly a hopeless out-party, or are
struggling to turn a rising tide of support for marriage equality. Thus, if out-party status
were the primary driver of DICT adoption, one would expect that the gap between DICT
adoption among organizations grouped by ideology to be largest in Ireland, where
conservative organizations have an incentive to be innovating intensively online. One
would expect a smaller gap in Britain, with conservative innovation leading to higher
DICT adoption scores for conservative organizations. Finally, one might expect the U.S.
to have a relatively small gap between the mean scores for DICT adoption of
conservative and liberal organizations, with conservatives enjoying a modest lead.
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Instead, the smallest difference is found in Ireland, and the largest in the U.S., and the
gap is meaningful only in the U.S., where liberal organizations display a much more
sophisticated approach to DICTs than their conservative peers. This is a noteworthy
departure from what we might expect given the literature on out-party status and
innovation.
I believe that the explanation for this gap lies, in part, in the role that first-mover
advantage plays in driving DICT adoption over time. According to Evan25, an organizer
at a medium-sized U.S. organization that promotes marriage equality, the reason that
liberal organizations have an online advantage in the U.S. is their long experience with
web technologies. “I don’t think it’s a mystery, really, I think we were just there first.
We, the community, the gay rights community, I guess, we were online right from the
beginning. We had nowhere else to go, a lot of the time. Or nowhere to talk politics, in a
way. So we were online. And then, you know, over the years, we just built on that and
built on it. We had a big fight on our hands, and we had to use everything we could and
that included the web, you know. So, it’s that, we were online early, and we kept trying
things online, like forums or what have you, or meetups, and we just built it up. So today,
we have a lot of experience, and just a lot of … spaces, maybe? Well, we have a lot of
experience and capacity online. And that’s really why we’re doing good work. It’s just a
long time of trial and error. Plus, you know, we could get funding. At first, of course it
was informal online, but then, we could show early results, and that helped us get
resources. So we built up the experience and we built up the resources.”

25

Not his real name, see footnote 2
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What Evan’s comments suggest is that, years ago when web technologies were
first emerging, progressives advocating for gay rights in the U.S., who were at the time a
political out-party, moved into online spaces to meet, strategize, and organize. Over time,
they developed expertise and skills, and importantly, strong online communities, which
have been hard for conservative activists to replicate. In recent times, when conservatives
have found themselves at a disadvantage in the politics of gay rights, any attempts on
their part to innovative online have been stymied by the pre-existing liberal advantage, as
discussed earlier and underscored by Geoff’s previously quoted comment. Thus, the
initial role that out-party status played in stimulating DICT adoption has now been
overshadowed by the role that first-mover advantage plays in inhibiting opportunities for
innovation for later adopters. This interpretation is supported by comments from
organizers based in Britain and Ireland. As Ted explains, “To some extent, I think we’re
all fairly new to this. I think that, yes, the pro-marriage equality community moved faster
into the web, certainly. But I also think we’re just quite new at it as a national
community. It’s not that Britons aren’t online, and they haven’t been active online, it’s
more that we just perhaps got a later start than the Americans, or some of the Europeans
even. Not all around, I’m talking about the NGO community more. We just were a bit
slower getting into things.”
In other words, one of the reasons why the gaps in DICT adoption look different
in Ireland and the United Kingdom than they do in the U.S. might be that in Britain and
Ireland, neither group accrued a particularly strong first-mover advantage online. This is,
of course, made complex by the fact that, particularly on interactive forums, people from
around the world comment and engage online. Thus, it is possible that the early adopters
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in the U.S. formed a ready-made community when British and Irish groups began to
move online that helped to protect those groups from trolling and inhibit conservative
groups. Unfortunately, the study of such dynamics is beyond the scope of this paper, but
would make an interesting topic for future research. Nevertheless, these findings
highlight the crucial role that first-mover advantage plays in DICT adoption. This has
important implications for organizations seeking to increase their online efforts in
contexts in which opponents already hold an online advantage. In particular, it suggests
that organizations may need to work on strategies to negate the inhibiting impact of firstmover advantage, such as the chilling effect that trolling may have on nascent
communities of interest. Possible strategies might include using registration options to
control commenting, and hiring staff that have obtained experience with DICTs in other
contexts, such as in consumer products marketing, who will not be inhibited by their
ideological convictions from sharing skills and experiences with the disadvantaged
organization.
Having considered some of the key ways in which the factors that my heuristic
model indicated may affect DICT adoption operate in different national contexts, I will
now offer some additional hypotheses on how national context may influence DICT
adoption. One of my goals in conducting a cross-national study was to theorize on the
role of national context, and in the section that follows, I will draw on my qualitative data
to offer some possible explanations thereof.
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Potential Alternative Explanations for Cross-National Differences in DICT
Adoption
As I have shown, organizations based in the U.S. tend to be more sophisticated
adopters of DICTs than their European counterparts and the U.K. and Ireland tend to
display similar patterns of DICT adoption. There are a number of potential explanations
for these findings, including the explanation offered above related to the role of firstmover advantage, and some are more convincing than others.
At the most simplistic level, this difference could be attributed to internet
penetration; if Americans used the internet more than Europeans, it would make sense
that U.S. organizations display more online sophistication. However, this is unlikely to be
the case. As noted, according to World Bank data, in 2011 U.S. had 78.2 internet users
per 100 people, the United Kingdom had 81.7, and Ireland had 76.8 (World Bank,
2013b). Furthermore, the data I gathered on individual usage of the internet by group
characteristics indicated that patterns of internet usage were very similar across all three
countries, even in terms of usage by age, sex, and socio-economic status. Any differences
in internet penetration and access were thus marginal and inadequate to account for the
differences in adoption.
Differences in wealth and resources are perhaps a better candidate for
explanation. According to the World Bank, in 2011 per capita income in US dollars in the
United Kingdom was $37,780, it was $48,620 in the United States, and $39,150 in
Ireland (World Bank, 2013a). As discussed earlier, at the individual level, wealth plays a
limited or no role in internet usage. However, wealth could play a role in organizations’
adoption of DICTs. Specifically, greater wealth may allow Americans to devote more
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resources to their advocacy organizations by giving more money and volunteering more
time to help such organizations, which might help those organizations to devote more
resources to DICTs, while similar levels of wealth in the U.K. and Ireland may lead to
their similar patterns of DICT adoption. I found mixed evidence to support this argument.
First, I compared the data I was able to collect on organizations’ staff across countries.
US organizations typically had somewhat larger staffs than their Irish and British
counterparts, and all of the biggest organizations, in terms of staff, were American. This
suggests that American organizations were better able to mobilize resources in pursuit of
their political goals than their peers in Europe. Second, I considered data on international
giving. CAF America, a global grant making organization, produces an annual World
Giving Index, which compares charitable giving and volunteering around the world (CAF
America, 2013). According to the 2013 World Giving Index, the United States was the
most charitable nation in the world in 2013, with Ireland and the United Kingdom
ranking fifth and sixth respectively. A greater proportion of Irish people (70%) and
British people (76%) donate to charity than Americans (62%); however, data from the
Center for Civil Society Studies at the Johns Hopkins Institute for Health and Social
Policy indicate that Americans give more (Center for Civil Society Studies, 2013).
According to the Center for Civil Society Studies, Americans’ donations between 1995
and 2003 were equal to 1.85% of GDP, while Irish donations equaled 0.85% of GDP, and
British donations equaled 0.84% of GDP. Furthermore, according to the World Giving
Index, a greater proportion of American individuals engaged in volunteering (45%) than
the proportion of Irish individuals (37%) and British individuals (29%). However, I do
not find this a totally convincing argument. The U.S., Britain, and Ireland are all wealthy
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countries, and no doubt organizations that met a need in their respective political
environments would be able to secure funding. Instead, based on my interviews and
overall assessment of my data, I argue that the reason why U.S. organizations fare better
online and may, perhaps, enjoy an edge in fundraising (as illustrated by their relatively
larger staffs) is the nature of the competition over the issue of marriage equality in the
U.S. compared to the U.K. and Ireland. Earlier, in my literature review, I suggested that
differences in the political environment and in the intensity of competition over social
issues may play a role in cross-national differences in DICT adoption, and in the course
of my study, I found evidence that this is true.
The competitive environment. As I mentioned above, the competitive environment

in which the advocacy organizations under study differ in the three countries under study.
Marriage equality enjoys broad public and political party support in Ireland, broad
political party support and moderate public support in the U.K., and divided political
party support and public support in the U.S.; the issue is therefore most competitive in
America, where public support of marriage equality is closest to 50%, and where one of
the country’s two political parties staunchly opposes it. In both Ireland and the U.K., the
issue is much less competitive, and given the near-unanimous political party support for
marriage equality, the battle for the right to marry is almost won in those countries.
Events that occurred after the period under study bore out this assessment. Same-sex
marriage was legalized in the U.K. in mid-2013 (“Same-sex marriage becomes law”,
2013), the pro-marriage equality outcome of the Irish referendum on the topic is widely
expected to be a foregone conclusion (“67% support the introduction of same-sex
marriage”, 2014), and in the U.S., despite a number of legislative victories, the battle
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remains relatively intense, particularly after a surprise appeal court decision upholding
three state bans on same-sex marriage (“Appeals court upholds bans on same-sex
marriage”, 2014). This state of affairs means that, during the period under study,
American conservative organizations had the best opportunity to fight moves to legalize
same sex marriage – the issue was competitive enough that it was not a foregone
conclusion that marriage equality would become a reality. This also meant that American
liberal organizations faced a more challenging task than their European peers in
maintaining and expanding support for marriage equality. Therefore, in this study U.S.
organizations on both sides of the issue should be, overall, better able to mobilize
resources than their peers; not because of greater American wealth, but because the
competitiveness of the battle over the issue motivates supporters of both sides to
contribute resources. As Geoff expresses it, “The battle is being decided now, so we’re
willing to put in whatever we can to make it a good fight, to win on this. And of course,
our members support that, they want it, they are available to help out, and to give, and to
participate.” According to Schervish and Havens (1997), charitable giving, which is the
primary source of funding for the organizations under study, supplemented with grant
money in some cases, is driven by what they call the identification model. Essentially,
people are driven to contribute to organizations by virtue of the identification they feel
with its goals and ambitions. In the Schervish and Haven (1997) model, through their
formal and informal networks of relationships and motivated by their particular ways of
thinking including political convictions, people build connection with particular
organizations and are motivated to give to those organizations when they feel that by
doing so they will further a goal they support. Thus, when there are roughly equal groups
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of people with strong convictions over an issue that is being debated in the public sphere,
as there is in the U.S., both sides will be able to motivate their supporters to devote
resources to the cause; hence the larger staffs at the American organizations and
American organizations’ higher adoption scores. In contrast, in a place like Ireland and
the U.K., where marriage equality enjoys wide support, particularly at the legislative
level, those who support and oppose the policy have less incentive to contribute
resources, and organizations have lower adoption scores.
If this is correct, however, and in the U.S. both sides are able to mobilize
resources, how then do I explain the finding that liberal American organizations adopt
DICTs more intensively than their conservative peers? My proposed explanation has two
parts. First, I emphasize that the gap in DICT adoption among liberal and conservative
organizations in the U.S. is primarily the result of a small group of outliers; conservative
organizations that display a very low level of DICT sophistication. This suggests that
there are organizational level factors at play. In particular, I argue that the relatively
extreme rhetoric that these organizations embrace places them outside the competitive
mainstream of the debate. The small group of people to whom these arguments appeal is
not large enough to provide the resource to support concerted advocacy action, and these
organizations thus remain at the margin, a point I will expand on in the next chapter. As I
noted earlier, when these organizations are excluded, the difference in DICT adoption
between liberal and conservative organizations in the U.S. is much smaller. At this point,
the second element of my argument becomes relevant; I argue that first-mover advantage
plays a key role here, as discussed above. Liberal organizations advocating marriage
equality in the U.S. are in the happy position of being able to mobilize resources
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effectively thanks to the competitiveness of the issue, and of enjoying a first-mover
advantage online that helps them to maintain their online edge in the face of motivated
conservative organizations, which have the resources to innovate online and which are
motivated by their out-party status to do so, but thwarted by pre-existing liberal
advantages. In other words, as I anticipated, at the national level, the more competitive
the political environment is around a particular issue, the higher the adoption scores of
organizations advocating positions related to the issue are likely to be, in part because
those organizations will be better able to mobilize resources. However, issues such as the
history of lobbying around the issue and the legacy of advantage that history has given
particular organizations will still play a role in determining individual organizations’
adoption of DICTs.
The political environment. In terms of the political environment more broadly,

there does appear to be a link between the political environment and a country’s political
traditions and the extent to which organizations adopt DICTs. Consider, for example, the
similarities in the adoption patterns in the U.K. and Ireland, and how they differ from the
U.S.. I argue that these patterns are, in part, the result of certain aspects of the political
environment in these two European countries. These aspects differ somewhat across the
two countries, but have similar effects on the propensity of organizations within these
countries to adopt DICTs.
First, let us consider the case of Ireland. According to Sara, “You have to
understand that this model of organizing around social issues is quite new in Ireland. We
have a history of organizing of course, fighting the English and so on. But for so long,
Irish society just relied on the Church as far as social issues goes, whether abortion, or
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gay rights or anything really. So it’s only since the Church has lost its grip that we’ve
really organized around these things in an organized way. I’m not saying there’s no Irish
history of social mobilization, but it is true that the last few years have been
transformative, the last few decades, in terms of how we are trying to shape Irish society.
It used to be the parties and the Church only, you were a member of a political party and
they dealt with politics and then you went to Church and lived that way, the Catholic
way. Now, it’s different.”
Sara’s point, which was echoed by much of the literature that I read on Ireland, is
that for much of its history, Ireland saw relatively little organization around social issues
that did not occur through the formal channels of the Catholic Church (Bartlett, 2010;
Bew, 2007). This is not to say that Ireland has no history of social movements focusing
on issues like women’s rights, but rather that the country has seen less spontaneous
organization by citizens around such issues than has been the case elsewhere.
Specifically, for many years debate on social and moral issues was dominated by the
Catholic Church, which was long the most influential organization in Irish society, and
activity around these issues was channeled through that institution. Over recent years,
however, Church attendance and religious observance in Ireland have declined
dramatically, and increasingly the Irish are looking beyond the Church for guidance on
moral and social issues. This has meant that there has been an increase in efforts by
secular, informal social movement organizations and political entrepreneurs to organize
around social issues like marriage equality. Such efforts have borne fruit, as the success
of attempts to encourage support for marriage equality demonstrate. However, Irish
social movement organizations, and particularly those that focus on social issues, have
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less historical experience with organizing around these issues than their peers elsewhere.
Thus, one of the reasons that Irish advocacy organizations display lower levels of DICT
sophistication than their American peers is that these organizations are still developing
their capacity to organize and lobby. As Sara puts it, “We’re figuring this all out, still.
We’re learning how to do this work of building up the public to support something like
same sex marriage, which was not something we were even thinking about thirty years
ago, when the Church was really the only, or really the main game in town.”
In the case of the U.K., as in Ireland, advocacy organizations tend to adopt DICTs
less intensively than their U.S. peers, and again, this difference is, I argue, rooted in
differences in the political environment. While DICT adoption in Ireland is influenced by
the relative newness of non-Church organizing around social and moral issues in the
political environment, in the U.K., DICT adoption by advocacy organizations is
influenced by the British tradition of strong political parties and well-developed
institutional channels for organization (Childs, 2012; Jones, & Norton, 2013). While the
specific drivers of DICT adoption differ somewhat, the effect on average levels of
adoption appears to be similar.
According to Ted, “The British way of organizing is different, I think from the
Americans. We, I would say we do a lot more through channels, through the political
parties, through the Church of England, through maybe you could say formal channels. I
believe that most of the really big marches in British history were political, it was Labour
organizing the masses. In America, it seems to be different, they have more big marches
by groups, if you see what I mean.” In other words, Ted’s comments suggest that one
reason why American organizations achieve higher DICT adoption scores may be that the
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political traditions of Britain have favored collective action around social issues
expressed through traditional channels like churches and political parties.
Indeed, both Ireland and the United Kingdom have long been dominated by a
single church, the Catholic Church in the case of Ireland and the Church of England in
the case of the U.K.; in contrast, the U.S. has long been a place of significant religious
diversity among Christians (Bartlett, 2010; Jenkins, 2012; Jones, & Norton, 2013;
Weaver, & Rockman, 1993). Furthermore, the U.S. has a relatively weak party system
compared to the U.K. and Ireland (Bartlett, 2010; Bew, 2007; Childs, 2012; Kuklick,
2009; Weaver, & Rockman, 1993). This has led to a greater role for social movements
and extra-party political organizing in the U.S. than in Ireland and Britain. Furthermore,
in Ireland, there has been relatively little tradition of citizens organizing around issues
considered to be moral matters by the Church like same-sex marriage, while in the U.K.,
much organization around social issues has traditionally occurred through welldeveloped, formal political party channels. Thus, in both countries, social movement
organizations have less depth of historical experience of extra-institutional organization
than their American peers.
One might anticipate that this would give British and Irish organizations a further
incentive to adopt DICTs, in order to develop new modes of extra-institutional
organization in the absence of a long tradition thereof. However, I argue that instead, a
tradition of fierce extra-institutional competition in the U.S. drives organizations to more
actively seek out new tools for organizing. Thus, one national level factor that may drive
DICT adoption in a country is the degree to which the country has a tradition of strong
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parties or strong institutions like the Catholic Church in Ireland, or a tradition of extrainstitutional political organization.
A second aspect of the political environment that may influence organizations’
propensity to adopt DICTs is the structure of the media system and the partisan history of
various forms of media. For example, as noted earlier, in the U.S., conservatives have a
strong tradition of using direct mail and talk radio as platforms for expression, while
liberals have tended to have less tendency to use such tools (Jamieson & Capella, 2008;
Karpf, 2012; Viguerie & Frank, 2004). Mainstream media in the U.S. generally tend to
adhere to principles of balance and objectivity, and thus to offer a platform that is not
particularly friendly to either ideological orientation. Thus, in the U.S., it is possible that
conservatives feel less pressure to innovate online because they have access to channels
like talk radio, and this may help to explain their relatively unsophisticated adoption of
DICTs. In contrast, in the U.K. and in Ireland, broadcast media are dominated by stateowned, public service broadcasters – the BBC in the U.K. and RTE in Ireland – while
newspapers tend to embrace partisan identities and offer political parties and ideologues
platforms for their views (Doyle, 2002; Horgan, 2001). Thus, in those countries, neither
side of the political spectrum has a particular advantage in any medium, and therefore
neither has a strong incentive to claim online spaces. Although I have gathered no data
that would specifically address the extent to which this explanation works to explain
variation in DICT adoption across the three countries under study, this may offer a
fruitful avenue for future research.
Similarly, there are important differences in the legislative practices and
structures of the three countries under study (Bartlett, 2010; Bew, 2007; Childs, 2012;
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Jenkins, 2012; Jones, & Norton, 2013; Kuklick, 2009; Weaver, & Rockman, 1993).
While the U.S. has a federal, presidential system based on a constitution, the U.K. is a
unitary, parliamentary, constitutional monarchy, while Ireland is a unitary, parliamentary,
constitutional republic. The particulars of how laws are made and implemented in these
different systems may also play a role in patterns of DICT adoption by advocacy
organizations domiciled therein. This issue is beyond the scope of the present project, and
should be explored in future research.
It is also worth noting that I found no evidence that different internet regulation
regimes played a role in the extent to which DICTs were adopted by organizations in the
three countries under study. Although European law requires websites domiciled in
European Union countries that are signatories to certain E.U. statutes, which includes the
U.K., to alert visitors to their use of cookies and obtain permission from visitors to place
cookies in their browsers, many of the European sites I visited did not provide such
warnings despite their use of cookies. Further, although as I noted I did not include my
measures of cookie usage and other online data-gathering practices in my overall
analysis, I did note that there were no meaningful differences among organizations
domiciled the three countries under study with respect to the number of cookies used or
their propensity to use third-party cookies. Given the European countries’ disregard of
the regulations around cookies, and the absence of any cross-national differences in datagathering practices, it seems unlikely that such regulations are having a chilling effect on
organizations’ use of DICTs. Furthermore, none of my interview subjects made any
mention of issues with internet rule regimes or even awareness of particular rules and
regulations. Thus, I do not think that such rules make any meaningful difference to DICT
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adoption in developed democracies with free speech regimes. It is possible that such rules
play an important role in DICT use in countries in which speech is curtailed, but that is
beyond the scope of this study.
In conclusion, then, I have identified two major national-level factors that I argue
may account for the cross-national differences in DICT adoption that I have identified.
Specifically, I argue that the intensity of competition around a given social issue will play
a role in determining how intensively advocacy organizations working on that issue will
adopt DICTs, such that the more intense the competition, the more intensely
organizations will adopt DITCs. Further, I argue that the political traditions of a country,
in particular the extent to which it has a tradition of extra-institutional political
organizing, will play a role in organizations’ adoption of DICTs such that countries with
a strong tradition of extra-institutional organization will produce organizations that adopt
DICTs with greater intensity.
My final goal in this project was to assess my overall heuristic model, and to
identify additional factors that may drive DICT adoption at the organizational level and
could therefore be included with group characteristics, ideology, out-party innovation and
first-mover advantage. It is to this final task that I now turn.
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CHAPTER 6: THE UTILITY OF THE HEURISTIC MODEL
As discussed earlier, the goal of this project was threefold. First, I planned to
explore the heuristic model I built based on the literature, gathering data and determining
how well the patterns I observed fit those I theorized would exist. Second, I planned to
evaluate the extent to which national context shapes the adoption of DICTs by social
movement organizations by grouping them by country and comparing those groups.
Finally, I planned to evaluate the usefulness of my heuristic model and suggest
refinements thereto; this is the task of this final chapter.
Refinements of the Heuristic Model
Overall, I found the heuristic model to be somewhat useful, but in need of
modification. First, given the strong relationship between group characteristics and
ideology, such that people with particular demographic qualities are likely to also have
particular ideological qualities, and that the demographic attributes associated with
particular ideologies are also associated with web use, it was impossible for me to treat
those aspects of the model as distinct drivers of DICT adoption, and this is likely to be
the case in most developed democracies at this time. In decades to come, this may
change, but currently, there is an unavoidable overlap between age, internet proficiency,
and ideology in developed democracies. Nevertheless, based on my data and particularly
on my cross-national comparison, it appears to me that these factors play a relatively
minor role in organizations’ tendency to adopt DICTs. All of the organizations under
study and all of the people I engaged with recognized the need to maintain a web
presence, and strove to do so. The differences I noted in organizations’ tendencies to
adopt DICTs appeared to be largely unrelated to their ideological orientation or to their
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particular target audiences, although target audience appeared to play a role in
organizations’ tendencies to use offline communications tools, as discussed earlier.
Ideology was, however, a useful way to position organizations in the political landscape
surrounding the issue of interest. The degree of political competition around an issue is
one factor that I argue influences organizations’ tendencies to adopt DICTs, and
understanding where organizations are positioned vis-à-vis the issue through
understanding their ideology helps one understand how the political environment has
influenced that organization’s propensity to adopt DICTs. Thus, I would not remove
ideology from the model, but I would argue that it is important primarily because it gives
the position of the organization relative to the issue and the political debate around it.
Given an adequate understanding of the political environment and nature of an issue,
organizational ideology can serve as a useful proxy for the organization’s relative
political position, in- or out-party status, and for the group characteristics of its audience.
Group characteristics, meanwhile, I would consider to be of interest primarily in terms of
how they relate to the total communications strategy of an organization, beyond its online
activities. As I noted earlier, conservative organizations appear to do more offline
communication work than liberal ones, and I argue that this is related to the
characteristics of the groups that they are targeting. Thus, organizational ideology is not,
in itself, a useful variable, but it serves as a useful proxy for other important variables,
and helps locate organizations in the political landscape.
Second, it appears that the existence of first-mover advantage accruing to one
ideological party may be enough to stifle innovation in the other, even when the other
finds itself to be a political out-party with a strong incentive to innovate; this finding was
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consistent when comparing all of the organizations and when comparing them grouped
by country. Thus, I would argue that historical processes are important to understanding
how and why organizations use DICTs. Among the organizations in my study, for
example, it appears that the liberal organizations were at one time an out-party, and that
in that period, they moved online aggressively. According to Lisa, a community manager
at a U.S. organization that manages a forum for LGBTQ people, “We started about
twelve years ago, I would say. Back then, it was very different for people, if they wanted
someone to talk to or a place to go, there weren’t that many places. So we went online
because we had to, it was a place we could go that was safe and we could talk and just
interact. So the reason we have the great community we do, I think, is because we’ve
been around for ages, and so people know about us, and they know they can come and be
welcome. And so even though things are so different now, and the politics have changed
a lot, we still have this community and this role to play.”
As this quote illustrates, people with an interest in gay rights were initially drawn
to the internet and its affordances because they were an out-party, just as Karpf (2012)
suggested. Their communities were therefore able to grow as outlined in his discussion of
Wikipedia (Karpf, 2010b); from a small dedicated core, the community expanded slowly,
attracting supporters while remaining unnoticed by opponents, who as yet had no
incentive to move online to organize, because their position vis-à-vis gay rights was, at
the time, the dominant one, particularly related to marriage. Over time, the online gay
rights community gained scale, and was then able to resist malicious trolling and other
attacks by opponents, and to stifle the development of oppositional communities by
intervening in them when they are still small and growing. This pattern was particularly
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notable in the U.S.; in Ireland and the U.K., organizations did not display any meaningful
differences in DICT adoption when grouped by ideology, and it appeared that their online
organizing efforts were less robust than their American peers’. However, I tentatively
hypothesize that it is possible that the existence of a robust online community in the U.S.
had a spillover impact on the nascent communities in the U.K. and Ireland. As I
mentioned earlier, I seldom found hostile comments from conservatives on liberal forums
or blogs, but did find hostile comments from liberals on conservative forums and blogs,
and this pattern was relatively consistent across the countries under study. Given the fact
that there was little difference between conservative and liberal organizations’ adoption
of DICTs in the U.K. and Ireland, I would tentatively suggest that perhaps the strong
online community of liberal Americans played some role in this online trolling. It is hard
to find evidence of this, as people do not typically declare their nationality when
commenting anonymously (or with a name) on forums or blogs. However, I did notice
several instances in which U.S. spelling appeared on Irish and British forums (colour vs.
color, for example), which suggested that at least some Americans were visiting these
online communities. More research would be needed, but I suggest that, particularly
when language is not a barrier, there may be some spillover online in communities built
around issues of cross-national interest, such that a robust community supporting an issue
in one jurisdiction may spill into the online environment in another jurisdiction, offering
support to online peers and opposition to online opponents in the new jurisdiction. This
would further complexify the processes driving DICTs adoption by social movement
organizations.
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Taken together, these findings suggest that it is possible that, for latecomers,
online innovation and expansion will be difficult, even when they are motivated to
innovate by their position as political outsiders, due to the historical first-mover
advantage their opponents enjoy. This would explain a contradictory finding of mine. As
I noted in my discussion of the data I gathered on DICT adoption, overall, conservative
organizations scored slightly higher than liberal ones on the non-interactive, non-social
media aspects of their web presence, but slightly lower on the interactive and social
media fronts. It is possible that conservatives, in response to their position in the political
landscape, have attempted to strengthen their online presence, but the first-mover
advantage that liberals enjoy has reduced conservative organizations’ ability to expand
into interactive options and social media. In other words, DICT adoption may be the
result of complex processes over time, and certain factors that propel organizations to
innovate may be countered by other factors that retard their innovative ability. Thus, due
consideration of the historical evolution of the political landscape is important in
understanding why organizations do and do not adopt DICTs.
A third, and crucial revision that I would make to my heuristic model would be to
include material resources as a key driver of DICT adoption. It is curious, but the
literature makes no mention of the role that resources might play in the use of DICTs,
except to note that their lower cost makes them more accessible to people and
organizations with limited access to resources. To the extent that the relationship between
material resources and DICTs is considered, the literature typically assumes that the fact
that these tools are frequently free or low-cost means that they are almost costless to use
and that they will lower the overall resources required to engage in organization.
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However, I did not find this to be so. Instead, I found that the more resources an
organization had access to, the more sophisticated its DICT adoption tended to be. The
reason for this seems to be that fully utilizing the tools that the web offers requires
knowledge, skills, and, especially, a significant investment of time. It seems that only
organizations that can afford to hire staff members who have relevant skills and
knowledge to work full-time on DICTs can fully utilize these tools. Amanda26 is a
communications manager at a medium-sized, liberal American organization. “If you want
to run a tight ship online you have to have the people. I mean, just consider what it takes
to have a good Twitter feed. You have to have someone whose job it is to run the feed,
because if you do it right, it’s almost a full-time thing. OK, the same person could also do
Facebook, but you have to have someone who is responsible for it all the time. On the
weekend too. Because you have to be writing tweets all the time, because Twitter is so
ephemeral, you have to be in conversation basically all the time. And you have to
monitor it, to see what’s trending, look for stuff to tweet about, like things to share, and
respond to people too, if they tweet you... So it’s quite non-stop. And so we have to have
someone whose job it is to just deal with Twitter. Or else why bother, if you’re only
going to use it every now and then, there’s no point. No one will follow you, and then
there’s no point. OK, you have to have the people to do the work.”
As this quote illustrates, using DICTs can be a labor-intensive enterprise. While email costs less to send than postal mail, switching to e-mail can often compound an
organization’s costs because messages must be compiled more frequently, a-b testing
must be conducted, vast databases of names and addresses must be managed, and

26

Not her real name, see footnote 2
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responses must be monitored and managed. Online, blogs must be written and updated,
content must be discovered and shared, and new tools and technologies have to be
considered and incorporated all the time. For example, according to Angela, “We send
people to events all the time, to conferences and such, to keep up-to-date. We have to be
there to find out what’s happening, just so that we can keep up online, and be part of the
next big thing. It takes a lot of work.” In order for an organization to incorporate and
effectively utilize DICTs, it must dedicate staff to the task, which costs money. Thus,
organizations that have few staff members, and are run by passionate individuals on a
volunteer basis, tend to be much less consistent users of DICTs. In my sample, for
example, among the smaller organizations, many had social media pages, but updated
them infrequently, or would publish a lot of website content one day, and then very little
for the next two weeks. The lack of resources made it difficult for small organizations to
use DICTs consistently, which weakened their overall online profile; typically there is a
correlation between how frequently social media are updated and how many followers
they attract (Schonfeld, 2009).
It is, perhaps, surprising that resources play such a key role in DICT adoption
given the literature’s assumption that they are low-cost communications tools and the
relative neglect of the role of resources in new social movement theory, but my data
clearly point to this. Although I did not initially anticipate this finding, I nevertheless
attempted to test it after noting the pattern. I attempted to gather revenue data for the
organizations in my sample. Many of them made such data easily available, and public
records were available for many others, but the data were not available for all of the
organizations in my sample. By combining these data with the data I was able to gather
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on staff (assuming that organizations with many staff members had access to more
resources) and I was able to divide 30 of my organizations into three categories: low
resources, average resources, and high resources. I found that the average DICT adoption
score for the low resources category was 2.4, for the average resources category, 4.6, and
for the high resources category 8.1. Although the sample is small, this is further evidence
of a relationship between resources and DICT adoption. In addition, as I mentioned
earlier in the section of the relationship between diffusion and DICT adoption, I noted
that there were a handful of very large organizations that were highly networked, had
access to significant resources, and were very sophisticated adopters of DICTs, such as
the Human Rights Campaign and Focus on the Family. It seems that these organizations
have succeeded in attracting and deploying resources in a way that has enabled them to
take a place at the center of organizing efforts by organizations in the issue space. Many
smaller organizations partner with these large ones, and rely on their resources to learn
about DICT best practice and so on. Again, the role of resources is crucial, and is an
element that is missing from my original model. I would therefore argue that, while the
insights of new social movement theory have greatly enhanced our understanding of how
social movements form and act, it is unwise to discard the contribution of the resource
mobilization paradigm. Resources play a crucial role in how effectively organizations are
able to undertake the labor of organizing, even in the supposedly costless realm of DICT
tools. Any consideration of the strategies that organizations use to achieve their goals
must incorporate a clear sense of the role that resources play therein. As Lisa points out,
“We definitely spend money and time on our online forum. It’s not free. And I don’t
mean, like, the cost of hosting or anything. I mean that we have to have people whose job
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it is to manage the forum. We have to pay these community managers. We have
volunteers, sure, but you can’t just run on volunteers. Not for long, anyway. I mean, we
used to just use volunteers but we, to keep it going and to build it, we have to spend
money, spend time. It’s not free.”
In addition to including resources in a revised model, I would also like to note that
there is an interrelationship between an organizations position in the political landscape
and the resources it is able to attract. Earlier, I pointed out that conservative
organizations’ relatively weak DICT performance in the U.S. was primarily driven by the
inclusion of three outlier conservative organizations that had particularly low DICT
adoption scores. These organizations, Defend the Family, Heterosexuals Organized for a
Moral Environment, and the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, were all outliers
both in terms of their DICT adoption scores, their access to resources, and their rhetoric. I
suggest that one of the reasons why these organizations underperform the way that they
do is that their extremist rhetoric attracts only marginal support in the U.S. political
context. “OK, so, yes, there are some crazy folks out there who make these crazy
arguments about why people should reject marriage equality – I’m talking about the kind
of folks who say that gays target kids, or have some weird agenda. But those people
actually aren’t our enemy, OK, because they are so off-the-wall that they just don’t have
the support. OK, who is going to give money to them? Very few people. Who’s going to
read their stuff? Very few people. They just aren’t in the real debate. The real debate, the
real enemies, or, OK, opponents that we have are the people who make the pro-family
argument, about strong families. They get the supporters, and they are the ones we have
to talk back to,” explained Dennis, an organizer at a liberal U.S. organization. By arguing
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for a particularly extreme position, these three organizations have reduced their potential
support base, and thus struggle to attract resources. This, in turn, limits their ability to be
effective users of DICTs. This is again in contrast to what one might expect from the
broader literature, which suggests that DICTs offer particular advantages for those with
extreme or marginal views. It is, of course, plausible that without their digital platforms,
these extreme organizations would not be able to attract the news coverage that they have
attracted. However, they are still limited online because of their scant resources. They
may have been able to build a bigger community using online tools than they would have
without access to such tools, but there relative inability to attract resources has meant that
they have remained relatively unsophisticated users of DICTs compared to other, larger,
and better-resourced organizations. In other words, I argue that the political environment
shapes the extent to which organizations are able to secure resources , which in turn
affects the extent to which they are able to effectively use DICTs. This is, perhaps, why
organizations that make the most politically palatable arguments are the largest and have
the most resources. For example, the Human Rights Campaign deploys human rights
arguments in favor of marriage equality, asserting that the prohibition against gay
marriage is a form of discrimination, and prevents gay citizens from enjoying full
equality before the law. Meanwhile, Focus on the Family deploys arguments related to
the social importance of strong families, and scriptural guidelines for the patterns families
should follow to advocate against marriage equality. Both of these positions are widely
palatable to Americans, and these organizations have succeeded in attracting significant
resources and in achieving high DICT adoption scores. There is, I argue, a crucial
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interaction between the political environment and the organization that determines how
effective the organization will be at securing resources and effectively using DICTs.
Finally, there is another key factor that should be added to any model that seeks to
understand how and why social movement organizations adopt DICTs. Among the many
differences that I noticed when speaking to representatives of conservative and liberal
organizations in the three countries under study, one of the most striking was the
difference in how they understood their networks. Many of the conservative
organizations in my sample are very closely linked to religious communities. Indeed,
given the nature of the selected issue, gay rights, religious groups make up the most
important group of that oppose their extension. One of the factors most closely associated
with support for or opposition to marriage equality is religious conviction. In the U.S., for
example, while 52% of Americans support same-sex marriage overall, only 27% of white
evangelical Protestants do so (

Public Religion Research Institute, 2014). In the

U.K., University of Leicester professor Ben Clements reports that while 52% of Britons
who claim no religious affiliation supported marriage equality in 2007, that number fell
to 32.3% among Anglicans, 40.9% among Catholics, and 38% among other Christians
(Clements, 2012). I was unable to find data for Ireland, but as the Catholic Church
opposes marriage equality, it is likely that devout Irish Catholics are more likely to
oppose it than their less devout peers. Indeed, it is possible that the relationship between
age and support for marriage equality is, in large part, a function of the relationship
between religion and marriage equality, as older people tend to be more devout in all of
the countries under study. The reason that this is important for the purposes of my study
is that this close relationship between the issue position (opposing gay marriage) and
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organized religion means that many of the organizations that oppose same-sex marriage
have their roots in religious communities. Many of them therefore view their target
audiences primarily in terms of faith; for example, one Catholic group in Ireland
responded to survey questions about how they defined their target audiences saying “We
target all Catholics, of all ages, everywhere!” Clearly, then, these organizations are able
to tap into the networks that exist within organized religions, including churches,
devotional groups, action committees and so on. Although many of the organizations
were independent of formal church control, many were very closely affiliated with
various churches, and active within formal church networks. In contrast, the liberal
organizations tended to think of their target audiences in broader terms as people
interested in equality, for example. There are no pre-existing, formal, institutionalized
networks of such people, and even the networks of gay advocacy groups and
communities that do exist today had to be built from almost nothing over the last few
decades. Therefore, while conservative groups could, to an extent, rely on pre-existing
networks to structure their organizing attempts, liberal organizations had to build
networks from scratch. This is, potentially, another reason why liberal organizations
moved online more aggressively than their conservative counterparts over the years, in
the U.S. particularly. Just as I noted that political traditions such as a history of strong
institutions may influence organizations’ tendencies to use DICTs, it is possible that, at
the mezzo-level, organizations’ ability to tap into institutional structures may play a role
in their use of online tools. Conservative organizations may, for example, choose not to
include many online interactive options because they prefer to interact face-to-face at
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church gatherings; access to formal networks may influence the strategies that
organizations use to reach their target audiences.
I therefore propose a number of changes to my heuristic model. I would deemphasize the importance of ideology and group characteristics as isolated drivers of
adoption, instead positioning them as interacting with environmental factors to shape
organizations’ relative positions in the landscape. I would highlight the importance of the
historical evolution of the issue, in terms of the history of public opinion thereof, and of
organizations’ historical activities related thereto. I would place resources as a central
factor in determining organizations’ ability to mobilize DICTs. Finally, I would
emphasize that institutional and external networks may play a role in the communication
strategies organizations choose to pursue, particularly for organizations that are already
closely embedded in formal institutional networks such as churches.
A Revised Heuristic Model of DICT Adoption by Social Movement Organizations
Taking into account the refinements I have outlined above, I propose a revised
heuristic model that may help researchers understand the processes that influence
organizations’ tendency to adopt DICTs in developed democracies. Again, the model is
intended as a contingent device to help guide understanding and analysis, rather than as a
firm statement of how organizations operate. I hope that, by highlighting the importance
of context and certain organizational characteristics, this model will enable researchers to
approach questions related to organizations’ use of DICTs in fresher and more sensitive
ways.
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Figure 6.1: Revised model of social movement organizations’ DICT adoption
As can be seen, the revised model shown in figure 6.1 is more complex and less
linear than my original heuristic model, and allows for interactions between all of the
factors. I will now briefly explain the elements of the revised model, and how they work
together to drive organizations’ communications strategies. At the center of the model, I
have placed the organization and its environment, by which I mean the context in which
it finds itself. It is the interaction between environment and organization that influences
the particular communication strategies that the organization will pursue. Various aspects
of the organization are crucial in understanding how it will interact with its environment.
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First, it is important to understand the organizations’ position in the issue space. For
example, in the case of my study, I had to understand how each organization was
positioned relative to public opinion on the issue of gay rights, how its rhetoric compared
to broader public discourse, and how it was positioned relative to political parties’
policies on the issue. Thus, this factor incorporates the ideas I discussed around ideology,
group characteristics, and out-party innovation. This factor also interacts strongly with
the second key factor in my model, organizational resources. As I explained, resources
are a key determinant of how intensively organizations are able to deploy DICTs that was
omitted from my earlier model. Further, to a large extent, organizations’ ability to
mobilize resources is linked to their relative position in the issue space, as discussed
above. Thus, these two factors are closely linked. The third organizational factor in the
model is the organization’s relationship to preexisting networks. When organizations
have strong roots in or strong connections to existing networks, particularly formal,
institutional networks such as churches or labor unions, this connection can influence
DICT adoption in several ways. First, it can help organizations access resources, both
financial and in the form of volunteers. Second, it can shape how the organization choses
to communicate with its target public by, for example, encouraging face-to-face models
of interactivity rather than online ones. Finally, the organization’s historical activities
influence its choices with respect to communication strategies. For example, an
organization that has historically built a strong online presence during a period of relative
political insignificance may be more likely to pursue sophisticated DICT policies today,
while an organization that has historically eschewed DICTs may find it challenging to
move into online spaces, particularly if opponents have already colonized the internet.
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This factor thus incorporates the idea of first-mover advantage, but emphasizes its
historical dimensions.
Turning to the bottom half of the model, there are three important environmental
factors that must be understood if one hopes to understand why some organizations adopt
DICTs and others don’t. First, there is the level of competition over the issue. As
discussed, when there is more intense competition over an issue, it is easier for
organizations – at least those with relatively broad, mainstream appeal on either side of
the issue – to mobilize resources and, thus, to engage in complex and sophisticated DICT
usage. Competitive issues will also tend to lead to more engagement from the public, and
thus help to drive the spread of online messages. The second key factor is the historical
evolution of the issue. Understanding how opinions have changed, how organizations
have influenced the debate, and how the issue has played out online over time will help
the researcher to position the organizations under study in the issue environment, and to
understand their historical activities. Once again, the inclusion of this factor underscores
the importance of understanding the history of the issues and organizations under study,
and how that history has affected the communication strategies organizations deploy.
Finally, the last important environmental factor is the political traditions of the nation in
which organizations are domiciled. As discussed earlier, countries with a strong tradition
of extra-institutional organization may find that their social movement organizations are
more aggressive in utilizing new affordances for the furthering of political agendas.
Furthermore, differences in media systems and legislative norms and structures may also
influence organizational practices.

170

By understanding the environment in which the organization operates, how that
organization relates to the environment, how it has influenced the environment, and how
it is internally structured, one can begin to understand why that organization adopts the
particular communication strategies it does, and especially why the organization does or
does not move aggressively to use DICTs. This model summarizes my findings on how
these processes work, how organizations negotiate their positions, resources, strategies,
connections, and environment in the pursuit of their broader goals, and why organizations
choose, or choose not, to use DICTs.
CONCLUSION
This project is rooted in the study of the ways in which the development of DICTs
has influenced the practice of politics. At their advent, digital technologies were
celebrated for their political promise; they offered hopes of empowerment for ordinary
citizens, the ability to organize without organization, the ability to mobilize people for
global change, and the potential for the freer and more open flow of information.
However, as these technologies have matured, much of this early promise has been
caveated or qualified. As DICTs become a routine part of people’s daily lives, and as a
small handful of companies and sites capture an ever-larger proportion of web traffic, the
revolutionary potential of these technologies seems diminished, high hopes for the
potential of social media notwithstanding.
In the course of this study, I have learned that, rather than remaking public and
political life, DICTs have instead been incorporated into extant routines of public protest
and political movements. While some organizations, like Moveon.org, appear to have
developed fresh models based exclusively on DICTs, my study of more-traditional
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advocacy organizations that are not superstars in their fields, but that have been effective
at mobilizing people around topical issues, underscored how these technologies are, for
organizers, another set of tools among many, offering advantages and disadvantages,
requiring resources, and demanding active decisions from organizations. Their use has
not completely revolutionized the process of social movement organization. Rather,
organizations use these tools, to a greater or lesser extent, as a result of a host of internal
and external factors as outlined in my revised model. My model highlights the
importance of the interaction between organizations and their environments, and of the
multiple, interdependent factors that influence how organizations integrate these tools
into their routines.
Understanding this process is important, both for scholars interested in DICT
adoption, and for social movement organizers who wish to understand how and why
organizations lag behind in DICT adoption. As DICTs become ever-more important in
daily life, it will become ever-more important for organizations to use these tools to
engage with the public in order to achieve meaningful social change. In cases where
organizations underperform their peers or opponents in the use of DICTs, understanding
the roots of this underperformance could suggest strategies for overcoming it. As I
suggested earlier, understanding that the first-mover advantage accruing to an ideological
opponent who was online early can inhibit an organization’s ability to adopt DICTs may
encourage that organization to develop strategies specifically targeted at solving this
problem. For new entrants, too, understanding the forces driving DICT adoption can help
them to adapt their own organization to better utilize these tools.
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Although this paper presents a model for helping researchers and activists
understand the process of DICT adoption, it is by no means the final word on the topic.
Instead, this project represents an important first step in building scholarly understanding
of how average, contemporary advocacy organizations adopt and deploy DICTs, and how
this process is influenced by contextual factors. Possible avenues for future research
would include extending this model to a fresh set of organizations to explore its
usefulness, as well as consideration of the potential effect that cross-national spillover has
on DICT adoption, as discussed earlier. Future researchers should consider the ways in
which the structure of the media system may influence organizations’ adoption of DICTs,
and how the particular legislative arrangements that obtain in different national contexts
influence the decisions advocacy organizations make with respect to DICTs. Further, a
study that includes organizations that do not engage in online activities would deepen and
enrich our understanding of what drives organizations to use, or not to use, such tools.
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APPENDIX ONE
Below is a tabular copy of the codebook used in the web analysis.
Variable name

Description

Values

Organization

Name of the organization

Text

ID Number

Assigned id number

Number

Nationality

Which nation the organization is primarily 1 = United States
active in
2 = United Kingdom
3 = Ireland

Conservative

Measure of ideological orientation based on 0 = not conservative
analysis of the website and associated
materials
1 = conservative

Website

URL of the relevant website

Text

Facebook

Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
has a Facebook page
1 = yes

Fb page

URL of the organization's Facebook page

Text

Likes

Number of likes the organization's
Facebook page had garnered as of March
31, 2014

Number

Post in last week

Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
had posted within a week of January 31,
2013, February 28, 2014 and March 31,
2014
1 = yes
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Post today

Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
had posted on the day immediately before
or of January 31, 2013, February 28, 2014
and March 31, 2014
1 = yes

Twitter

Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
has a Twitter feed
1 = yes

Twitter feed

URL of the organization's Twitter feed

Text

Followers

Number of followers the organization's
Number
Twitter feed had garnered as of March 31,
2014

Tweets

Number of tweets the organization had
tweeted as of March 31, 2014

Tweet in last week

Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
had tweeted within a week of January 31,
2013, February 28, 2014 and March 31,
2014
1 = yes

Tweet today

Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
had tweeted on the day immediately before
or of January 31, 2013, February 28, 2014
and March 31, 2014
1 = yes

YouTube

Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
has a YouTube channel
1 = yes

YouTube channel

URL of the organization's YouTube
channel
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Text

Subscribers

Number of subscribers the organization's
YouTube channel had garnered as of
March 31, 2014

Views

Total number of views the organizations
Number
YouTube videos had garnered as of March
31, 2014

Number

Video in last two weeks Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
had posted a video within two weeks week
of January 31, 2013, February 28, 2014 and
March 31, 2014
1 = yes
E-mail newsletter

Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
publishes a regular e-mail newsletter to
which a site visitor can subscribe
1 = yes

Take action

Measure of whether or not the
0 = no
organization's site includes a section or
button to help site visitors identify relevant
actions that they can take, such as e-mail
campaigns to participate in
1 = yes

Contact details

Measure of whether or not the site provides 0 = no
visitors with a way to contact the
organization, either through e-mail or via
the mail or a phone number
1 = yes

Blogs

Measure of whether or not the
organization's website includes blogs
produced by organization staff offering
news or opinion

0 = no

1 = yes
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Comments

Measure of whether or not the site offers
any comment facilities, either on
organizational or user-generated blogs

0 = no

1 = yes
UGC

Measure of whether or not the organization 0 = no
publishes user-generated content on its site,
in the form of blogs, vidoes, or petitions,
and excluding comment facilities
1 = yes

Forum

Measure of whether or not the site offers a 0 = no
forum in which users can engage directly
with one another and share any content or
comments of interest
1 = yes

Video

Measure of whether or not the site includes 0 = no
embedded video content, whether original
or produced by other organizations
1 = yes

Donate

Measure of whether or not the site offers a 0 = no
way for site visitors to donate money
online
1 = yes

Media section

Measure of whether or not the site includes 0 = no
a dedicated section for the press, with press
releases or other relevant content
1 = yes

Media contacts

Measure of whether or not the site includes 0 = no
contact details for a media liaison or
communications department
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1 = yes
Website sophistication A subjective measure of the website's
1 -10 scale, with a higher
relative sophistication (compared to the
number indicating greater
sites of the other organizations under study) sophistication
Website interactivity

A subjective measure of the website's
1 -10 scale, with a higher
relative interactivity (compared to the sites number indicating greater
of the other organizations under study)
sophistication

Cookies

Number of cookies inserted into my
browser by the site homepage

Number

Third-party cookies

Measure of whether or not the site uses
third-party cookies

0 = no

1 = yes
Notes

Personal notes on the website
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Text

APPENDIX TWO
Below is a copy of the organizational survey I fielded between January 2014 and March
2014. It included a consent form, as shown.
Consent Form

University of Pennsylvania
Informed Consent Form
Project: Collective action and digital information communication technologies: The
search for explanatory models of social movements’ use of DICTs to mobilize,
organize, and achieve political goals through collective action
Principal Investigator:
Michael X. Delli Carpini, Dean
Annenberg School for Communication
3620 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA, 19104
mxd@asc.upenn.edu
Investigator:
Felicity Duncan, PhD Candidate
Annenberg School for Communication
3620 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA, 19104
fduncan@asc.upenn.edu
You are being asked to take part in a study about the role that digital information
communication technologies play in your organization. We are interested in learning how
you use such tools, and what factors lead you to use certain tools and not others.
Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any
question and to stop the survey at any time or for any reason. No personal information
will be collected, and every effort will be made to keep your responses anonymous. All
the data collected will be stored in a secure workspace until this project is completed in
August 2014. All data will then be deleted.
The risks of participating in this study are minimal. You will not be asked for any
confidential or sensitive information. You may contact the Office of Regulatory Affairs
with any question, concerns or complaints at the University of Pennsylvania by calling
+1 215 898 2614. You can also contact the principal investigator with any questions.
I hereby acknowledge that I have read the above consent form.
Organizational Data
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What is the name of your organization?
Do have permanent offices?
Yes
No
We did previously, but do not any longer
Do you employ any full-time staff members?
Yes
No
Sometimes, but not currently
We'd like to ask you some questions about your staff. You may not be certain about the
answers to some of these questions. However, the intention of these questions is simply
to get a general sense of the kinds of people your organization employs. If you do not the
exact answer, simply offer your best estimate.
How many full-time staff members do you typically employ?
1-5
6-10
11-20
More than 21
What age category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's typical
staff member? (Maximum 3)
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Over 65
What education category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's
typical staff member? (Maximum 3)
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Less than High School
High School / GED
Some College
2-year College Degree
4-year College Degree
Masters Degree
Doctoral Degree
Professional Degree (JD, MD)
In your estimation, what is the typical salary paid to your organization's typical staff
member? (Maximum 3)
Less than $30,000
$30,000 – $39,999
$40,000 – $49,999
$50,000 – $59,999
$60,000 – $69,999
$70,000 – $79,999
$80,000 – $89,999
$90,000 – $99,999
$100,000 or more
What are some words you would use to describe your organization's typical staff
member? For example, you might describe them as traditional, or innovative, or
cosmopolitan, or hard-working.
Membership data
You will now be asked some questions about your typical members. Again, it is not
necessary to be certain that your answer is correct. Instead, the goal of these questions is
to get a sense of how your organization visualizes its members.
Some organizations consider individuals to be members if they pay dues, and some
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organizations consider individuals to be members if they subscribe to organizational
communications, while others have yet another definition of membership. Does your
organization have members, however you define them?
Yes
No
I'm not certain
How do you define "members" in your organization?
How many members do you estimate you have?
What age category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's typical
member? (Maximum 3)
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Over 65
What education category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's
typical member? (Maximum 3)
Less than High School
High School / GED
Some College
2-year College Degree
4-year College Degree
Masters Degree
Doctoral Degree
Professional Degree (JD, MD)
What household income categories/categories do you think best describe/s your
organization's typical member? (Maximum 3)
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Less than $30,000
$30,000 – $39,999
$40,000 – $49,999
$50,000 – $59,999
$60,000 – $69,999
$70,000 – $79,999
$80,000 – $89,999
$90,000 – $99,999
$100,000 or more
Which of the following communication methods do you use to stay in touch with your
members?
Use frequently

Use infrequently

Never use

E-mail/E-newsletter
Organizational
website
YouTube
Twitter
Facebook
Other social media
Automated phone
calls
Postal mail
Other
What are some words you would use to describe your typical member? For example, you
might describe them as urban, or suburban, or traditional, or modern.
Many organizations collect some basic information about their members, such as their email addresses, age, and other information. Do you gather any data on your members?
Yes
No
I'm not sure
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What types of data do you typically gather?
Target public
In addition to members, many advocacy organizations have a target public, a broader
group of people that they seek to influence or inspire. The next few questions are about
your organization's target public. Once again, you should answer to the best of your
knowledge, even if you are not entirely certain that your answer is correct.
What age category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's target
public? (Maximum 3)
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Over 65
What education category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's
target public? (Maximum 3)
Less than High School
High School / GED
Some College
2-year College Degree
4-year College Degree
Masters Degree
Doctoral Degree
Professional Degree (JD, MD)
In your estimation, what is the average household income/s of your organization's target
public? (Maximum 3)
Less than $30,000
$30,000 – $39,999
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$40,000 – $49,999
$50,000 – $59,999
$60,000 – $69,999
$70,000 – $79,999
$80,000 – $89,999
$90,000 – $99,999
$100,000 or more
Which of the following communication methods do you use to communicate with your
target public?
Use frequently

Use infrequently

Never use

E-mail/E-newsletter
Organizational
website
YouTube
Twitter
Facebook
Other social media
Automated phone
calls
Postal mail
Other
What are some words you would use to describe your organization's target public? For
example, you might describe them as traditional, or innovative, or cosmopolitan, or hardworking.
Many organizations use technological means to help them understand their target public
better. For example, many organizations use cookies or other browser-based technologies
to collect information about visitors to their sites. Does your organization use
technologies like cookies to collect information about visitors to your site?
Yes
No
I'm not certain
What technologies does your organization use to collect information about visitors to its
site?
Some organizations have started to use information that they (or another company) have
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gathered from people's online activities to try and reach people with relevant messages
about their goals. To your knowledge, does your organization do this?
Yes
No
I'm not certain
To the best of your knowledge, how does your organization use information about
people's online activities to reach those people?
External relations
The next set of questions deals with your organization's relations with other organizations
and institutions that can help them achieve their goals.
Do you frequently interact with other organizations that are also active on issues related
to LGBTQ issues?
Yes
No
I'm not certain
Please list some of the other organizations you interact with.
Does your organization send representatives to any networking conferences or events that
help to foster and develop relations with other organizations?
Yes
No
Which of the following communication methods do you use to communicate with other
organizations?
Use frequently

Use infrequently

E-mail/E-newsletter
Organizational
website
YouTube
Twitter
Facebook
Other social media
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Never use

Automated phone
calls
Postal mail
Other
Do you ever communicate with journalists?
Yes
No
I'm not certain
Which of the following communication methods do you use to communicate with
journalists?
Use frequently

Use infrequently

Never use

E-mail/E-newsletter
Organizational
website
YouTube
Twitter
Facebook
Other social media
Postal mail
Phone calls
Face-to-face
meetings
Other
Online communities
These final questions address the issue of online communities. Many organizations
engaged in advocacy have online supporters who use the Internet to share information,
discuss important issues, and build relationships. The following questions will ask about
your organization's online presence and the online activities of people who support you.
They will also ask you about organizations that oppose your goals and the people that
support them, and their online activities.
How strong do you think your organization's online presence is?
Very strong
Somewhat strong
About average
Somewhat weak
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Very weak
How would you say that your organization's web presence has changed in the last two
years?
Improved a lot
Improved a little
Stayed about the same
Become a little worse
Become a lot worse
How strong do you think the online community of people who support you is? A strong
community might, for example, have an active online presence, perhaps in the form of
active forum discussion groups, or popular Facebook pages that are used for discussion
and networking.
Very strong
Somewhat strong
About average
Somewhat weak
Very weak
How would you say that your organization's supporters' online community has changed
in the last two years?
Grown a lot
Grown a little
Stayed about the same
Shrunk a little
Shrunk a lot
How strong do you think the online presence of organizations that oppose you and
advocate against your goals, is?
Very strong
Somewhat strong
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About average
Somewhat weak
Very weak
How would you say that web presence of organizations that oppose you has changed in
the last two years?
Improved a lot
Improved a little
Stayed about the same
Become a little worse
Become a lot worse
How strong do you think the online community of people who oppose you is? A strong
online community might, for example, have an active online presence, perhaps in the
form of active forum discussion groups, or popular Facebook pages that are used for
discussion and networking.
Very strong
Somewhat strong
About average
Somewhat weak
Very weak
How would you say that the online community of people who oppose has changed in the
last two years?
Grown a lot
Grown a little
Stayed about the same
Shrunk a little worse
Shrunk a lot worse
Have you or your supporters ever faced online harassment or trolling from people who
disagree with your positions?
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Yes
No
I'm not certain
This concludes the survey. Thank you very much for your participation. If there are any
additional points you would like to make, or any other information you would like to
share, please do so in the space below.
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APPENDIX THREE

University of Pennsylvania
Informed Consent Form
Project: Collective action and digital information communication technologies: The
search for explanatory models of social movements’ use of DICTs to mobilize,
organize, and achieve political goals through collective action
Principal Investigator:
Michael X. Delli Carpini, Dean
Annenberg School for Communication
3620 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA, 19104
mxd@asc.upenn.edu
Investigator:
Felicity Duncan, PhD Candidate
Annenberg School for Communication
3620 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA, 19104
fduncan@asc.upenn.edu
You are being asked to take part in a study about the role that digital information
communication technologies play in your organization. I am interested in learning how
you use such tools, and what factors lead you to use certain tools and not others.
This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question and to stop the
interview at any time or for any reason. Unless you grant me permission to use your
name or title in any publications that may result from this research, the information you
tell me will remain anonymous.
I would like to record this interview on a digital voice recorder for my personal reference.
I will not record the interview without your permission. If you do grant permission for
this conversation to be recorded, you have the right to revoke recording permission
and/or end the interview at any time. This project will be completed by October 2014. All
interview recordings and transcriptions of those recordings will be stored in a secure
workspace until October 2014. The recordings and transcripts will then be deleted.
The risks of participating in this study are minimal. You will not be asked for any
confidential or sensitive information. You may contact the Office of Regulatory Affairs
with any question, concerns or complaints at the University of Pennsylvania by calling
+1 215 898 2614.
You can also contact the principal investigator with any questions.
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Participant
Name:___________________________________________________________
Participant
Signature_________________________________________________________
Date:___________________________________________________________________
___
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